The “Montreux Document” contains approximately 70 recommendations, including proposed procedures for screening personnel, correct prosecution when breaches of conduct occur, and personnel training on international human rights and humanitarian law. It is, in truth, a non-binding and non-legal document, as no signatory can be sanctioned for failing to implement these recommendations in domestic law or practice. Yet, in the decade since the “Montreux Document” was produced, only 54 countries have signed and ratified, including 23 of the European Union’s 28 member states and the US. Interestingly, many countries which have recently employed, or are currently employing, large numbers of PMCs have still neglected to sign the “Montreux Document”, including Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia.
The 53 Participating states of the Montreux Document.
This seems to suggest an ongoing lack of awareness within the international community about the destabilizing effect PMCs can have in conflict areas when accountability and a strict code of conduct are absent. In some cases, this destabilizing effect is understood and used to pursue perceived geopolitical objectives, as in the case of Iran employing PMCs in Syria. Some might argue that governments have abstained from the “Montreux Document” out of a belief that the private security industry should self-regulate, especially given the international nature of some of these companies and their operations. To that end, in 2013, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC PSSP) was developed, again through the leadership of the Swiss government. But only seven countries (Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the US), 24 civil society organizations, and 91 companies have signed on to this document, which is also non-binding and non-legal.
The ICoC PSSP goes some way toward plugging the gaps, with the 91 PMCs complying with this code hailing from 32 different countries, some of which have not yet ratified the aforementioned “Montreux Document”, such as Ghana and Colombia. The bulk of the PMCs party to the ICoC PSSP are based in the countries described in the table below.
Number of PMCs
United Kingdom (16), United States (15)
Cyprus (7), Pakistan (6)
China (4), France (4), Iraq (3), Singapore (3), Somalia (3)
A relatively easy way to ensure more widespread compliance with the recommendations outlined in the ICoC PSSP would be for countries which have signed the “Montreux Document” to also sign the code of conduct, with their national contact points then pressuring PMCs that have abstained from the ICoC to sign on as well. This “naming and shaming” certainly could not force full compliance from all PMCs, but it would certainly expand the scope of the code of conduct to include more actors within the private security industry. If this scope is then sufficiently expanded, it may well lead to international legal bodies viewing the provisions under the code of conduct as jus cogens, fundamental principles of law that can be applied to the conduct of even those PMCs which are not party to the ICoC PSSp. As only 7 of the 54 state parties to the “Montreux Document” have also signed the ICoC, there is considerable room for this growth in scope.
It is important that this power – to name and shame PMCs which do not comply with minimum standards of conduct – be fully utilized. In the past, intergovernmental organizations, aids groups, and other actors in conflict areas have exhibited a reluctance to do so. One recent comprehensive study by American University researchers on the implementation of the “Montreux Document” found several cases in which PMCs clearly breached minimum standards of conflict but were not “named and shamed”, such as an incident in July 2010, when private security personnel opened fire on the road from Baghdad International Airport, killing one Iraqi civilian, but the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) declined to specify which company had been involved in the incident. While this initial reluctance to name the company could be attributed to operational security needs – in particular, personnel from that company could find themselves targeted for reprisal by armed groups – the lack of transparency about the incident in years after the incident suggests a lack of appreciation for the corrective power “naming and shaming” can have for a specific company and for the broader private security industry.
In any case, that only 54 countries have signed the “Montreux Document” ten years on is hardly encouraging. A renewed effort to establish standards of behaviour for private military contractors operating in areas of armed conflict is needed, especially as the outsourcing of military operations to private contractors continues and commercial shipping comes under increased threat from piracy in the waterways of Southeast Asia, West Africa, and beyond. With that in mind, the Maritime Working Group of the forum for participants of the “Montreux Document” had its first meeting on the use of private military and security companies in maritime security on January 30, 2018.
• • •
What does the “Montreux Document”?
The “Montreux Document” …
recalls the pertinent international legal obligations of States, private military and security companies (PMSCs) and their personnel in situations of armed conflict;
contains a compilation of good practices designed to help States take national measures to implement their obligations;
highlights the responsibilities of three types of States: Contracting States (countries that hire PMSCs), Territorial States (countries on whose territory PMSCs operate) and Home States (countries in which PMSCs are based);
makes it clear that States have an obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and to uphold human rights law; as a result, they have a duty to take measures designed to prevent misconduct by PMSCs and ensure accountability for criminal behaviour;
recalls that PMSCs and their personnel are bound by international humanitarian law and must respect its provisions at all times during armed conflict, regardless of their status;
recalls that misconduct on the part of PMSCs and their personnel can trigger responsibility on two levels: first, the criminal responsibility of the perpetrators and their superiors, and second, the responsibility of the State that gave instructions for, directed or controlled the misconduct;
provides a toolkit for governments to establish effective oversight and control over PMSCs, for example through contracts or licensing/authorization systems.
The “Montreux Document” is useful because it enhances the protection afforded to people affected by armed conflicts. It does so by clarifying and reaffirming international law, by encouraging the adoption of national regulations on PMSCs designed to strengthen respect for international law, and by offering guidance on how and in what light this should be done, based on lessons learnt. The conduct of parties to an armed conflict is regulated by international humanitarian law. Another branch of international law – human rights law – also provides protection in armed conflicts. Most of the rules (expressed as statements) and good practices assembled in the “Montreux Document” derive from international humanitarian law and human rights law. Other branches of international law, such as the law of State responsibility and international criminal law, also serve as a basis.
by Asiri Fernando. He is currently reading for a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and Politics, Security and Counter Terrorism Studies at Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia. He has completed an internship at the Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka (INSSSL) as a research assistant and holds a diploma in International Relations from the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS) in Colombo. He has served as a news editor for the Sri Lankan Air Force Command Media Unit during 2009/10.
One of the UAVs is displayed upside-down to show its IEDs mounted on rails.
Up to 13 drones were used for these two attacks making it an unprecedented use of drone airpower by a non-state actor. The drones were guided by using GPS and could have been launched from up to 100 km away. Apparently, seven of these drones were destroyed by Pantsyr-S short-range air defence systems and the other six were intercepted by electronic warfare units. The Russian Ministry of Defence denied any own losses or damages due to the incident. Two recovered samples were displayed at a press briefing in January 11.
According to a statement of the Russian Ministry of Defence the “[e]ngineering solutions used by terrorists when attacking Russian facilities in Syria could have been received only from a country with high technological potential on providing satellite navigation and distant control of firing competently assembled self-made explosive devices in appointed place” (“UAV attack causes no damage to Russian military facilities in Syria“, TASS, 8 January 2018). Major General Aleksandr Novikov, the head of the Russian military’s UAV development and construction department highlighted that the drones carried each ten 400g improvised explosive devices (IED) with fragmentations (small metal balls). Apparently, Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) was used as explosive basis in the IEDs, which is produces “by a number of countries, including Ukraine at the Shostkinsky Chemical Plant”.
An attack south of Tal Afar in north-western Iraq carried out by an Air-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (ABIED) launched from a drone in February 2017.
Russians finger-pointing could be interpreted as a sign of the growing tensions between the USA and Russia. Both Russia and the USA support, supply and train different fractions waging war in Syria. However, contrary to claim by the Russian Ministry of defence on the satellite navigation and distant control of firing technology, the necessary technological solutions have been available in the civilian market for many years and PETN was used by terrorist groups several times before (for example in the 1980 Paris synagogue bombing, the 2001 shoe bomb attempt and it was used in 2009 by the “Underwear Bomber“). According to Samuel Bendett, a researcher specializing in unmanned systems at the Center for Naval Analyses, “[i]t’s very likely that such parts were most likely acquired commercially, in which case we are entering a dangerous terra incognita with respect to unsanctioned UAV use by non-state and terrorist organizations.” The use of drones by insurgents and terrorists is a growing trend in the Iraq-Syria conflict zone during the past few years; it is a showcase of what is possible with existing and emerging technologies.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and other groups such as Hezbollah and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham have been known to use drones for their activities in the past and continue to do so today. Non-state actors have mostly used drones for reconnaissance, fire correction and to strike ground targets with small munitions or IEDs. The use of drones offers insurgents and terrorists unprecedented tactical advantages to coordinate attacks and gather intelligence, especially in urban environments. Further, imagery captured by drones make valuable propaganda material for groups like ISIS, who rely heavily on online visual content for recruitment. The proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) technologies, ease of access to commercially available components, availability of commercial drones and recreational crafts is viewed as a concern by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre. The number of Airborne Improvised Explosive Devices (ABIEDs) has been increasing since the start of the Syrian war, and ABIEDs have been used in Iraq as well.
Recovered ABIED’s used in the Khmeimim Air Base attack.
ISIS is believed to be the most prolific user of drones up to now. Although insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and Syria have used fixed-wing drones from time to time in the past few years, most of the used drones have been commercial quadcopters, most of which are small enough to be carried and used by one individual. The possibility to purchase them online at a low cost makes them an ideal choice. The quadcopter configuration offers a stable slow and low altitude platform and comes with easy to master controls, real-time video downlink and simple navigation systems. Furthermore its ability to hover over a target offers relatively good accuracy. For aerial attack, quadcopters are often used with small ABIEDs. The most frequently ones have been made of 30 mm or 40 mm grenade launcher ammunition with an improvised tail-fin assembly (Nick Waters, “Death From Above: The Drone Bombs of the Caliphate“, Bellingcat, 10.02.2017). ISIS is also known to have designed and manufactured in numbers, several types of ABIEDs, projectile bombs and related fuses in Syria (“Islamic State’s Multi-Role IEDs: Projected Grenades Used as Air-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (ABIEDs)“, Conflict Armament Research, April 2017).
However, according to military analyst Nick Waters, the ABIEDs recovered after the Khmeimim attack may be specifically built for a drone-borne attack (see his Tweet below). The downed drones displayed by the Russian Ministry of Defence indicate that they were purpose built. Designed in a conventional aircraft (fixed–wing) configuration and powered by a small diesel engine, it is clear that these drones were designed to have greater range and higher payload capacity. These facts indicate that the Khmeimim Air Force Base attack was a progression in the tactics of drone-borne ABIED-use by a non-state actor. Further, the use of commonly available “off the shelf” components make it difficult to track its origins and builders, adding a layer of deniability to the drone user.
More pictures released by the Russian MoD of the mysterious Khmeimim drones.
Note the construction of the bomblet too. These were custom made for drones, rather than modifying an existing munition. https://t.co/4sMfYTbRrc
There have been reports of drones and ABIEDs being used in the ongoing civil wars in Yemen and Libya. In December 2017, the US have used a recovered drone amongst other exhibits as evidence for alleged Iranian state sponsoring of Yemeni rebel and terrorist groups. Laura Seal, a US Defence Department Spokesperson, referred to the Qasef-1, an ABIED “kamikaze-style” drone, which had been recovered from Houthi groups by the Saudi Forces. Seal claimed that “[o]nly Iran makes the Qasef-1. It is a member of the Ababil UAV family, designed and produced by the Iranian government.” Due to such claims, it is prudent to expect that more sophisticated UAS technology and more advanced types of drones may be fielded by non–state actors in the future. Drones such as the Qasef-1, give non-state actors a degree of stand-off range precision strike capabilities which were previously only available to government forces.
Captured Qasef-1 Kamikaze style drone, on exhibit by the US Department of Defense.
Off the battlefield, drone-borne threats to critical infrastructure, aviation and soft targets are a significant security concern, too (Asiri Fernando, “Unlawful Use of Civilian Drones in Sri Lanka: A Security Concern?“, Institute of National Security Studies of Sri Lanka, 29.07.2017). Between early October and late November 2014, drones breaching the restricted airspace over 13 of France’s 19 nuclear power plants caused the French authorities to introduce several measures to counter illegal drone intrusions over critical infrastructure and defence related sites. In 2015, a drone carrying radioactive sand landed on the Japanese Prime Minister’s residence. Police later arrested a man who had intended to protest against Japan’s Nuclear energy policies with the drone landing (“Japan Radioactive Drone: Tokyo Police Arrest Man“, BBC News, 25.04.2015). Such acts demonstrate that Drones or UASs can be used to deliver small chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear payloads.
In February 2017, the US Department of Homeland Securityreleased a document on critical infrastructure security where it notes that drones can be a significant threat to national security and that the potential for drone use in an attack is on the rise. Utility services networks such as the national power grid, water distribution systems and filtration plants, telecommunication networks, ports and oil refineries are key to maintain the economy running smoothly and are vulnerable on drone attacks. Therefore, it is important that security policymakers pay attention to the evolving threat landscape, especially in relation to critical infrastructure protection.
Die Anstrengungen, welche das langfristige Schicksal des Iraks beeinflussen werden, beginnen erst jetzt. Der IS forderte unter der irakischen Bevölkerung seit 2014 mehr als 68’000 Todesopfer und das fehlende Vertrauen unter den einzelnen Bevölkerungsgruppen ist noch lange nicht wieder hergestellt. Zusätzlich zu den Flüchtlingen aus Syrien hatte der Irak bis zum Ende der erfolgreichen Bekämpfung des IS über 5 Millionen Binnenflüchtlinge, wovon schätzungsweise die Hälfte wieder in ihre Häuser zurückkehren konnten. Der Wiederaufbau wird nach irakischen Schätzungen mehr als 88 Milliarden U.S.-Dollar kosten und noch mehrere Jahre andauern. Al-Abadi unterstrich deshalb auch, dass der Irak nun weitreichende politische Reformen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung erzielen müsse, welche allen ethnischen Gruppierungen zugute kommen müssten.
Das Problem des richtigen Sprachgebrauchs
Nicht nur das Beispiel Iraks zeigt auf, dass mit dem militärischen Erfolg gegen den IS dessen Form des Dschihadismus noch lange nicht besiegt ist. Es geht vielmehr um einen vielfältigen und komplexen Kampf der Ideologien. Das beginnt bereits beim richtigen Sprachgebrauch und bei der Deutung der Begriffe. So erklärte der nationale Sicherheitsberater des nigerianischen Präsidenten, General Babagana Monguno, dass für die überwiegende Mehrheit der Muslime die Begriffe “Dschihad” und “Kalifat” nichts mit Terrorismus, Extremismus und Zerstörung gemeinsam hätten. Vielmehr würden es Konzepte darstellen, die nicht gegen andere Staaten und Kulturen, sondern gegen die Tyrannei gerichtet seien. Deshalb sei darauf zu achten, dass diese Begriffe nicht mit einer negativen Konnotation versehen würden.
Auch der Stabschef der pakistanischen Streitkräfte, General Qamar Javed Bajwa vertrat diese Meinung in einer einführenden Ansprache an der MSC 2018. Ein bewaffneter Dschihad sei eigentlich ausschliesslich einer Staatsmacht vorbehalten. Dieser Grundsatz sei jedoch beim Kampf gegen den sowjetischen Einmarsch in Afghanistan 1979 aufgeweicht worden. Auf der Seite der westlichen Staaten unterstützte damals Pakistan die Mudschahedin. In Schulen wurden mit gewaltverherrlichenden Lehrbüchern und aus dem Zusammenhang gerissenen Koranversen Kinder radikalisiert. Die USA unterstützten diese Indoktrinierung in Afghanistan mit mehreren Millionen U.S.-Dollar. Dadurch wurde auch die Meinung verbreitet, dass der bewaffnete Dschihad zu Verteidigungszwecken auch für nichtstaatliche Akteure legitim sei. Später diente diese Indoktrinierung den terroristischen Gruppierungen als Basis zur weiteren missbräuchlichen Instrumentalisierung des Konzepts des Dschihads. Bis heute versuchen auf dieser Basis terroristische Gruppierungen in Pakistan die Bevölkerung zu radikalisieren — zum Teil mit Erfolg, denn gemäss Bajwa fühlten sich viele Muslime verletzt oder missverstanden.
Pakistan habe seine Lektion schmerzlich lernen müssen — man ernte nun, was vor 40 Jahren gesäht wurde. Um den Extremismus in Pakistan zu bekämpfen, sei es deshalb wichtig, die Dinge korrekt beim Namen zu nennen: Beim gewalttätigen Extremismus handle es sich nicht um Dschihadismus, sondern um blanken Terrorismus. Informationskampagnen an Schulen mit dem Ziel falsche Interpretationen des Korans zu korrigieren, würden für Pakistan seit letztem Jahr eine wichtige Massnahme im Kampf gegen den Extremismus darstellen. Eine im letzten Jahr ausgesprochene Fatwa untersage beispielsweise Selbstmordanschläge und gesetzliche Regelungen würden jegliche Form von Extremismus unter Strafe stellen.
Der Verbleib der IS-Kämpfer
Die Frage nach dem Verbleib der IS-Kämpfer nach dem Fall ihres Kalifats ist von höchster Bedeutung. Gemäss einer Studie des Soufan Center vom letzten Oktober sind etwas mehr als ein Achtel bzw. 5’600 der ursprünglich mehr als 40’000 ausländischen IS-Kämpfern in ihre Ursprungsländer zurückgekehrt (siehe Graphik oben). Gemäss einem Bericht des von der EU finanzierten Radicalisation Awareness Networks sollen bis im Juli 2017 von den rund 5’000 europäischen Dschihad-Reisenden rund 30% wieder in ihre Ursprungsländer zurückgekehrt sein. Die danach zunehmend erfolgreiche Bekämpfung des IS führte jedoch gemäss dem bis im März 2018 noch amtierende deutsche Innenminister Thomas de Maizière zu keiner signifikanten Rückreisewelle von ehemaligen IS-Kämpfer bzw. zu deren geografische Verlagerung in andere Konfliktgebiete. Der britische EU-Kommissar für die Sicherheitsunion, Sir Julian King erklärte, dass die Rückreisewelle der europäischen IS-Kämpfer bereits zu einem Zeitpunkt erfolgte, als der IS zunehmend Gebietsverluste einstecken musste. Es handelte sich dabei primär um desillusionierte bzw. wenig motivierte Kämpfer. Die bis zum kompletten Zusammenbruch des IS in der Region Verbliebenen, würden vermutlich zu den motivierteren Kämpfern gehören, welche entweder getötet wurden, oder sich auch jetzt noch in der Region aufhalten bzw. sich in andere Konfliktgebiete verlagern würden.
Mit der erfolgreichen Bekämpfung ist die Attraktivität des IS für potentielle Kämpfer aus westlichen Staaten spürbar gefallen. Doch am Nahen Osten benachbarte Konfliktgebiete und Staaten mit Ablegern des IS oder der Al-Qaida werden zukünftig mit sich verschiebenden motivierten ehemaligen IS-Kämpfern konfrontiert sein. General Qamar Javed Bajwa sagte beispielsweise, dass mehrere Nachrichtendienste bestätigt hätten, dass der erfolgreiche Kampf gegen den IS im Nahen Osten zu einer Verschiebung der IS-Kämpfer nach Afghanistan bewirkt hätte. Dies werde natürlich auch die Sicherheitslage in Pakistan beeinflussen, denn der grenzüberschreitende Terrorismus aus Afghanistan stelle für Pakistan nach wie vor ein grosses Problem dar. Zwar hätten die pakistanischen Streitkräfte Fortschritte im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus erzielt, und es gäbe keine terroristischen Camps auf pakistanischem Territorium, doch die 2,7 Millionen afghanischen Flüchtlinge in Pakistan würden insbesondere vom Haqqani-Netzwerk zur Anwerbung neuer Kämpfer missbraucht. Deshalb habe die pakistanische Regierung ein Interesse daran, mittel- bis langfristig diese Flüchtlinge wieder nach Afghanistan zurückzuführen. Gleichzeitig würden Schritte unternommen, um die afghanisch-pakistanische Grenze besser zu sichern, darunter auch die Befestigung eines 2’300 km langen Grenzabschnittes. Zwar konnte sich der IS bis jetzt nicht in Pakistan etablieren, doch für Afghanistan bleibe diese Gefahr bestehen. Um dies zu verhindern sei zukünftig eine noch stärkere internationale Zusammenarbeit wichtig. Die Befriedung Afghanistans sei entscheidend im Kampf gegen den grenzüberschreitenden Terrorismus. Deshalb unterstütze Pakistan den U.S.-amerikanischen Ansatz in der Region voll und ganz. Man dürfe sich jedoch keine Illusionen machen, der Kampf gegen den Extremismus werde noch lange andauern. Für den Erfolg sei ein ideologisches Gegenkonzept notwendig — in diesem Bereich sei noch Aufholbedarf. Darüberhinaus versuche Pakistan die verschiedenen Konfliktparteien zusammenzubringen und so eine Aussöhnung zu erreichen.
Eine falsche Ideologies muss bekämpft…
Der Direktor der nationalen Nachrichtendienste in den USA, Dan Coats erinnerte an die Erfahrungen bei der Bekämpfung des IS in den südlichen Philippinen. Hier habe die Vernichtung des IS-Rumpfes dazu geführt, dass Teile davon sich wie Fangarme weiter verbreitet, und sich in anderen Gebieten festgesetzt hätten. Diese Beobachtungen wurden auch in Indonesien, Malaysia und in anderen ostasiatischen Staaten gemacht. Al-Qaida, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab und andere lokale terroristische Gruppierungen würden die Niederlage des IS nicht primär als Schlag gegen ihre eigenen Organisationen auffassen, sondern als Chance eine tragende Rolle spielen zu können. Die Herausforderung bestehe also nicht nur darin den IS militärisch zu vernichten, sondern der Ideologie dahinter erfolgreich zu begegnen. Der IS sei auch eine pervertierte theologische Interpretation des Korans. Es sei deshalb notwendig, dass die muslimische Gemeinschaft von sich aus klar auf diese falsche Interpretation hinweise. Wegen der fehlenden Reputation könne diese Aufgabe nicht von anderen Religionsgemeinschaften übernommen werden. Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus gleiche stark dem ideologischen Kampf gegen den Kommunismus in den 1980er-Jahren: Auch hier habe schliesslich die Bevölkerung in den betroffenen Staaten den Ausschlag gegeben — sie hätten von der kommunistischen Ideologie genug gehabt, und sich schliesslich dagegen gewehrt. Die Einschätzung der U.S.-Nachrichtendienste sei deshalb, dass der IS eine langfristige weltweite Bedrohung bleiben werde.
Der ägyptische Aussenminister Sameh Hassan Shoukry teilte die Ansicht von Coats, dass primär die muslimische Gemeinschaft auf die Pervertierung des Korans durch extremistische Ideologien hinweisen müsste, und dass dies nicht anderen religiösen Gemeinschaften überlassen werden könne. So wie die terroristischen Gruppierungen die sozialen Medien für die Verbreitung falscher Ideologien benutzen würden, müssten diese Kanäle noch stärker im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus genutzt werden, um die richtigen Botschaften bei den Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen zu platzieren. Shoukry erinnerte jedoch auch daran, dass es beim Kampf gegen den Terrorismus nicht nur um den IS gehen würde, sondern dass eine Vielzahl von verschiedenen Gruppierungen auf einer gleichen oder sehr ähnlichen ideologischen Welle mitreiten würden. Der IS sei dahingehend etwas Besonderes, weil er als Einziger die Ausrufung und die Etablierung eines Kalifats zum Ziel hatte. Auch wenn das bei den anderen terroristischen Gruppierungen nicht oder noch nicht der Fall sei, so gehe es ihnen primär ebenfalls um die Erreichung politischer Ziele. Dies sei womöglich auch der Grund, weshalb gewisse dieser Gruppierungen von einigen Staaten finanziert würden. Bezüglich Ägypten sei der Kampf gegen den Extremismus noch lange nicht vorbei, im Gegenteil seien einige ägyptische Bürger seit 2011 von Terroristen eingelullt und zu kriminellen Aktivitäten verführt worden. Doch mit der folgenschwersten Attacke islamistischer Terroristen in Ägypten im letzten November auf eine Mosche im Sinai, was zu über 300 Todesopfer führte, sei dem ägyptischen Volk schmerzvoll aufgezeigt worden, dass eine solche fehlgeleitete Ideologie nicht hinnehmbar sei. Momentan würden die ägyptischen Streitkräfte eine grossangelegte, langfristige Kampagne durchführen, um den Terrorismus im Sinai zu einem Ende zu bringen. Allein anfangs Februar seien mehr als 50 Waffenverstecke ausgehoben worden, an zwei Orten seien total 1’500 kg C4-Sprengstoff, eine hohe zusätzliche Menge TNT, 56 Zünder und 13 Schaltkreise zur Herstellung von IEDs sichergestellt worden (siehe auch “Statement No. 7 of the General Command of the Armed Forces on the Comprehensive Operation ‘Sinai 2018’“, Ministry of Defense – Egyptian Armed Forces, 14.02.2018).
Soldaten der ägyptischen Streitkräfte während einer Operation gegen Terroristen auf der Sinai-Halbinsel Mitte Februar 2018.
…und die wirtschaftlichen sowie sozialen Bedingungen der Bevölkerung verbessert werden!
Der tunesisch Aussenminister Khémaies Jhinaoui ist überzeugt, dass die IS-Kämpfer aus dem Nahen Osten früher oder später unter einer neuen Adresse — beispielsweise in Libyen oder in der sub-Sahara — wieder auftauchen würden. Um langfristig den Krieg gegen den Terrorismus zu gewinnen, müssten drei Punkte angegangen werden: Die falsche Ideologie muss bekämpft, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und die internationale Kooperation gefördert werden. Für Tunesien hiese dies beispielsweise, dass der Bildungssektor reformiert und gestärkt, sowie die Toleranz gefördert werden müssten. Der Wohlstand müsse nicht nur lokal, sondern global erhöht werden, denn wo es grosse Wohlstandsgefälle gäbe, da entstehe auch Terrorismus (siehe auch “The future of rising aspirations“, offiziere.ch, 15.04.2018). Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus sei im Interesse aller Staaten; deshalb würde sich Tunesien eine noch intensivere Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Staaten wünschen. Tunesien stelle eine junge, laizistische Demokratie dar, was den islamistischen Terroristen ein Dorn im Auge sei. Leider zeige sich, dass Tunesien über Jahre hinweg viel zu wenig in seine Streitkräfte investiert hätte, um Bedrohungen aus der eigenen Bevölkerung anzugehen. Hier seien Korrekturen vorgenommen worden, doch dazu benötige Tunesien die Unterstützung anderer Staaten. Sollte das tunesische Modell erfolgreich sein, dann wäre dies schliesslich zum Vorteil für die ganze Region.
Nicht nur Ägypten und Tunesien müssen sich der Herausforderung des grenzüberschreitenden Terrorismus stellen — das Problem betrifft insbesondere die Sahel-Region. Gemäss Jim Yong Kim, dem Präsidenten der Weltbank, gäbe es weltweit keine zweite Region, wo die Weltbank mit so hohen Herausforderungen im Kampf gegen die Armut konfrontiert sei. Die Hälfte der 150 Millionen Einwohner würden in extremer Armut leben und die Klimaerwärmung erhöhe bereits heute die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Dürre und Überflutungen. In der südlichen Sahel-Region seien mehr als 30 Millionen Menschen der Gewalt der Boko Haram ausgesetzt. Im letzten Dezember seien 5,3 Millionen Menschen auf der Flucht gewesen, inklusive 1 Million Flüchtlinge von anderen Regionen, die nach Europa gelangen wollten, jedoch das Mittelmeer nicht überwinden konnten. Seit der französischen Intervention in Mali seien mehr als 11’000 UN-Soldaten in der Region im Einsatz gewesen, wovon 150 getötet wurden. Die Sahel-Region sei ein Beispiel dafür, dass für einen langfristigen Erfolg im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus Sicherheit und Entwicklung Hand in Hand gehen müssten — leider würden bis dato effektive Konzepte dafür fehlen.
Die Bevölkerung als Alliierte der staatlichen Sicherheitskräfte gewinnen
Die Sahel-Region sei seit gut hundert Jahren noch nie stabil gewesen, bemerkte der malischen Aussenministers Tiéman Coulibaly. Durch ein Bildungssystem, das nie wirklich funktioniert habe, und einer nur schwer zu überwindenden Armut sei die Bevölkerung in der Sahel-Region sehr anfällig für extreme Ideologien. Die Vorgänge in Libyen, Syrien und im Irak bzw. im Nahen Osten im Allgemeinen hätten einen direkten Einfluss auf die Sicherheit und Stabilität in dieser Region. Sicherheit und Stabilität könne nur mit der Bevölkerung als Alliierte der staatlichen Sicherheitskräfte erreicht werden. Dies sei jedoch nur dann möglich, wenn die Erwartungen der Bevölkerung an die staatlichen Institutionen und Sicherheitskräfte erfüllt würden. Diese Erwartungen seien jedoch nicht nur sicherheitstechnischer Natur, sondern würden beispielsweise auch die Versorgung mit Wasser, Güter usw. umfassen. Militärische, ökonomische und soziale Massnahmen müssten dementsprechend Hand in Hand gehen. Dabei müsse es auch Raum für lokal geplante, entwickelte und umgesetzte Lösungen geben. In Mali hätte die Regierung leider die Erfahrung machen müssen, dass mögliche lokale Ansätze zur Konfliktlösung und Entwicklung von NGOs blockiert wurden, weil eine Vielzahl von externen NGOs in Mali Interessen verfolgen würden, welche sich nicht mit den Interessen des Staates decken würden.
Auch General Babagana Monguno unterstrich die Wichtigkeit der Entwicklung als Grundlage für Sicherheit und Stabilität. Nigeria sei bis 2001 nicht mit Terrorismus konfrontiert gewesen. Strukturelle Faktoren und Korruption hätten jedoch einen negativen Einfluss auf die Regierungsführung gehabt und zusammen mit Armut und Hoffnungslosigkeit einen Nährboden für terroristische Gruppierungen, insbesondere für Boko Haram geschaffen. Damit stelle Boko Haram ein selbstgemachtes Problem mit einer Rekrutierungsbasis im Nord-Osten des Landes dar. Boko Haram kämpfe gegen die gesellschaftlichen Normen in Nigeria und mittlerweile auch in anderen Staaten um den Tschadsee. Mit der erfolgreichen Bekämpfung des IS im Nahen Osten bestehe die Gefahr, dass ein Teil der Kämpfer in die Konfliktzzonen in der sub-Sahara abwandern könnten, und dass dabei Nigeria nur schon wegen der Bevölkerungszahl und der Volkswirtschaft ein lohnenswertes Rückzugsgebiet darstellen könnte. Die Regierung von Präsident Muhammadu Buhari habe deshalb eine nationale anti-Terrorismus-Strategie mit verschiedenen Unterprogrammen entwickelt. Diese umfassen beispielsweise die Verhinderung von Extremismus, die Verbesserung der Grenzsicherung, die Verstärkung der regionalen und internationalen Kooperation usw. In der Region des Tschadsees bekämpfe eine Task-Force aktiv den Terrorismus mit militärischen Mitteln, gleichzeitig würden aber auch die Fähigkeiten und die Effizienz der Streitkräfte im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus verbessert. Nigeria müsse sich jedoch zunehmend auch mit den Themen Cyber-Sicherheit und Terrorismus-Finanzierung befassen, um die Dominanz in diesen Bereichen nicht den Terroristen zu überlassen. Im Rahmen des Kampfes gegen den Terrorismus müsse jedoch auch die Regierungsführung verbessert und die Armut bekämpft werden (siehe auch Peter Dörrie, “Nigerias Terrorismusproblem ist größer als Boko Haram“, offiziere.ch, 16.11.2015).
by Captain Stefan Bühler, graduate engineer (University of Applied Sciences), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer at the NBC-KAMIR Competence Center for the Swiss Armed Forces and Commander of Tank Squadron 12/1. This article was originally published on the OG Panzer blog site – my gratitude to the author for allowing its republication on offiziere.ch. For a German version of the article see here.
Twice, offiziere.ch has taken a critical look at the new Russian combat tank, the T-14 Armata. In the first critique in the summer of 2015, Joseph Trevithick came to the conclusion that the basic design of the T-14 was rather antiquated, based on the limited public resources available at the time. He was not alone in this opinion at the time: Dave Majumdar, for example, noted in an article in National Interest that the Leopard 2 could successfully engage the T-14 if the right ammunition was used. With the publication of additional technical details, Sébastien Roblin critically analyzed the T-14 once again and came to a mixed conclusion. However, some findings were based on incomplete data resources – to this day, not all the technical details have been published. For this reason, and the fact that both authors are not engineers, we take into serious consideration the criticism offered to us that the reports on the T-14 on offiziere.ch may be politically biased and may no longer be based on fully accurate facts. We are, therefore, extremely grateful to Captain Stefan Bühler for making his article available to us for a second publication, and for giving us a somewhat different perspective.
Since the first public display of the T-14 Armata at the Victory Parade in May 2015, the vehicle and its capabilities have been hotly debated in the western military press. Many of the articles published were extremely critical; this was, in part, due to the authors’ lack of technical expertise but, in most cases, quite obviously for political reasons. Every breakdown and alleged defect in the system, no matter how small, were used to criticize the technical concept as a whole. The following article aims to evaluate the T-14 from a technical point of view, based on the published data and pictures as well as the author’s personal impressions, and without political bias, if possible.
The T-14 has the same power output as the Leopard 2 or the M1 Abrams, however, with a combat weight of 48 tons, it is 20% lighter, resulting in a specific output of 31.3 hp/T (22.9 kW/T). In comparison its western counterparts with 24 hp/T (17.6 kW/T), this new vehicle is extremely agile. Its maximum range should be around 500 km (310 miles) with a comparable consumption and an estimated fuel tank size of 1,000 liters (265 gallons), similar to the western models.
In contrast to previous models T-64/T-72/T-80/T-90, the T-14 chassis consists of seven pairs of track rollers, whereof the two front rollers and the rear suspension can be actively controlled hydraulically (hydropneumatic chassis). This allows for manual or automatic adjustment of the chassis to the terrain, and thus enables significantly higher speeds on medium-heavy terrain compared to a chassis with conventional torsion bar suspension. However, experience shows that chassis with hydropneumatic suspension systems are much more technically demanding and less reliable than torsion bar suspension systems, which is why technical difficulties are still to be expected in this area. Notwithstanding, the T-14 prototype vehicles are already equipped with such a chassis (the author can be certain of this based on observations of the 2016 Victory Parade in Moscow), and it can be assumed that the Russian engineers have already gained some experience with this technology in the past three years.
The T-14’s tracks are narrower in the current version compared to the Leopard 2 or the M1 Abrams, however, due to the significantly lower combat weight, wide tracks are also not absolutely necessary: the specific ground pressure will be about the same compared to the western counterparts.
For understandable reasons, the Russians did not give exact values related to vehicle protection. However, a few estimates can be made on the basis of weight and geometry.
The following components contribute to the protection of the crew and the main groups of the T-14:
welded basic structure of armor steel;
local reinforcement of the basic structure with composite armoring;
For mechanical reasons, the basic structure should have a thickness of at least 25 mm of armored steel with a hardness of 400 to 500 Brinell. Thus, the basic structure of the vehicle consists of a continuous minimum protection against armor piercing with 12.7 x 99 mm caliber ammunition (.50 Browning heavy machine gun), in some areas – depending on geometric arrangement – the basic structure is also expected to resist fire from the 14.5 x 114 mm API (Russian heavy machine gun) and older 20 mm caliber weapon systems.
For operational reasons, it is not be possible under normal circumstances for lighter vehicles such as infantry fighting vehicles to neutralize a main battle tank from the front (±60°). Most western infantry fighting vehicles have 30 x 173 mm machine guns as their main armament and shoot armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabots (APFSDS-T) with a maximum penetration capacity of 120 mm steel armor equivalents. A few exceptions, such as the Dutch CV9035 and the Swedish CV9040 respectively, have larger 35 or 40 mm caliber machine guns but the maximum penetration capacity of this ammunition should not exceed 160 mm of armored steel. The crew and ammunition compartments on the T-14 are likely to be protected frontally and laterally with a suitable dimension of composite armor.
For weight reasons, it can be assumed that the basic structure in the engine compartment has not been reinforced. However, the T-14 prototypes have a so-called cage armor around the engine compartment – this shuts off the electric ignition circuit on some antitank munitions, such as the widely used PG-7, upon impact, thus preventing them from being triggered. Since this type of protection system has no performance-reducing effect on most western anti-tank munitions (e.g. Panzerfaust or M72 LAW) – apart from the increased explosive distance – it can be assumed that the production version does not use the cage armor or that it will only be used adaptively in certain countries of operation.
In urban terrain, light anti-tank weapons (e.g. PG-7, Panzerfaust, M72 LAW), which are fired at short range at the side of the vehicle, are a major problem for a battle tank. By attaching reactive protection elements in the appropriate dimensions, the effect of shaped charges can be reduced by more than 80%. The Malachit reactive protection elements used in the T-14 are a logical further development of the previous Kontakt-5 and Relikt models, and should be correspondingly powerful. Like the Kontakt-5 technology, Malachit will also be able to significantly reduce the penetration rate of projectiles.
In terms of penetration performance, the biggest threats to a battle tank are the large-caliber projectiles from other battle tanks and modern anti-tank guided weapons.
Even with highly-developed passive and reactive protection technologies, this threat can be countered only to a limited extent – especially not with the estimated 48 ton combat weight of the T-14. Accordingly, the Afganit active protection system must be designed in such a way that – in combination with other technologies – it offers effective protection against both artillery projectiles and powerful antitank guided weapons (with tandem shaped charges).
The Afganit active protection system (Hard Kill).
It is currently very difficult to make a reliable statement about the performance of Afganit due to the scarce amount of data available. It is assumed that it contains both a hard-kill and a soft-kill system. This seems plausible, especially since the Russians have the appropriate operational experience in both areas with the Arena system (hard-kill) and the Shtora-1 system (soft-kill).
The Afganit system is comprised of the following components:
ten forward facing launchers arranged on the turret (hard-kill system);
two swiveling launchers, each with 12 tubes on the left and right in the front area of the turret (soft-kill system);
two fixed, upturned launchers with 12 tubes each in the rear area of the turret (soft-kill system);
two laser warning modules on the left and right side of the turret’s front;
two radar panels on the left and right side of the turret.
Threats are detected by laser warning modules (laser distance measurement or laser target illumination by the enemy) or by a radar with electronic beam deflection (measurement of the trajectory of incoming projectiles). According to various sources, the radar is based on the AESA radar technology of the new Suchoi T-50 fighter – this would make sense inasmuch as the unit price reduced by the larger procurement volume would ultimately benefit both projects.
In the area of soft-kill system performance, it must be assumed – also against the background of the Russian capabilities in electronic warfare that have been greatly expanded over the past ten years – that Afganit is significantly more powerful than the Shtora-1 developed in the 1980’s: a possible disturbance or deception of modern guided-weapon sensors by corresponding electro-optical or magnetic effectors is quite realistic from a technical point of view.
Furthermore, the four small launchers (two swiveling, two fixed, upturned) probably serve as smokescreens with multi-spectral smoke. Should this be the case, modern third or fourth generation anti-tank guided weapons with top-attack capability (including the FGM-148 Javelin) and sensor function of artillery (SMArt, BLU-108) could also be defended against, in contrast to Shtora-1.
Components of the Afganit active protection system.
The ten launchers on the turret are definitely part of the hard-kill system and, like their predecessors Drozd and Arena, are likely to fire a type of explosive and/or fragmentation grenade that damages or destroys explosive and shaped charge projectiles or anti-tank missiles and guided weapons before they hit the main armor. Due to the geometric arrangement of the launchers, a coverage of ±60° in the front area can be assumed.
Although it is technically unlikely that these countermeasures will damage or destroy a projectile made of tungsten carbide or depleted uranium. However, if the grenade is fired at the level of the control unit, this would lead to a pendulum of the penetrator and thus to a considerable reduction in power (30 – 50%). The necessary ignition of the grenade requires a data link between the fire control computer of the active protection system and the grenade itself. The fact that this is basically possible has already been proven in Western research projects.
However, all these protection systems – apart from the further developed technology – are not really new. What actually makes the T-14 unique from a technical point of view is the unmanned turret. This offers two distinctive advantages over a manned turret:
The crew compartment volume – and thus the volume requiring a high level of protection – is reduced by approximately 60%, which in turn leads to corresponding weight savings with the same level of protection for the crew.
The turret volume is also reduced: the turret surface is about 35% smaller, the front surface is about 15% smaller than the Leopard 2A6 or M1A2 Abrams. The first shot probability (without taking aiming errors into account) with the Leopard 2A6 and the most advance projectile DM63 available on the turret of a T-14 (partially covered position) at a distance of 3,000 m (9,842 feet) is approximately 25%. Or in other words, statistically speaking, four shots would be needed to land a hit.
Based on all these considerations, it must be assumed that the T-14 Armata offers the crew a higher overall level of protection than its western counterparts, despite its significantly lower combat weight.
The T-14 Armata turret (clearly visible are the launcher tubes on the turret, the two swiveling launcher units on the top of the turret, as well as the radar panels and laser warning modules on the front and side of the turret).
The current T-14 prototypes are all equipped with a new 125 mm (2A82) smoothbore gun. It can be assumed that this new version has undergone an increase in performance compared to the 2A46M-2 of the T-90. Since Russian designers, like their western counterparts, are also bound to the laws of physics, the expected penetration performance can be predicted quite accurately: at an operating distance of 3,000 m (9,842 ft), it should be in the range of 800 mm armored steel and thus about 10% above the values of the 120 mm RH L55 of the Leopard 2A6 with the DM53/63 projectile. In the case of shaped charge projectiles, the penetration rate increases practically in proportion to the caliber, which is why the penetration values here are probably only about 5% higher compared to the 120 mm caliber shaped charge projectiles. The maximum operating distance for the projectiles should be around 5,000 m (16,404 ft), with an effective operating distance around 3,000 m (9,842 ft).
The new weapon will probably be able to fire all 125 mm projectiles already introduced and, like its predecessors, will have a guided missile complex which allows the firing of anti-tank guided weapons with operating distances of more than 5,000 m.
Since the first presentation of the T-14, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the vehicle could also later be equipped with a 152 mm smoothbore gun. From a technical point of view this should be feasible, but the problem is different: a 152 mm projectile requires approximately 50% more space than a 125 mm projectile, which would reduce the ammunition capacity from 45 rounds (125 mm) to approximately 30 rounds (152 mm), which in turn has a negative effect on the autonomy of the system.
For secondary armament, the Russian designers have initially held to the proven system of a 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun and a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun. The announced optional 30 mm coaxial machine gun would probably be technically feasible without any problems, especially since the Russian tank builders already have decades of experience in this field (the BMP-3 introduced in 1987 also has a 30 mm coaxial machine gun in addition to the 100 mm main weapon).
The automatic loader should also pose no technical problems – Russian designers can look back on 50 years of development and application experience in this field (the first automatic loader EZ-10 was introduced in 1967 with the T-64A). The discussion in the West about the advantages and disadvantages of automatic loaders and three or four crew members is probably less technical than emotional: with the introduction of the T-64, the Russians have opted for this solution and have consequently adapted their training and deployment procedures accordingly, which is why a comparison with western main battle tanks (apart from the French AMX-56 Leclerc) makes only limited sense from the author’s point of view.
The crew are placed side by side in the front and are comprised of the driver (left), the gunner (middle), and the commander (right). A bulkhead separates the crew compartment from the weapons and ammunition compartment, another bulkhead separates the weapons and ammunition compartment from the engine compartment. The control of the weapon system and propulsion is exclusively electronic, so that the vehicle can be controlled remotely without any problems, even without a crew.
In cross section: in front, the strong armor; the compartment for the commander, the gunner, and the tank driver; the unmanned turret; the fuel tank; propulsion; and at the rear of the turret, additional space for ammunition and tools.
Driver, gunner, and commander each have two LCD monitors, which serve as an interface with the vehicle computer or fire control computer. The T-14 Armata fire control system consists of the following components:
electro-optical rifle scope with infrared camera and laser range finder;
electro-optical commander periscope with infrared camera and laser range finder;
stand-alone weapon station (12.7 mm) with infrared camera and laser range finder;
autonomous analogue TV rifle scope (emergency shooting);
six TV cameras on the turret for 360-degree observation;
millimeter wave radar (Afganit active protection system);
various sensors (e.g. wind, temperature, tilt);
fire control computer;
LCD monitors for the crew;
control panels and control handles for the crew.
Driver and commander each have three additional periscopes, while the gunner has only one periscope. The commander’s periscopes are most likely equipped with tip-visor buttons, which were introduced with the T-90MS and serve to swing the turret in the direction corresponding to the tip-visor button pressed.
The information and management system consists of a satellite navigation system (GLONASS) and a tactical command system. The interface with the fire control system via the vehicle computer essentially makes it possible to determine the coordinates of a spotted target and make them visible in real time to all vehicles and command posts integrated in the control system.
The discussion among experts now revolves mainly around the question of whether the commander lacks the necessary overview when sitting in the tank or whether TV cameras and electro-optical aiming devices can actually provide the same information as the optical aiming devices and observation equipment on the current generation of battle tanks. A look into the sky provides the (technical) answer: the pilot of an F-35 can look through the aircraft with his head-up display – a computer generates a virtual 3D world from the video signals from the cameras mounted all around, which is then faded into his optics depending on the pilot’s direction of vision. With such technology, as offered by the Israeli company ELBIT Systems under the name “Iron Vision” for use on armored vehicles, the commander of a T-14 could see even more than the commander of a battle tank with a manned turret. A completely different question in this case is the price: a pilot’s helmet for the F-35 costs about $400,000; there is no reliable information about the price of “Iron Vision” yet.
Finally, the question of vulnerability remains: compared to older optical systems, video cameras and electro-optical scopes are neither more nor less vulnerable to enemy fire or splintering. Optics are, and will remain, the Achilles’ heel of a battle tank, including the T-14.
Certainly, all data released by the Russians on the new tank must be critically examined. Notwithstanding: Russian engineers, with the appropriate political support from the Kremlin, have consistently implemented the concept of the unmanned turret battle tank; while in the West, desperate attempts were made to extend the life of battle tanks whose development dates back to the 1970’s with limited system upgrades.
The current version of the T-14 may still have a number of constructive deficits and teething problems, but one thing is certain: when the West presents the first prototype of a new generation of battle tanks in three to five years (a highly optimistic estimate), the Russians will already have several years of practical experience in this area – a backlog that cannot be compensated for so quickly even with the alleged technological superiority of Western industry. A look at the history of tank development shows that the Russians revolutionized tank construction several times – not because they were the first to have the idea, but because they were the first to have the courage to take a step forward.
• • •
Info-Box: Russian milestones in tank development
Although developed in the USA as early as the beginning of the 1920’s, and after the Americans showed no particular interest in it, the Soviet designers built and improved the Christie drive under licence and, from 1931, installed it as standard equipment in BT-series light tanks. The BT tanks were the fastest tanks at that time and the Christie drive was later successfully used for the T-34.
The T-34 is considered by many tank experts to be the most successful tank design of all times. The almost perfect balance of firepower, protection, and mobility made it technically superior to German tanks at the beginning of the war. The T-34 was also the first mass-produced tank with a diesel engine.
The T-55 was the first battle tank to be equipped with NBC protection.
The T-62 was the first battle tank with a smoothbore gun capable of firing penetrator projectiles.
The T-64 was the first battle tank with an automatic loader. With the T-64A version, a fire suppression system was installed for the first time in a battle tank, and the T-64B was equipped with the first composite armor (Combination K).
The T-72 is the most produced battle tank in the world. It was also the focus of western criticism, in particular because of the poor performance of the Iraqi T-72 against the American M1 Abrams in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Although the different versions of the T-72 were used in numerous wars and conflicts, the Soviet vehicle versions never clashed with Western tank models – always the weaker export versions were involved in the fighting.
The Kontakt-5 reactive armor, which first appeared in 1985 on the T-80U, was able to reduce the penetration rate of projectiles by more than 30% compared to its predecessors. Western engineers were able to analyze the technique after the fall of the Berlin Wall and came to the conclusion that no western battle tank from that time would have been able to penetrate a Kontakt-5 reinforced armor with the first hit.
The T-90 was the first battle tank to be equipped with a soft-kill active protection system (Shtora-1) as standard.
The T-14 will probably be the first battle tank to be built with an unmanned turret as standard.
Today is the slowest day of innovation you will ever experience again in the rest of your live. — Rob Nail, CEO and Associate founder of the Singularity University.
Jim Yong Kim, the president of the World Bank, warns about the rising aspirations of the people all over the world. According to Rob Nail, by 2025 at the latest all 8 billion people on the planet will have access to broadband and smartphones. Only in Africa, the number of smartphones is going to triple, from around 200 million to 700 million from 2015 to 2020. Experience shows that at first the people are very happy about their new possibilities to link and interact with the rest of the world. However, over time, they are beginning to compare their standard of living with the one in highly developed countries. Even if that would motivate to change and improve the political, economic and social situation in their countries, most likely this will lead to frustration in the short-term – especially if people realize that they will probably never be able to reach the standard of living in highly developed countries. Such frustration about this obviously unfair situation will lead to a higher flow of economic refugees and certainly to more extremism and violence. Therefore, Kim thinks that it will be crucial for the future of rising aspirations to invest today in the educational system in the developing countries, so that today’s children are able to compete in the economy in the future.
Wrongly, there is little talk in Western and Central European countries of the changes in the Arctic. The term “Global Arctic”, introduced at the Arctic Circle meeting in 2014, underlines the magnitude of the changes in the Arctic. According to Konrad Steffen, Director of the Swiss Federal Institute for Forest, Snow and Landscape Research, the melting ice sheet in Greenland has caused sea levels to rise by an average of 1 mm per year over the last 40 years; by 2100 they are expected to rise by another 1 m in total. This will lead to long-term changes to coastal regions around the world.
The changes in the Arctic do not only have a global impact: distant events, such as increasing carbon dioxide emissions, are also causing far-reaching changes in the Arctic. This interplay can be seen not only in the ecological sphere, but also in the economic, geopolitical, social and cultural realms. This makes supra-regional and interdisciplinary cooperation all the more important in order to meet the current and future challenges linked to the Arctic region. (Lassi Heininen und Matthias Finger, “The ‘Global Arctic’ as a New Geopolitical Context and Method“, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 04.12.2017).
This role falls to the Arctic Council, which is an intergovernmental forum with a strong scientific focus. The objectives of the Arctic Council are to promote cooperation, coordination and interaction between Arctic states relating to typical Arctic issues, while keeping indigenous communities involved. The Arctic states listed in the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, which form the core of the Arctic Council, are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the USA. In addition, 13 states, 13 international organisations and 13 non-governmental organisations currently have observer status.
Not only did Finland take up the presidency at the 10th meeting of the Arctic Council in May 2017: Switzerland was also officially admitted to the circle of states with observer status. The Arctic strategy of the three Nordic countries was considered in the context of “The Arctic – closer than you think” organised by “foraus – Forum Foreign Policy” in cooperation with the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian embassies and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Finally, the question remained as to how Switzerland could contribute as profitably as possible, as an observer in the Arctic Council.
“The Arctic – closer than you think” — From left to right: Host Markus Mugglin, the Swedish Ambassador Björn Lyrvall, the Norwegian Ambassador Anniken Krutnes, the Finnish Ambassador Aleksi Härkönen and the Swiss Ambassador Stefan Flückiger.
Finland is an Arctic state. A quarter of Finland’s territory lies north of the Arctic Circle. A third of the population who live north of the 60th degree of latitude have Finnish citizenship – including some of the Samis, the only indigenous ethnic group within the EU. It is therefore important for Finland that the Arctic remains a stable and safe area.
Finland has a great deal of expertise on Arctic matters. The Finnish government’s aim is to understand the changes in the Arctic, to adapt to them or even to take advantage of them. However, Finland does not only want to take a leading position in Arctic research: it also wants to use Arctic expertise for economic purposes, in a responsible manner.
Finland is committed to sustainable development and the sustainable use of natural resources in the Arctic region.
Finland encourages international cooperation in the Arctic region.
The Finnish Ambassador and Chairman of the Arctic Council, Aleksi Härkönen, emphasised good cooperation in the Arctic Council, although he is concerned about further long-term cooperation due to the negative trend in international relations. International relations are particularly burdened by global changes in power politics and geopolitical competition between the major powers. It therefore seems to be to the Arctic Council’s advantage that it does not deal with security policy issues (cf. Christoph Humrich, “Sicherheitspolitik im Arktischen Rat? Lieber Nicht!“, Sicherheit & Frieden 33, Nr. 3 (2015): 23–29).
Good cooperation in the Arctic Council is in everyone’s interest, because climate change will lead to fundamental changes in the Arctic region, which will affect all the Arctic states. New sea routes and newly available resources are to be used in a responsible manner. The aim is to develop the region economically while at the same time protecting the environment and the habitat of the indigenous population. This is why Finland intends to focus on mitigating the consequences of climate change and adapting to them, as well as using the Arctic region sustainably during its presidency, which runs until 2019.
With regard to the use of new sea routes, in February the Arctic Council organised an international conference on the harmonised implementation of the “Polar Code“, which the International Maritime Organisation brought into force in early 2017 for ships navigating the two polar regions. Among other things, the Arctic Council runs a forum for the exemplary conduct of Arctic shipping, ran a staff exercise in Finland in March on combating an oil disaster in the Arctic Sea, organises a congress on Arctic biodiversity in October of this year and arranges a meeting of the environment ministers of all Arctic states (Aleksi Härkönen, “A Look Ahead: The Arctic Council in 2018“, Arctic Council, 09.02.2018).
Finland is not alone in its strategy for the Arctic region. Norway and Sweden have defined very similar strategies. The Norwegian Ambassador for Arctic and Antarctic Affairs, Anniken Krutnes, recalled that the Arctic is a prosperous, stable and peaceful region. The Arctic is not just plains of ice and snow. Different regions can take on different shapes, and can be clothed in green during the summer. However, climate change will affect all these different regions. The Arctic Council is an important institution for ensuring prosperity, stability, peace and sustainable economic usage in the region. Simpler access to natural resources should not be allowed to lead to a mining contest. In fishing, care is already being taken that fish stocks in the Arctic region are only used to the extent that they can regenerate, on the basis of scientific data. Norway has a strong interest in the economic development of the region, as half of its land mass and around 10% of Norway’s population is located in the Arctic region.
The Swedish Ambassador for Arctic Affairs, Björn Lyrvall, also emphasised the importance of the Arctic Council. Regardless of intergovernmental relations in other policy areas, there would be consensus in the Arctic Council on the main points and priorities, he said. Accordingly he also highlighted the opportunities associated with global warming: access to resources and the Northeast Passage offering a shorter, more economical and safer link to East Asia than the standard route through the Suez Canal today.
As a result, the points and strategies of the three Nordic ambassadors coincide. Of course, global warming is a challenge, but the opportunities that result from it must be seized, they say. This view seems to be a little too rosy: the ambassadors did not address in detail the challenges for coastal regions triggered by rising sea levels and the challenges for the indigenous population due to the change in lifestyle caused by global warming. In particular, the extraction of mineral resources could have a negative impact on the region’s environment and population. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, 13% of untapped oil resources and 30% of untapped natural gas resources are to be found in the Arctic region. The sustainable, environmentally friendly extraction of these resources borders on wishful thinking. This is why Anna Stünzi, co-director of the Environment, Energy & Transport Programme at “foraus – Forum Foreign Policy”, considered in the discussion that it would be better for the sustainable, environmentally friendly development of the Arctic region if these mineral resources were not mined. However, the Norwegian ambassador’s reaction clearly showed that Norway does not want to do without such an economic opportunity, if only to offer the Norwegian population in this region the best possible positive economic prospects for the future. On the contrary, Norway’s Statoil, 67% of the shares in which are owned by the state, is already mining natural gas in the Arctic region and operates Europe’s largest liquefied natural gas processing plant in Hammerfest. In addition, the Norwegian Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani has a small-scale coal mining operation in Spitsbergen. The Finnish strategy also clearly shows that Finland wants to make economic use of resources in the Arctic.
Natural gas processing plant on the island of Melkøya near Hammerfest.
As an observer in the Arctic Council, Switzerland could play a role in protecting the environment and the way of life of the indigenous population. Switzerland’s Arctic strategy does not seem to have been formulated yet – this was the impression given by Swiss Ambassador Stefan Flückiger, Head of Bilateral Economic Relations at the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research. He merely underlined the importance of observer status with regard to joint research efforts. The Swiss Alps have much in common with the Arctic, he said. During the four-year campaign to obtain observer status in the Arctic Council, Switzerland was praised as a “vertical Arctic nation”. Switzerland has been active in the Arctic for over 100 years and is up there with the best in terms of research (Tina Herren, “Beobachter im Arktischen Rat – ‘Wir haben ähnliche Probleme wie die Arktis’“, Interview with Stefan Flückiger, Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen (SRF), 12.05.2017). The Swiss Polar Institute was founded in 2016 to further promote research in this area. For its part, the Arctic Council supports 10 research projects in the Arctic each year. In terms of research, Switzerland can therefore not only benefit a lot from its observer status – it can also offer a lot in return. Nevertheless, it would be a wasted opportunity if Switzerland, as an observer in the Arctic Council, were to confine itself exclusively to research topics.
by Israel Rafalovich. He is a journalist based in Brussel, who has 50 years of experience including international postings in Tel-Aviv, Brussels, Germany and Washington,DC
The Middle East is likely to face more instability in the near future and the incentives for maintaining or acquiring nuclear weapons are likely to increase. In this case, Middle East conflicts could easily escalate into nuclear standoffs in a region bereft of tempering international bodies or adequate mechanisms for conflict resolution. A factor that looms large behind Middle East aspirations for nuclear weapons is power and influence in regional and international politics.
Well, things are changing: Over the years, it has become more difficult for the United States to bring its power of deterrence to bear in the Middle East. This unique dynamic and political climate provides the Arab countries with unprecedented regional legitimacy to pursue a robust nuclear programme. A number of states in the Middle East have taken lately to set up and advance civilian nuclear power programmes possibly as means for obtaining the capability to manufacture nuclear arms in the future. While every country has stated that it has no plans to purchase nuclear weapons capabilities, the fact is that once a country has acquired these capabilities — under certain conditions — it could initiate a nuclear weapons programme. Civilian nuclear programmes can facilitate illicit procurement and provide technology and expertise to support a clandestine weapons programme.
States in the Middle East seeking civil nuclear programmes are likely to play off of the Russian, Chinese and European nuclear interests in a bid to bolster their power vis-a-vis primary ally the United States. Motivated by political and economic power-based interests Russia seems to be the chief contact in this field. Its arms and technology deals in the region have contributed towards renewed rise in the flow of highly sophisticated and strategically important technology to the Middle East.
Well, who is who in this emerging nuclear Middle East club?
Algeria’s nuclear history began before it gained its independence. France conducted its first nuclear test (Gerboise Bleue) on February 13, 1960 near Reggane, in the middle of the Sahara Desert. Algeria has one of the best and most developed nuclear complexes of the whole Arab world. As early as 1974, it was making grandiose plans for a future nuclear energy programme designed to save gas and oil exports. Since the late 1980s Algeria has had a significant nuclear programme, which includes four now safeguarded nuclear facilities at different sites.
The NUR research reactor, is located at the Draria nuclear complex, about 20 km east of Algiers. It was constructed by Argentina. The 1 MWt pool-type-light-water reactor went on line in 1989. Its fuel, twenty percent Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), was provided by Argentina. It is officially used for research and the production of isotopes.
The Es Salam research reactor is located in Ain Oussera, in the Sahara Desert, 140 km south of Algiers. It is a 15 MWt heavy-water moderated reactor and was built following the signing of a nuclear cooperation agreement with China. In 1991 China stated that under this agreement, it had also delivered 11 metric tonnes of heavy water and 216 fuel moduls totalling 909 kg of three percent LEU (Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Capabilities in the Middle East“, p. 10). The site also hosts various facilities, including an isotope production plant, hot cell laboratories and waste-storage tanks.
In Paris people examine the bonus pages of the newspaper covering the French nuclear tests in Algeria.
Algeria also has significant Uranium deposits, about 26,000 tonnes in Targu shield (Nuclear Energy Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency, and International Atomic Energy Agency, “Uranium 2016: Resources, Production and Demand“, 2016). In common with Morocco, it has considerable amounts of phosphate ore from which Uranium is being recovered.
However, Algeria is a potential proliferating country. The proliferation concerns stem from several factors. The Es Salam complex, which is fairly large and well protected for research facility, is of a type that would potentially allow for production of weapons grade Plutonium. According to European intelligence sources, a heavy-walled building near the reactor appeared to have been intended to be full scale reprocessing plant. The size of the cooling towers exceeded the requirements of a 15 MWt reactor and would be more with a 25 MWT or 60 MWt reactor. Estimates regarding the quantity of Plutonium that could be generated by the reactor at 15 MWt vary from between 1-5 kg a year. (Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Capabilities in the Middle East“, p. 11).
The hot cell in Inshas are the only known facilities in Egypt that could be used to separate weapon usable Plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. Furthermore, it has facilities and equipment necessary for fuel separation. There is to point out that spent fuel accumulated by the ETTR-2 reactor over ten years of operation is likely to be equivalent to eight to ten weapon worth of Plutonium reprocessed (see also Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Capabilities in the Middle East“, 06.-07.07.2011, p. 12).
Already in 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Egypt President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi signed an agreement for Russia to build a nuclear power plant in Egypt.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman promised to contribute to the revival of the long dormant Egyptian programme. Politically, Egypt has never come to terms with Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons; so, a nuclear Egypt remains on the table. Although Egypt regularly show’s strong commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and to a nuclear free Middle East, European diplomats in the Middle East said that Egypt might be considering building a break out capability. Egypt’s Nuclear Material Authority has been conducting work to extract Uranium ore concentrate from phosphoric acid derived from El-Shaiya phosphate ore. According to European intelligence sources Egypt has a semi-pilot Uranium extraction plant, to separate Uranium from phosphoric acid. If Egypt continues to perfect methods to recover Uranium from phosphoric acid, it will secure a steady domestic production of Uranium.
Reactor construction operation and management have also been the focus of the Egyptians and could be intensified in the future after the recent political decision regarding the construction of a nuclear power reactor. On December 2017, a final contract to start work constructing Egypt’s first nuclear power plant was signed in Cairo during a meeting between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The power plant, which will contain four VVER-1200 reactors, will be built in El Dabaa on the Mediterranean coast. The site is deemed suitable for eight reactors. Rosatom will supply nuclear fuel throughout the plants entire life time. Rosatom will also train personnel and will assist its Egyptian partners in operation and maintenance during the first ten years of the plants operation. The first unit is to get online in 2026.
Nevertheless, in October 2017, the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy signed with Rosatom a “programme of cooperation” for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The plan is to cooperate in small and medium-size reactors which can be used both for power generation and desalination of sea water. Rosatom will also be training Saudi personnel for the national nuclear programme and in the development of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear energy infrastructure. According to Rosatom, they will also look into the prospects of establishing a center for nuclear science and technology in Saudi Arabia based on a Russian-design research reactor.
At the same time, according to informed sources in Washington, the U.S. nuclear industry is pushing to restart talks with Saudi Arabia on an agreement to help the Kingdom develop nuclear energy. Under Article 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, a peaceful cooperation agreement is required for the transfer of nuclear materials, technology and equipment. It would deprive Saudi Arabia of the possibility of one day enriching Uranium. The Kingdom refuses to sign up to any such agreement with the United States. They want to secure enrichment if down the line they want to do it (see also Kingston Reif, Daryl G. Kimball, and Kelsey Davenport, “The Risks of Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the Role of Congress“, Arms Control Association, 5 April 2018).
Saudi Arabia’s interest in nuclear technology, is coming at a time of heighten tension in the Gulf. It seems to underline the Saudi intention to seek some type of deterrent against future Israeli and Iranian weapon capabilities. These nuclear power projects would allow Saudi Arabia to develop a nuclear infrastructure and scientific expertise under NPT rules. Although, not by itself a gateway to nuclear weapons, this could be a long-term security hedge.
In the past Saudi Arabia has been the subject of speculation regarding nuclear weapons ambitions. “[A]mong the charges levelled at it have been that it possesses undeclared nuclear facilities; that it sought or may seek a nuclear security guarantee from a country [(Pakistan)] other than the United States in return for energy supplies; and that it has attempted or planned for the outright purchase of a nuclear weapon and/or delivery system from another state.” (Mark Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran“, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p 42). It has been believed that the Saudi’s bankrolled Pakistan’s nuclear programme in the 1970s and ’80s and now want some reciprocity in the shape of ready-made nuclear weapons, paid for by massive financial aid to Islamabad (Mark Urban, “Saudi Nuclear Weapons ‘on Order’ from Pakistan“, BBC News, 06.11.2013).
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Saudi King Salman listen national anthems during their meeting in Kremlin, Moscow, Russia, Thursday, Oct. 5, 2017. It was the first ever visit by a Saudi monarch to Russia.
Should Turkey decide to establish its own deterrent, it would do so with the advantage of already having in place a well established nuclear research agency, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK). Furthermore, preliminary work has begun on civilian nuclear energy programme, that appears to move ahead, thereby expanding Turkey’s nuclear expertise.
The Turks have a lingering skepticism about NATO guarantees, which they not feel were forthcoming. Confidence in American leadership remains low. A hardening EU mood against Turkish accession is another reason to growing alienation from the West, which Turkey sees as a reason to consider its own deterrent.
The ITU TRIGA Mark-II Training and Research Reactor at the Istanbul Technical University.
Turkey has a substantial nuclear infrastructure run by the TAEK. Four research centers and laboratories have been established within government facilities and universities and the most important is Çekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center located in Istanbul.
For now, Turkey does not have the ability to produce significant quantities of fissile material usable in a nuclear weapons programme. The TAEK has already begun to search for Uranium deposits in Turkey in order to avoid relying on imported Uranium to support the nuclear energy programme. Turkey is estimated to have just over 9,200 tonnes of Uranium in reserves but there is disagreement over whether this will be sufficient (Nuclear Energy Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency, and International Atomic Energy Agency, “Uranium 2016: Resources, Production and Demand“, 2016).
European intelligence sources said that Turkey has the technical capabilities to manufacture many of the components for gas-centrifuge Uranium enrichment programme, although, until now, Turkey has not given any hint that it has the intention of doing so.
The risk is substantial that Turkey will seek advanced nuclear capabilities in order to have comparable power to Iran under ambitious nuclear energy plans laid by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan’s increasingly dictatorial actions increase the risk that Turkey will seek nuclear weapons capabilities – tools that Erdogan may find useful for consolidating power and augmenting Turkey’s regional power status. Turkey is also adamant about making its nuclear infrastructure as independent from foreign aid as possible, as soon as it has acquired the needed workforce and technology. Turkey’s interpretation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as granting a “right to enrich” and its resistance to tightened Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) restrictions on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology are strong indicators of a desire to keep open the possibility of advanced fuel cycle development. Therefore, although official statements deny Turkish plans to acquire enrichment capabilities, NSG member states should block any attempts by Turkey to import technology that would support enrichment facilities and further destabilize the Middle East. National intelligence agencies should watch for any signs of illicit efforts by Turkey to procure these or weaponization knowledge and capabilities. — Sarah Burkhard et al., “Nuclear Infrastructure and Proliferation Risks of the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt“, Institute for Science and International Security, 25 August 2017, p. 10.
United Arab Emirates
Since the late 1970s, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has periodically expressed an interest in nuclear energy. It has a long history of technical cooperation projects with IAEA. Beyond that the UAE has been pursuing its own nuclear plans. Yet, the UAE also faces strategic threats that have caused the government’s decision to explore a national nuclear programme. Its domestic security situation seems to justify its choice. While the possibilities of eventual proliferation ultimately depend on future political choices, and can therefore never be completely excluded in the programme early years.
Construction of UAE’s first nuclear power plant at the Barakah site.
The pursuit of nuclear capabilities in the Middle East gives countries in the region the right to adopt policies and forge alliances with countries that possess nuclear technology with a view to striking a military balance in the region in defence of their interests. A nuclear Middle East will have profound impact on the security and non-proliferation issues in the Middle East. There is to take into consideration that in the foreseeable future several countries will decide on a collective breakout from the NPT. The objective of a total nuclear disarmament in the Middle East will not be achieved as long as it excludes Israel. What is more: As long as one other country has the potential to make and use nuclear weapons, it makes no sense for any other country to give up altogether its own nuclear capabilities.
Imagery acquired on 08MAR2018 of the UK Naval Support Facility in Bahrain. (DigitalGlobe).
The opening of a United Kingdom Naval Support Facility (NSF) in Bahrain is the latest in a series of moves that continues to see a stronger UK defence presence with countries in the Gulf. In pursuing a policy of returning to facilities “East of the Suez,” the UK is reversing the country’s 1971 decision to withdraw from the region.
In addition to Bahrain, the UK also recently closed negotiations to access other complementary naval facilities in Oman. In August 2017, the UK Defence Secretary signed an agreement securing access to the port of Duqm, located on the southeast coast. Plans to establish a Joint Logistics Support Base at the location were also reiterated. The MoD particularly set its sights on Duqm to utilize the port’s dry docks to support the HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier, the largest ship in the British navy.
Bottom Line – The UK shows no signs of curtailing its commitment to strengthen military ties with states in the Gulf.
Aby Austin Michael Bodetti. He is an analyst and journalist specializing in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has a comedic email list about the Middle East that you can join here.
Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.
The United States tried to overthrow Muammar al-Gaddafi, dictator of Libya since 1969, for decades. In 1986, US President Ronald Reagan bombed Libya while the United Nations implemented sanctions against the embattled strongman. In 2011, US President Barack Obama assisted Libyan rebels battling al-Gaddafi’s military. Unlike Reagan, however, Obama would succeed: the rebels killed al-Gaddafi in his hometown of Sirte before launching a provisional government that has become one of three competing Libyan governments. One has allied itself with a former American agent.
Khalifa Haftar, part of al-Gaddafi’s inner circle, found himself a prisoner of war (POW) in Chad in late 1980s. Libya had long sought to conquer Chad, its southern neighbour with a population twice Libya’s, and Haftar had suffered one of his country’s many defeats. As Haftar grew embittered with al-Gaddafi during his brief stint in a POW camp, the Central Intelligence Agency recruited him and — after failing to oust al-Gaddafi in the early 1990s — moved Haftar to Northern Virginia. In 2011, Haftar, though comfortable in his home near the George Bush Center for Intelligence, decided to return to Libya for good.
Since 2011, Haftar has evolved into one of Libya’s most divisive public figures. The US, which used to sponsor him, now considers him an irritant. Haftar has expressed little interest in the UN’s attempts to achieve a political settlement to the factionalism that has plagued Libya since 2011, frustrating the international community, which would prefer to focus on crises in North Korea and Syria. “Haftar is not interested in democracy”, a former official from the US State Department told The Washington Post in August 2016. “I don’t even think he’s particularly interested in peace”.
Haftar perceives himself through a messiah complex, describing himself as saving Libya from civil war, terrorism, and itself. “Everyone told me the same thing”, he said in an interview with The New Yorker in early 2015. “‘We are looking for a savior. Where are you?’ I told them, ‘If I have the approval of the people, I will act.'” Now that al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) have made Libya one of their many homes, Haftar bills himself as an anti-Islamist strongman. He has aligned himself with the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, fighting militias in Benghazi and Derna.
After the HoR replaced the General National Congress in August 2014, it became the de facto representative of the Libyan state until the formation of the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA is an interim government, which was formed by the signature of a political agreement in December 2015. Because this agreement has been based on a UN-led initiative and unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council, the GNA is Libya’s only legitimate government recognized by the UN. In December 2015, the Chairman of the Libyan House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh Issathe declared his support for the political agreement. Later, in Summer 2016, the HoR withdrew its recognition of the GNA in a vote. Until Summer 2016, Britain, France, and the US did support Haftar in his war against Islamists, even if he has refused to support the UN-backed unity government in Tripoli (Karim El-Bar, “Leaked Tapes Expose Western Support for Renegade Libyan General“, Middle East Eye, 8 July 2018). Italy, whose colonial empire controlled Libya until World War II, has also courted the controversial warlord. However, the break between the GNA and the HoR resulted to an end of the support of Haftar by Western states. For example, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), which oversees the US’s involvement in the Libyan Civil War, denied a relationship with Haftar.
According to the political agreement of December 2015, the Presidential Council presides over the Government of National Accord, based in Tripoli. The GNA should be endorsed by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, which would become the legitimate legislative authority in the Libyan government, but on two occasions the House of Representatives has voted down the list of ministers (Mary Fitzgerald and Mattia Toaldo, “A quick guide to Libya’s main players“, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).
However, AFRICOM has launched airstrikes against ISIS affiliates and other militants throughout Libya, trying to balance counterterrorism with conflict resolution in the country. The last airstrike, the first time against an affiliate of al-Qaeda, took place in coordination with the GNA near Ubari in late March as the US continues to fight its oldest foe in the War on Terror. “As part of the overall US government effort, US Africa Command remains committed to working with Libya and our international partners to help resolve the political conflict and advance stabilization in Libya”, Samantha Reho, an AFRICOM spokeswoman, told Offiziere.ch in an email.
Nevertheless, Haftar may find that his foray into politics will encounter a few problems. Critics have accused his son of looting the Central Bank of Libya’s branch in Benghazi after Haftar captured the city. He has also set preconditions for negotiations with the GNA, threatening to unravel what little remains of Libya’s stability. The warlord has come far since his time as a Gaddafi stooge and POW, but he has much further to go, if he wants to return to the halls of power in Tripoli. For now, he must remain in the east of a country that, as a CIA asset, he abandoned for over two decades. Haftar has a ways to go to power.
• • •
The social order in Libya has broken down. You have massive protests against Qaddafi. You’ve got tribal divisions inside of Libya. Benghazi is a focal point for the opposition regime. And Qaddafi is marching his army toward Benghazi, and he has said, ‘We will kill them like rats.’ Now, option one would be to do nothing, and there were some in my administration who said, as tragic as the Libyan situation may be, it’s not our problem. The way I looked at it was that it would be our problem if, in fact, complete chaos and civil war broke out in Libya. But this is not so at the core of U.S. interests that it makes sense for us to unilaterally strike against the Qaddafi regime. At that point, you’ve got Europe and a number of Gulf countries who despise Qaddafi, or are concerned on a humanitarian basis, who are calling for action. But what has been a habit over the last several decades in these circumstances is people pushing us to act but then showing an unwillingness to put any skin in the game. Free riders. So what I said at that point was, we should act as part of an international coalition. But because this is not at the core of our interests, we need to get a UN mandate; we need Europeans and Gulf countries to be actively involved in the coalition; we will apply the military capabilities that are unique to us, but we expect others to carry their weight. And we worked with our defense teams to ensure that we could execute a strategy without putting boots on the ground and without a long-term military commitment in Libya. So we actually executed this plan as well as I could have expected: We got a UN mandate, we built a coalition, it cost us $1 billion — which, when it comes to military operations, is very cheap. We averted large-scale civilian casualties, we prevented what almost surely would have been a prolonged and bloody civil conflict. And despite all that, Libya is a mess. — Barack Obama, cited in Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine: The U.S. President Talks through His Hardest Decisions about America’s Role in the World“, The Atlantic, April 20016).
• • •
Update April 12, 2018:
We had nothing to do with it; I promise! Libyan military chief Khalifa Haftar severely ill after stroke. According to France 24, he was rushed to the Jordanian capital of Amman after losing consciousness in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi and was later transferred to a Paris hospital, after suffering a cerebral haemorrhage. However, a spokesman of the Libyan National Army told the Libyan Al-Nabaa TV station that Haftar was fine and in good condition. The spokesman denied all reports of Haftar suffering a stroke or a heart attack.
Much of northern Syria, including the Afrin region, is part of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS), which is commonly referred to as Rojava. YPG militias began fighting ISIS and other groups in northern Syria for control of the territory in 2012. The YPG then merged with various Arab, Turkmen, Armenian, and Assyrian militias to form the The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in 2015.
The Kurdish militias and SDF are widely considered to be the most effective fighting force against ISIS on the ground. With the help of US airstrikes, they have liberated huge swaths of Syria from the terrorist organization. Kurdish militias in Iraq, who operate independently from those in Syria, were vital in defeating ISIS in their country as well.
The SDF proved itself so capable of defeating ISIS that in May of 2017 US President Donald Trump approved a plan to provide weapons to the SDF so it could lead the siege on Raqqa, the Islamic State’s de facto capital at the time. Turkey, which is a member of NATO and a US ally, adamantly protested the decision. Turkey sees the YPG as an extension of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that has been leading a Kurdish insurgency in southeast Turkey since 1984. The PKK is considered a terrorist group by the United States, Turkey, and the European Union. The YPG contends that while they are inspired by the same concepts of communalism and democratic confederalism espoused by the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, they are independent of the PKK and do not support terrorist activities.
SDF, YPG, and YPF flags in Raqqa after its liberation from ISIS.
Even though the SDF and YPG are not technically the same entity, distinguishing the two is complicated. YPG units account for roughly half of the SDF’s soldiers and are considered the backbone of its fighting force. The US agreed that the YPG is distinct from the PKK, and has since supplied them with machine guns, ammunition, mortars, anti-tank weapons, armored vehicles, and engineering equipment. The SDF also acquired ops-core helmets and sensitive advanced tech such as night vision goggles, rifle optics, and infrared illuminators used by US special operators, but the Pentagon denied supplying those materials and suggested they were funneled to the SDF by “other means through other sources”.
Turkey watched from across the border as the area controlled by the DFNS grew and its Kurdish militias and governing councils consolidated their power. From Turkey’s perspective, this presented the possibility that the semi-autonomous Kurdish state could remain in perpetuity and become a safe haven and source of support for the PKK and other Kurdish separatists in Turkey.
After the Iraqi government announced in December that ISIS had been military defeated in that country as well, the situation changed for Turkey. With ISIS’s infrastructure and capabilities drastically diminished in both Iraq and Syria, the SDF was no longer as valuable to the US. They had served their purpose. Moving against them would be discouraged but ultimately allowed.
Ankara’s growing frustrations were exasperated when news broke on 13 January that the US would help the SDF train and fund a new 30,000-strong border security force, half of which would be SDF fighters. The border security force was supposedly intended to help prevent members of ISIS and other terrorist groups from entering Rojava from Turkey and Iraq or from across the Euphrates River, which currently separates areas controlled by the SDF from those controlled by Syrian government and anti-government rebels.
Turkish tanks on the road to Afrin.
The announcement enraged Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan saw it as an indication that the US was actively supporting Kurdish autonomy and helping to further bolster its military capabilities. He referred to the proposed border force as a “terror army” and vowed that Turkish troops and allied Syrian rebels would destroy all of the “terror nests” along its border. Afrin and Manbij were named as the first targets.
The idea of the border force was opposed by nearly every military actor in the conflict, except the US and SDF, of course. The Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, which has a tenuous relationship with the SDF, called the plan a “blatant attack” on its sovereignty. Russia and Iran, Assad’s two primary foreign allies in the conflict, also condemned the plan and suggested it was a move by the US to partition Syria. The US quickly downplayed the projected strength and function of the border force and subsequently promised Ankara it would quit supplying the SDF with weapons.
Turkey was not satisfied. It began cross-border shelling of areas in the Afrin region on 19 January, and officially launched Operation Olive Branch the following day with a series of airstrikes on numerous Kurdish positions there. Turkish soldiers and ordinance began streaming into Syria. Even though Erdogan stated he intends to wipe out out the YPG in the area, Ankara has tried to justify the campaign by asserting it is also fighting ISIS in Afrin. There is no evidence that ISIS is active in any significant way in the area.
Afrin is particularly difficult for the Kurds to defend because it is cut off from the rest of Rojava by areas controlled by the Syrian government or the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA). Manbij is often considered part of the Afrin region even though its government and demographics differ somewhat from other communities in Rojava, but it is separated from the rest of Afrin region and is also cut off from Rojava by the Euphrates River.
A statue in Afrin of Kawa the Blacksmith, a figure from Kurdish and Persian mythology, was toppled by the rebels on Sunday (Photo: Bulent Kilic / AFP / Getty Images).
Turkey’s insistence that it will move on to Manbij after Afrin presents an exceptionally complicated military and diplomatic situation. Manbij is roughly 100 km east of the city of Afrin and is defended by Manbij Military Council (MMC), which is comprised primarily of local Arabs but aligned with the SDF and YPG.
The MMC formed in 2016 after the SDF pushed ISIS out of the city. US troops helped organize and train the MMC and continue to provide training, materials, and logistical support. This has made them a target for the rebels aligned with Turkey and hostile to the SDF. According to a report from CNN, rebels in the area regularly fire on US patrols, who occasionally return fire in self-defense.
Fighters from the Euphrates Liberation Brigade, a faction of the MMC, in Manbij.
Direct conflict between two NATO members like the US and Turkey is incredibly unlikely, but if neither side backs down on the issue of Manbij it could escalate a tensions in an area where Syria, Russia, Turkey, Iran, the US, the SDF, and several other militias and operatives from additional NATO countries are all currently active.
That could lead to more US troops who would otherwise be fighting ISIS in the Euphrates Valley being redeployed to cities Turkey pushed the SDF out of to ensure that ISIS does not use move in and establish a toehold. American forces might also have to assume a peacekeeping role to prevent the conflict between Turkey and the SDF from spiraling further out of control.
Çavuşoğlu was quoted by the Turkish daily Hürriyet as saying that the US and Turkey were negotiating the exit of YPG forces from Manbij and that if the YPG refused to leave then “a military operation will be carried out not only in Manbij, but also to the east of the Euphrates”.
The US has repeatedly confirmed it will not remove its troops from Manbij but has not officially stated if US military personnel would be involved in coordinating a peaceful withdrawal of SDF or YPG forces from the city. With the plan for the border force nixed, the US may also have to divert resources to securing the borders surrounding Rojava.
Regardless of the different roles they may fill, it is clear is that additional US forces are being sent to the Manbij. “I could tell you that we have probably done some repositioning to make sure of our own force protection, both down south, as well as up in Manbij,” McKenzie stated at the press briefing.
Fighters loot shops after seizing control of Afrin from Kurdish forces on Sunday, 18 March.