Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with his Russian President Vladimir Putin in the Black Sea resort of Sochi on May 17, 2018.
In his May 31 interview with Russia Today, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said that his regime will soon focus on dealing with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), outlining two options it has to do so in his view: negotiations or force. He claims that he has already “started opening doors for negotiations”, reasoning the fact that “the majority of them are Syrians”, that “supposedly they like their country” and may prove receptive to this option. However, he added that, if negotiations fail, the Syrian Army will be forced to liberate areas occupied by the SDF — “with the Americans, or without the Americans”.
SDF spokesman Kino Gabriel also told Reuters that such a move “is not a solution that can lead to any result. […] Any military solution, as far as the SDF is concerned, will lead to more losses and destruction and difficulties for the Syrian people.”
Several past examples all conclusively show how swiftly the US can bring force to bear when either its troops or the SDF were threatened by Assad or his Iranian-backed militia allies.
Two US Air Force F-22 Raptors fly over Syria, February 2, 2018. (Photo: Sgt. Colton Elliott / Air National Guard).
Taking these precedents into account even a large-scale regime attack against U.S./SDF positions is unlikely to afflict any significant defeat against the U.S. forces in Syria. Aside from the al-Tanf base all the areas in Syria the US has a military presence in are on the east bank of the Euphrates. The way the Euphrates separates northeastern Syrian Kurdish territories and large swathes of Deir ez-Zor from the rest of the country resembles a large moat. While the regime has demonstrated its capability to use Russian-made pontoons — similar to what the Egyptian Army used to cross the Suez Canal in the 1973 Yom Kippur War — to cross the Euphrates in the past (see video below), its forces are unlikely capable of moving large numbers of tanks nor mechanized infantry across the river via pontoons or bridges without being interdicted and destroyed by U.S. aircraft. Even if it does manage to target, or even kill, U.S. troops anywhere in Syria, Washington could — and more likely than not would — promptly retaliate by destroying several regime targets across Syria using large numbers of Tomahawk cruise missiles — which neither Russian nor Syrian forces in the country have the capability to shoot down.
Also, it is highly unlikely Damascus could get Moscow’s backing in any attack against the SDF, never mind U.S. troops. Russia has shown on numerous occasions that it seeks to wrap up the conflict in Syria through negotiations now that the regime is no longer directly threatened. Taking on the SDF and risking a wider war against the U.S. could completely compromise this goal.
Damascus’s empty threats against the Israelis and Turks for their respective attacks on Syrian soil also show why this is a likely outcome. The regime has failed to deter Turkey’s significant ground incursions in the northwest, mostly because Russia never seriously opposed them.
Assad’s veiled threat against the SDF and its U.S. backer is clearly a bluff since he demonstrably possesses no capability to actually challenge the U.S. military in Syria. The likelihood of Moscow giving tacit support to a Syrian offensive against the SDF and the U.S. military is extremely unlikely for aforementioned reasons. Even if Moscow acquiesces to any regime offensive, Damascus would most likely suffer a swift battlefield defeat at the hands of the U.S. military. Ultimately, so long as the U.S. remains in northeast Syria, Damascus will not be able to send in its army and subdue the Kurds once again. With this being the case, Assad only really has one option: to try and compel the U.S. to leave Syria, and regain some form of control over its northeast, and that is his first one, negotiating with the SDF in good faith.
Two Russian Air Force Su-57s (Photo by Anna Zvereva).
For years now Syria has been the foremost proving ground for major military powers to test their equipment in real combat conditions. The first half of 2018 has proven no exception and in fact demonstrates that this trend is as, if not more so, popular as ever.
In May 2018 alone both Israel and Russia separately announced the combat debut of two different fifth-generation stealth fighter-bomber aircraft in Syria within days of each other. While both claims of these respective planes carrying out combat operations in Syria are unverified they are nevertheless worth evaluating.
In a recent article in The Daily Beast, on the other hand, military analyst David Axe outlined several reasons to be extremely skeptical over the Kremlin’s claims of a February test launch, pointing out that Moscow “seems determined to portray its stealth fighters in the best possible light as prospects fade for mass-production of the troubled warplanes.” He notes that the Su-57 “currently lacks many of its planned electronics and sensors and has been cleared to carry only a few different kinds of munitions” and in its public appearances to date has only carried “dummy bombs and missiles that are strictly for display.” Citing experts Axe illustrates that there is nothing in Shoygu’s video presentation to indicate that the missile launch did indeed take place in Syria rather than “some remote air force testing site deep in Russia’s interior.”
The military operation in Syria certainly required certain funds […]. Some 33 billion rubles were earmarked in the Ministry’s 2015 budget for military exercises. We simply retargeted these funds to support our group in Syria, and there is hardly a better way of training and perfecting combat skills than under real combat conditions. […] I am sure these costs are reasonable and necessary, because this was a chance to test everything in combat, find faults and rectify them. — Vladimir Putin, “Meeting with Russian Armed Forces Service Personnel“, President of Russia, 17.03.2016.
The symbolic projection of power that comes with using such weapon systems is another factor, which is one reason why flying Su-57s to Syria for a mere two days and firing hitherto unused missiles at unspecified targets is a worthy endeavour in Moscow’s view, if that is in fact what they did.
“We are flying the F-35 all over the Middle East,” announced the Commander of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), Major General Amikam Norkin, during the IAF Senior Air Force Conference in Herzliya last May. “It has become part of our operational capabilities,” he added. “We are the first to attack using the F-35 in the Middle East and have already attacked twice on different fronts.” Norkin made these comments while displaying a photograph showing an F-35I or “Adir” (Hebrew for “Mighty One” or simply “Awesome”) flying high above the skies of the Lebanese capital Beirut.
Israel’s Haaretz newspaper pointed out that the display “is certainly a deterrent value” against Israel’s numerous adversaries across the region, namely Hezbollah and Iran, but nevertheless added that it “comes off like an inordinate swagger” and went on to speculate that it was “perhaps also an attempt to rehabilitate the IAF’s image following the downing of an F-16 by the Syrian air defenses during the previous escalation of hostilities with Iran and Syria, in February.”
While Norkin did not mention which two fronts the F-35Is saw combat one of them was doubtlessly Syria. On May 11, Israel bombed no fewer than 30 sites believed to form part of the military infrastructure used by Iranian paramilitaries and their Shiite militia proxies in the country. IAF F-35s likely participated, but in what capacity remains unclear.
Israeli Air Force F-35I “Adir” flying over Beirut.
Israel’s single squadron of F-35s became combat operational in December 2017. As per tradition Israel’s variant of the plane has been outfitted with Israeli avionics and technology, most noticeably a domestically-developed command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) system.
Writing in Popular MechanicsKyle Mizokami reasonably speculates that the F-35Is likely took part in the May 11 strike either by participating in the extensive bombing of the numerous targets or using “its advanced sensors to identify targets on the ground for other warplanes to attack, then coordinated the entire attack via [the] airplane’s C4I system.” In other words, the F-35I may have operated as a stealthy mini-AWACS platform that oversaw the numerous attacks across the Syrian battlefield below.
As with the Russians the United States, France and the United Kingdom seized the opportunity to live fire test their new missile. The JASSM entered service back in 2006 and has a range of 370 km and can deliver a 1,000 pound warhead (almost 455 kg). An extended version of the missile, simply called the JASSM-ER, can hit targets from over 900 km away. However, in the Syria strike, the US used only the original JASSM. The massive April strike was also the first time France fired their naval variant of the Storm Shadow, the Missile de Croisière Naval (MdCN). Three of the missiles were launched from the FREMM multipurpose frigate Languedoc in the Mediterranean. 
Syria was also the first conflict zone in which the US deployed the F-22 Raptor, when it began bombing Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria back in September 2014, which continues to fly over the country today. Rather than just function as another bomber the F-22 has primarily used its powerful sensors to gather information for other US and coalition aircraft operating over Syria and helped guide them to their targets – performing a not so dissimilar function to what Mizokami speculated Israel’s F-35s might have done.
The Raptors have also helped ensure no clashes occurred between US-led coalition and Russian aircraft and successfully deterred Syrian Su-24s from bombing Kurdish forces in the city of Al-Hasakah in late August 2016 a second time. As military analyst Robert Beckhusenput it: “Think of the F-22 like a sniper – it can use force if needed, but its primary job in the Middle East is to provide overwatch.”
A picture taken on March 2, 2018 shows a Turkish army T129 ATAK attack helicopter flying towards the village of Al-Maabatli in the Afrin region in the northwestern Aleppo province countryside as part of the Operation Olive Branch (Photo: Bakr Alkasem).
Given the fact the Syrian conflict shows no sign of ending anytime soon – with regional powers like Israel and Turkey intervening more forcefully in recent months, and the likelihood that the US and Russia will retain forces in the country for some years to come more – more weapon systems will doubtlessly make their combat debut on the Syrian battlefield in the foreseeable future.
An Austrian Leopard 2 A4 during the Strong Europe Tank Challenge 2017 at Grafenwoehr, Germany (Photo: U.S. Army by Spc. Nathanael Mercado).
Since Russia annexed the Crimea in 2014, its common sense within EU member states that the use of military force is back in politics and serious land forces are important again. Main battle tanks (MBT) are regarded as their backbone. However, especially on heavy tanks the Europeans are weakly positioned – 17 types exist within their armies. In the event of war, differential technologies, crew complement and operational doctrines will severely hamper joint operations. Furthermore, especially the bordering EU member states to Russia in eastern Europe have at best outdated Soviet MBTs or none at all. Other EU states such as Germany were heavily reducing their tank fleet or have ceased them, as in the case of the Netherlands. The European Defence Agency (EDA) tries to target this weakness with the project of an “EU tank arsenal”, which should enhance the readiness of EU member states’ tank forces.
Founded in 2004, EDA’s mission is to promote and to facilitate the integration between the member states within the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and in this regard to develop projects, which should advance a common EU defence. Concerning the weakness in the area of the MBTs in the EU member states, the EDA came up with the idea that states with Leopard 2 tanks, the most frequent tank model in the EU, should modernize their older versions to the newest standard A7. These would include Germany, Finland, Greece, Italy, Austria, Poland, Sweden and Spain. After the completed modernization, these states should rent them to EU member states, which do not have modern MBTs. The detailed funding concept has been still to be determined, but it seems that the tank lessors should take over the investments for the modernization of the Leopard 2 tanks and could recoup these costs with the rents of the leaseholders over a time of ten years. The leaseholders would integrate the modernized tanks into their land forces and operate them, but servicing and crew training would be centralized in a virtual “EU tank arsenal”, organized as a grouping of European defence companies. This concept should create a win-win situation for lessor and leaseholder states. The former would be getting a steady inflow of money into its defence budget, the later modern MBTs for its forces. The EDA project based on this idea is called “Optimisation of the Main Battle Tank Capability in Europe with initial focus on Leopard 2 (OMBT-Leo2)” and its main goal is to equip eastern EU member states with modern Leopard 2 tanks. Automatically, this would boost the interoperability among the different armed forces within the EU. According to the estimation of Griephan, more than 300 Leopard 2 tanks could be allotted on this way.
The concept of a German defence company
The lead of such an “EU tank arsenal” would be readily undertaken by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), the producer of the Leopard 2 and the company behind the concept, which later was borrowed by the EDA. KMW pursues with it two business goals:
Firstly, bundled with maintenance, the EDA project would further distribute the Leopard 2 technology EU-wide. Furthermore, the “EU tank arsenal” would create a perfect base to establish the planned German-French MBT as an EU standard tank. KMW and its French partner Nexter (manufacturer of the French MBT Leclerc) are expected to be the producer of the future “Leoclerc” (known under the “KANT project“).
Secondly, modernizing and servicing older Leopard 2 variants would help KMW to survive the lean period until the next generation tank. This lean period could pose a major problem for KMW, because its first of all producing the main parts of the Leopard such as the glacis plate.
Currently, states are rarely buying new tanks, but upgrade their MBTs, for example, with a better fire control system. Such upgrades are in KMWs portfolio, but the company Rheinmetall, which supplies important parts of the Leopard (such as the cannon), is often better placed in this market segment. Rheinmetall, which KMW likes to speak about as a “subcontractor”, has won lucrative orders in the last years such as the ones from Poland and Indonesia. Both countries opted for KMW’s competitor to modernize their Leopard 2s on own concepts. KMW would certainly benefit from an overhaul to the version A7 as envisaged with “OMBT-Leo2”, an upgrade level which was developed under KMW guidance.
Benefits of an “EU tank arsenal”
The concept of an “EU tank arsenal” has more potential than only feeding the defence industry. It could offer benefits for a better territorial defence. Christian Mölling, deputy director of the German Council on Foreign Relations stated that “[s]uch a union arsenal would be like a garage with numerous service lifts instead of one in a single nation workshop. As a result, there would be a much better availability of tanks.”
The availability of tanks is a notable problem within the armies of the EU member states, which — as in the case of the German armed forces — are only in name prepared for substantial national defence. The German armed forces have huge difficulties maintaining their MBTs: less than half of all 244 Leopard 2s are operational. The spare parts depots are so badly filled that already the increased training of the German troops for the NATO presence in eastern Europe overcharged them. The maintenance of smaller national tank contingents would be more effective in a European-wide arsenal structure, where the industry provides services for a huger pooled tank fleet.
Mölling sees further advantages: The common use of one tank model would expedite the creation of a unite doctrine within European armies regarding the use of MBTs in operations. That would lead to well-matched tank units between national contingents, to much higher combat power and would favour the ability to sustain in fighting situations. The fallen tank crews of one state could be easily replaced by another. Regarding the territorial defence of European territories, this would improve the deterrence against potential adversaries with strong mechanized troops, such as Russia.
Little interest among potential participants
The advantages of an “EU tank arsenal” with Leopard 2 tanks in it are obvious. Nevertheless, the parliamentary commissioner for the German Armed Forces, Hans-Peter Bartels, is skeptical: “The industry does not have the servicing capacities for such a project. KMW already needs seven years to modernize 104 Leopard 2 for the German armed forces in our national program. For an EU arsenal, the industry or the states must advance huge payments. I don’t see the willingness for such a move.”
The number of MBTs in Member States of the EU has been constantly decreasing, from 15,000 in the year 2000 to just 5,000 today. — “Optimizing Europe’s Main Battle Tank Capabilities”, European Defence Matters, Issue 14, 2017, p.39.
In fact, there is little interest among countries labelled as potential Leopard 2 lessors by the original KMW concept. The ministry of defence in Finland (100 Leopard 2 A4) and Austria (40 Leopard 2 A4) stated on request that they don’t want to join the EDA project. Also Spain, one of the biggest holders of old Leopard 2 tanks (108 Leopard 2 A4), has other priorities, according to Esteban Villarejo, defence editor of Madrid’s daily newspaper ABC: “The defence ministry told me in the context of ‘OMBT-Leo2’ that investments in other projects such as new helicopters and frigates are considered much more important.”
The main problem of the KMW/EDA concept is that after ten years, either the lessor state takes back the Leopard 2 from the leaseholder state or these tanks would build the core of an EU tank fleet. If an EU tank fleet will ever be implemented cannot be foreseen, yet. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of the lessor the spent money for the modernization of the old Leopard 2 version to the newest standard does not represent a defence investment for the future. Strictly speaking, the Leopard 2 is a weapon system at its zenith and its development potential is exhausted. The industry is already designing the Leopard 2 successor. To ramp up the fighting power of old versions to the A7 level would cost at least seven million Euro apiece according to the estimation of experts.
Because the defence budgets in Europe only slightly increase and because the presence of other important new fields of armament such as drones and cyber technology, the upgrade of tanks takes place in a competitive environment. For now, only the German Armed Forces (from A4 to A7) and Poland (from A4 to A5/A6 equivalent) started a Leopard 2 modernization program. Apart from that, European armies with Leopard 2 tanks are using them as spare parts donors or to close other gaps in military equipment for the territorial defence; for example: Germany and Spain are planning to convert Leopard 2 A4s to armoured vehicle-launched bridges.
Despite their proximity to Russia, the potential leaseholder states in eastern Europe are not very keen to get MBTs from the EDA project. Hilmar Linnenkamp, former deputy chief executive of the EDA, assess that “[t]he smaller countries nowadays constrain themselves to maintain lighter armed troops which are not so expensive. They prefer a specialized defence concept within NATO and EU where huger players like Germany should bring in the heavy material.” For example, the defence concepts of the Baltic states only envisaged infantry fighting vehicles, but no MBTs. The ministries of defence of Lithuania and Estonia stated to the author that they don’t want to join the EDA project.
Czechia is a fan – Germany hesitates
Germany and the Czech Republic show their interest in the project. The ministry of defence in Prague signifies on request that its main interest lies in the benefits of country’s defence industry. Czech companies could deliver products in the field of optoelectronics, CBRN protection, cable harnessing and medical modifications of the Leopard tanks. The tone in the German ministry of defence on the “OMBT-Leo2” is more reserved: “We are tracing the development of the project with particular interest.” That surely means that Berlin is undecided if it should join or not.
There are pros and cons from a German perspective. The project could be a favourable platform to offer the planned German-French MBT to participants of the “EU tank arsenal” and could promote the implementation of the upcoming technology as an “EU standard”. That would serve Germany’s general interest to place itself as a main coordinator of a European-wide defence network. However, the concept does not fit to Germany’s military strategy for Europe, which is based on the approach that small, specialized armies should lean on frame forces with a broader range of capabilities, such as Germany. The idea behind this approach is the better long-term allocation of the shrunken, only slowly recovering, military resources of European states. In fact, the EDA-project offers exactly the opposite: the shrunken tank stocks in Europe would be spread among more users – an idea in which a lot of EU partner armies obviously don’t see any need. In other words: the concept of an “EU tank arsenal” with modernized Leopard 2 tanks could bring clear benefits for Europe’s territorial defence, but its implementation is unrealistic.
If even a sizable portion of the Emirate of Qatar’s current arms deals come to fruition in the foreseeable future then Doha’s military will become far larger and more powerful in the first half of the 2020s. From expanding its air force with cutting edge American and French fighter jets to an unprecedented expansion of its ground and naval forces, Qatar is pouring billions into making its military a formidable power that could punch well above its weight in the Persian Gulf region, if it finds enough skilled personnel.
Royal Saudi Air Force F-15SA, introduced in February 2017, which is similar but inferior to the F-15QA (Photo: Fahad Rihan).
The deal also includes the supply of Meteor air-to-air missiles and long-range cruise missiles, giving the Qataris an aerial platform capable of holding its own in the air and striking any potential adversaries on the ground with precision.
Just after the initial letter of intent was signed last September 17 Jane’s defence journal noted that if all of Qatar’s “orders are fulfilled in full, the QEAF will field a fighter force of 84 platforms across three different types.” (Add to this the additional 12 Rafales then the tiny sheikdom will possess a highly formidable fleet totaling 96 new jets; the Dassault Mirage 2000s will be replaced by the new fighter jets)
In March 2018 the tiny emirate also made an agreement to buy six armed Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones along with ground control systems, equipment and a training simulator. According to the Turkish press these systems will be delivered within a year.
Qatar also signed a letter of intent to buy 490 armoured VBCI infantry fighting vehicles built by the French government’s Nexter Systems weapons manufacturing company during Macron’s aforementioned visit last December. The Norwegian firm Kongsberg was selected in March to provide turrets and weapon systems for those vehicles. However, that potential $1.94 billion contract has not yet been finalized. Jane’s also noted that “it is unclear what vehicle variants and weapons configurations the Qataris will ultimately order”.
Another potential country that could supply Qatar with some of its military’s needs is Ukraine. Both countries signed an agreement regarding military and technical cooperation during a meeting with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in March. The document says it “will contribute to strengthening friendly ties between Ukraine and Qatar aimed at improving the defense capacity of the two states.”
In the meantime, Qatar has permitted Turkey to base troops (about 150 soldiers) and equipment on its soil since the onset of the blockade, which serve as another deterrent against any potential attacker.
An official Fincantieri artist depiction of one of the future multi-role air defence corvette of the Qatar Emiri Naval Forces.
On the sea, Qatar also wants to beef up its small navy of just seven attack boats – which currently consist of four British-made Vita-class fast attack craft and three French-made La Combattante III-class fast attack craft.
The vice president of Fincantieri’s Qatar program, David Traverso, lauded the deal describing it as “the biggest turnkey program we have ever had in terms of export market in the Arab region. [..] The program will be a big boost for our shipyards in the naval business area,” he said, “but I would say the same for Qatar, as we will be staying there for approximately 10 years in order to maintain the naval units.”
On March 13 the Anadolu Shipyard in Turkey also announced that it had signed an agreement to build two training ships for the Qatari Navy. The chairman of the shipyard told Turkey’s Anadolu news agency that they will have the capacity to train 72 naval cadets at a time. Qatari officials also said in March that they made agreements to procure another 17 warships which, according to Anadolu, “will be outfitted with weapons built by Turkish defense manufacturer Aselsan.”
Conclusion: Lack of manpower the main stumbling block
The fact that many of these deals were made after Qatar was placed under a blockade in mid-2017 is a slap in the face to that Saudi-led endeavour, which aimed to essentially strip the tiny country of its independence and bring its foreign policy in line with the interests of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. It’s also a sign that Doha is conscious of how limited its military capabilities have been in the preceding decades.
While all these deals combined are unlikely to enable Qatar to prevail on some future battlefield against its neighbours, they will give Doha a much more effective deterrent against any potential attack, fulfilling its most fundamental defence needs in ways it hitherto could not.
Nevertheless, tiny Qatar – with a native population of a mere 300,000 – is faced with the enormous task of finding skilled personnel to both operate these systems and, eventually, maintain them. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies‘ (IISS) 2018 Military Balance report notes: “At a conservative estimate of 1.5 pilots trained per aircraft, this will mean that, in due course, the QEAF will need a minimum steady state of over 300 trained pilots, plus the requisite engineers, weapons experts and other personnel, which will likely prove a significant challenge”.
Things are not much better on the naval front. The report notes that Qatar “lacks its own naval academy, and even if it had one, officers would be hard pressed to assimilate the specialist training and experience that will be required to operate the navy’s new ships to their full capability”.
And, finally, on the ground the Qatari army “also requires a wide range of supporting capabilities that will be essential for it to be militarily effective, not least a fully integrated command-and-control system, […] training, maintenance and logistics requirements”.
Iraqi Kurdistan’s former President Masoud Barzani welcoming Muqtada al-Sadr to Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital city Erbil in 2012.
“I think a powerful Sadr in Baghdad means a lot for Kurds in the Kurdistan Region, as Sadr has good ties with Saudi Arabia and his anti-Iranian policy in Iraq is quite advantageous for them,” Lawk Ghafuri, a Kurdish political writer and economic masters degree candidate, told Offiziere. “However a powerful Sadr also means a weaker U.S. in Baghdad, as it’s obvious Muqtada al-Sadr has been opposing the US policy in Iraq for years,” he added.
It’s not yet clear what the future government of Iraq will look like. Michael Knights, a leading Iraq analyst and Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Offiziere that he sees scenarios “in which Sadr shapes the next government, is in an Iran-built pan-Shiite government, or is the only major bloc not in the government.”
Knights consequently recommends that it is “best not to assume anything” at such an early stage. He does, nevertheless, point to Sadr’s past interactions with the Kurds, “most notably with the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party] in the May 2012 in the attempted vote of no-confidence in [former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki, when Muqtada resisted huge Iranian pressure to leave that [former Kurdish President Masoud] Barzani-led effort.”
The KDP is the largest political party in Iraqi Kurdistan and won the most seats among Kurdish parties in the Iraqi Parliament in this election.
Kyle Orton, a UK-based independent Middle East researcher, points to the broader history of Sadr transforming himself from a murderous sectarian thug in the early years of the Iraq War (2003-11) to a more conciliatory and largely non-sectarian nationalist figure in more recent memory.
Sadr’s Peace Companies militiamen leaving Kirkuk after Iraq seized the region from the Kurds last October (Photo: Raveen Aujmaya on Twitter).
He also instances Sadr’s historic visit to Saudi Arabia last year as well as his “attempts to reduce friction between Arabs and Kurds” as positive examples of his conciliatory approach. “Sadr’s stated position on Kirkuk is by no means aligned with the KDP, but it purports to be a lot more amenable to compromise than [incumbent Iraqi Prime Minister] Haider al-Abadi proved to be and obviously more so than Iran’s outright proxies such as Hadi al-Ameri,” Orton explained.
Knights also believes that al-Sadr “would be a net positive for the Kurdish people, especially now that Kirkuk is back in federal hands, which has removed one irritant and source of paranoia for Sadrists.”
Ghafuri argues that the most important thing for Kurds presently is “unity in Baghdad”. “We should also remember that after the Kurdistan independence referendum last September Sadr was one of the leaders who suggested to Abadi that he send forces to control border gates of the Kurdistan Region,” he went on to recall. “The first thing the Kurds need to is set some conditions before entreating the coalition to form any government in Baghdad, since forming the government in Baghdad now depends highly on Kurds, especially the KDP,” he reasoned. “I’m saying KDP as the others – namely the PUK [Patriotic Union of Kurdistan] and Gorran [Movement for Change party] – are already considered an Iranian policy implementers in Iraq in Sadr’s perspective.” The PUK is widely alleged, among other things, to have handed over the disputed region of Kirkuk to Iraq last October as part of an Iran-brokered deal.
Orton believes that al-Sadr’s electoral success could lead to the formation of “an ostensibly more moderate, less Iran-friendly governmental coalition in Baghdad combining together al-Sadr and al-Abadi, perhaps with Iyad al-Allawi<’s/a> Al-Wataniya and Osama al-Nujaifi’s Qarar al-Iraqi.”
Iraq’s Parliament in Baghdad.
“If Sadr wins and heads such a coalition he also provides something of a face-saving way for the KDP to re-enter a coalition with Abadi, who could be asked to stay on as prime minister,” he added. Orton also anticipates that in spite of these results “the pillars of Iran’s pervasive influence in Iraq will endure, even if Sadr’s positioning against Tehran is genuine. […] The Kurdistan Region is likely to continue to struggle to make its way within Iraq,” he added, pointing to its devastating loss of Kirkuk in October, the continuing economic crisis in the region as well as the machinations of the PUK in recent months – which Orton says places them “wholly in the Iranian camp”. “This loss of leverage for Erbil is compounded by the better-than-expected showing for the Fatah Alliance, which will further entrench politically the military power that Iran holds in Iraq through its Shiite militias, whose primary antagonist since ISIS receded has been the Kurdish Peshmerga forces under KDP command,” he concluded.
North Korean figure skaters Ryom Tae Ok (R) and Kim Ju Sik perform during the figure skating exhibition gala at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in Gangneung, South Korea, on Feb. 25, 2018.
The election of Moon Jae-in as President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in May 2017 has brought with it many changes in government policy, perhaps most notably the conciliatory approach he has adopted toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) during the 2018 Winter Olympic Games in Pyeongchang and the inter-Korean summit on April 28. The most ambitious of President Moon’s proposed reforms, though, relates to South Korea’s energy policy, which was unveiled in June 2017, barely a month after he took office. Yet, this proposal might not go far enough in ensuring South Korea’s energy security, especially when tensions inevitably erupt once again on the Korean Peninsula.
Under President Moon’s proposal, South Korea would turn away from coal and nuclear fission, with coal-fired power generation’s share of the national energy mix dropping from 40% to 21% by 2030 and nuclear power declining to 22% from approximately 30%. Meanwhile, Moon’s plan would have South Korea place greater reliance on gas-fired power and renewable resources in the future; by 2030, gas-fired power’s share of the South Korean energy mix would grow from 18% to 27% and renewables would expand from 5% to 20%. This will, in short, mean installing 47.2 gigawatts (GW) worth of new generating capacity from renewable resources in a period of only 12 years.
South Korea total primary energy consumption by fuel type, 2015.
In particular, it is worth noting that the SK Incheon Petrochem facility, which processes approximately 275,000 barrels of crude oil per day, is located within range of the conventional artillery that North Korea has amassed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). South Korea’s remaining four refineries, processing a combined total of 2.7 million barrels of crude oil per day, are within range of many of the missile designs within the North Korean arsenal, from the older Hwasong-6 to the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) unveiled in November 2017. Beyond refineries, several large-scale electricity generating facilities, such as the Yangyang Pumped Storage Power Station, owned and operated by Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power and with a hydropower capacity of 1,000 MW, are sufficiently close to the North Korean border that they could be targeted for a ballistic missile strike. This would have a devastating economic impact, as the Yangyang hydropower project alone provides electricity to about 164,000 households in South Korea and any significant damage to the facility would be very expensive to repair – in terms of both time and resources.
Given this, it is surprising that the new South Korean energy policy does not explicitly promote a transition to distributed generation and a decentralized grid. Such an approach would see South Korea placing greater emphasis on small-scale electricity generation facilities and encouraging each building, particularly in commercial districts, to be self-sufficient, such as through the installation of solar panels or geothermal heating and cooling systems. Distributed generation would be relatively easy for South Korea to implement; with a population density of approximately 507 people per square kilometre, South Korea is the 23rd most densely populated country in the world. As South Korea occupies a small territory of just over 100,000 square kilometres, the necessary infrastructure changes would not be prohibitively expensive either. By locating some power generation facilities close to major population centres, which would be almost unavoidable in such a densely populated country, it would also be possible to avoid high transmission costs. As such, promoting greater reliance on electricity generation from renewable resources without the accompanying change in how that energy is transmitted and distributed to consumers seems a half-measure.
Oil infrastructure of the Republic of Korea (Source: “Energy Supply Security 2014”, International Energy Agency, 2014, p. 289).
Political realities may explain why President Moon’s administration is reluctant to take the full steps necessary to guarantee energy security in the face of the North Korean threat. Polling from October 2017 suggests the South Korean public narrowly favours continued investment in nuclear power and, as of this writing, construction continues on five nuclear reactor units: three at Kori Nuclear Power Plant and two at Hanul Nuclear Power Plant. Amid an historic thaw in relations with North Korea, President Moon enjoys an approval rating of 84%. But this popularity could quickly erode if upcoming inter-Korea talks fall through or fail to produce any tangible outcomes, especially as President Moon’s popularity prior to the Olympics had dropped from 70.8% in early December 2017 to 59.8% just over a month later, in January 2018. This may go some way toward explaining why President Moon does not have much appetite for a controversial war on the nuclear industry or a major campaign to significantly change the way South Koreans interact with and manage electricity in their daily lives. This is especially true among young voters, who were key to bringing President Moon to power in 2017 and have shown strong disapproval of the decision to field a team representing a “united” Korea at the Pyeongchang Olympics. These same young voters would be most sensitive to any changes in South Korean energy policy that would suggest a weak level of commitment to the aforementioned Paris Agreement.
As it seems unlikely that President Moon’s popularity will be buoyed in the polls before South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) begins its implementation of the new energy policy, it is likely South Korea will continue to have weak levels of energy security, characterized by a reliance on large-scale power generating facilities and the importation of natural resources. This further raises the strategic importance for South Korea of participating in the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system proposed by the United States, though this technology cannot fully guarantee national energy security either. As some analysts have noted, more recent missile designs tested by North Korea may have the ability to evade modern ballistic missile defence systems. This would also offer no assurance for the security of those facilities within range of North Korea’s conventional artillery, like the SK Incheon Petrochem facility. The surest guarantee of South Korean energy security, therefore, is to give the North as few targets of opportunity for its ballistic missiles as possible by decentralizing power generation.
The launch of four ballistic missiles by the Korean People’s Army (KPA) during a military drill at an undisclosed location in North Korea earlier March 2017.
The “Montreux Document” contains approximately 70 recommendations, including proposed procedures for screening personnel, correct prosecution when breaches of conduct occur, and personnel training on international human rights and humanitarian law. It is, in truth, a non-binding and non-legal document, as no signatory can be sanctioned for failing to implement these recommendations in domestic law or practice. Yet, in the decade since the “Montreux Document” was produced, only 54 countries have signed and ratified, including 23 of the European Union’s 28 member states and the US. Interestingly, many countries which have recently employed, or are currently employing, large numbers of PMCs have still neglected to sign the “Montreux Document”, including Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia.
The 53 Participating states of the Montreux Document.
This seems to suggest an ongoing lack of awareness within the international community about the destabilizing effect PMCs can have in conflict areas when accountability and a strict code of conduct are absent. In some cases, this destabilizing effect is understood and used to pursue perceived geopolitical objectives, as in the case of Iran employing PMCs in Syria. Some might argue that governments have abstained from the “Montreux Document” out of a belief that the private security industry should self-regulate, especially given the international nature of some of these companies and their operations. To that end, in 2013, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC PSSP) was developed, again through the leadership of the Swiss government. But only seven countries (Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the US), 24 civil society organizations, and 91 companies have signed on to this document, which is also non-binding and non-legal.
The ICoC PSSP goes some way toward plugging the gaps, with the 91 PMCs complying with this code hailing from 32 different countries, some of which have not yet ratified the aforementioned “Montreux Document”, such as Ghana and Colombia. The bulk of the PMCs party to the ICoC PSSP are based in the countries described in the table below.
Number of PMCs
United Kingdom (16), United States (15)
Cyprus (7), Pakistan (6)
China (4), France (4), Iraq (3), Singapore (3), Somalia (3)
A relatively easy way to ensure more widespread compliance with the recommendations outlined in the ICoC PSSP would be for countries which have signed the “Montreux Document” to also sign the code of conduct, with their national contact points then pressuring PMCs that have abstained from the ICoC to sign on as well. This “naming and shaming” certainly could not force full compliance from all PMCs, but it would certainly expand the scope of the code of conduct to include more actors within the private security industry. If this scope is then sufficiently expanded, it may well lead to international legal bodies viewing the provisions under the code of conduct as jus cogens, fundamental principles of law that can be applied to the conduct of even those PMCs which are not party to the ICoC PSSp. As only 7 of the 54 state parties to the “Montreux Document” have also signed the ICoC, there is considerable room for this growth in scope.
It is important that this power – to name and shame PMCs which do not comply with minimum standards of conduct – be fully utilized. In the past, intergovernmental organizations, aids groups, and other actors in conflict areas have exhibited a reluctance to do so. One recent comprehensive study by American University researchers on the implementation of the “Montreux Document” found several cases in which PMCs clearly breached minimum standards of conflict but were not “named and shamed”, such as an incident in July 2010, when private security personnel opened fire on the road from Baghdad International Airport, killing one Iraqi civilian, but the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) declined to specify which company had been involved in the incident. While this initial reluctance to name the company could be attributed to operational security needs – in particular, personnel from that company could find themselves targeted for reprisal by armed groups – the lack of transparency about the incident in years after the incident suggests a lack of appreciation for the corrective power “naming and shaming” can have for a specific company and for the broader private security industry.
In any case, that only 54 countries have signed the “Montreux Document” ten years on is hardly encouraging. A renewed effort to establish standards of behaviour for private military contractors operating in areas of armed conflict is needed, especially as the outsourcing of military operations to private contractors continues and commercial shipping comes under increased threat from piracy in the waterways of Southeast Asia, West Africa, and beyond. With that in mind, the Maritime Working Group of the forum for participants of the “Montreux Document” had its first meeting on the use of private military and security companies in maritime security on January 30, 2018.
• • •
What does the “Montreux Document”?
The “Montreux Document” …
recalls the pertinent international legal obligations of States, private military and security companies (PMSCs) and their personnel in situations of armed conflict;
contains a compilation of good practices designed to help States take national measures to implement their obligations;
highlights the responsibilities of three types of States: Contracting States (countries that hire PMSCs), Territorial States (countries on whose territory PMSCs operate) and Home States (countries in which PMSCs are based);
makes it clear that States have an obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and to uphold human rights law; as a result, they have a duty to take measures designed to prevent misconduct by PMSCs and ensure accountability for criminal behaviour;
recalls that PMSCs and their personnel are bound by international humanitarian law and must respect its provisions at all times during armed conflict, regardless of their status;
recalls that misconduct on the part of PMSCs and their personnel can trigger responsibility on two levels: first, the criminal responsibility of the perpetrators and their superiors, and second, the responsibility of the State that gave instructions for, directed or controlled the misconduct;
provides a toolkit for governments to establish effective oversight and control over PMSCs, for example through contracts or licensing/authorization systems.
The “Montreux Document” is useful because it enhances the protection afforded to people affected by armed conflicts. It does so by clarifying and reaffirming international law, by encouraging the adoption of national regulations on PMSCs designed to strengthen respect for international law, and by offering guidance on how and in what light this should be done, based on lessons learnt. The conduct of parties to an armed conflict is regulated by international humanitarian law. Another branch of international law – human rights law – also provides protection in armed conflicts. Most of the rules (expressed as statements) and good practices assembled in the “Montreux Document” derive from international humanitarian law and human rights law. Other branches of international law, such as the law of State responsibility and international criminal law, also serve as a basis.
by Asiri Fernando. He is currently reading for a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and Politics, Security and Counter Terrorism Studies at Murdoch University, Perth, Western Australia. He has completed an internship at the Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka (INSSSL) as a research assistant and holds a diploma in International Relations from the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS) in Colombo. He has served as a news editor for the Sri Lankan Air Force Command Media Unit during 2009/10.
One of the UAVs is displayed upside-down to show its IEDs mounted on rails.
Up to 13 drones were used for these two attacks making it an unprecedented use of drone airpower by a non-state actor. The drones were guided by using GPS and could have been launched from up to 100 km away. Apparently, seven of these drones were destroyed by Pantsyr-S short-range air defence systems and the other six were intercepted by electronic warfare units. The Russian Ministry of Defence denied any own losses or damages due to the incident. Two recovered samples were displayed at a press briefing in January 11.
According to a statement of the Russian Ministry of Defence the “[e]ngineering solutions used by terrorists when attacking Russian facilities in Syria could have been received only from a country with high technological potential on providing satellite navigation and distant control of firing competently assembled self-made explosive devices in appointed place” (“UAV attack causes no damage to Russian military facilities in Syria“, TASS, 8 January 2018). Major General Aleksandr Novikov, the head of the Russian military’s UAV development and construction department highlighted that the drones carried each ten 400g improvised explosive devices (IED) with fragmentations (small metal balls). Apparently, Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) was used as explosive basis in the IEDs, which is produces “by a number of countries, including Ukraine at the Shostkinsky Chemical Plant”.
An attack south of Tal Afar in north-western Iraq carried out by an Air-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (ABIED) launched from a drone in February 2017.
Russians finger-pointing could be interpreted as a sign of the growing tensions between the USA and Russia. Both Russia and the USA support, supply and train different fractions waging war in Syria. However, contrary to claim by the Russian Ministry of defence on the satellite navigation and distant control of firing technology, the necessary technological solutions have been available in the civilian market for many years and PETN was used by terrorist groups several times before (for example in the 1980 Paris synagogue bombing, the 2001 shoe bomb attempt and it was used in 2009 by the “Underwear Bomber“). According to Samuel Bendett, a researcher specializing in unmanned systems at the Center for Naval Analyses, “[i]t’s very likely that such parts were most likely acquired commercially, in which case we are entering a dangerous terra incognita with respect to unsanctioned UAV use by non-state and terrorist organizations.” The use of drones by insurgents and terrorists is a growing trend in the Iraq-Syria conflict zone during the past few years; it is a showcase of what is possible with existing and emerging technologies.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and other groups such as Hezbollah and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham have been known to use drones for their activities in the past and continue to do so today. Non-state actors have mostly used drones for reconnaissance, fire correction and to strike ground targets with small munitions or IEDs. The use of drones offers insurgents and terrorists unprecedented tactical advantages to coordinate attacks and gather intelligence, especially in urban environments. Further, imagery captured by drones make valuable propaganda material for groups like ISIS, who rely heavily on online visual content for recruitment. The proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) technologies, ease of access to commercially available components, availability of commercial drones and recreational crafts is viewed as a concern by Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre. The number of Airborne Improvised Explosive Devices (ABIEDs) has been increasing since the start of the Syrian war, and ABIEDs have been used in Iraq as well.
Recovered ABIED’s used in the Khmeimim Air Base attack.
ISIS is believed to be the most prolific user of drones up to now. Although insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and Syria have used fixed-wing drones from time to time in the past few years, most of the used drones have been commercial quadcopters, most of which are small enough to be carried and used by one individual. The possibility to purchase them online at a low cost makes them an ideal choice. The quadcopter configuration offers a stable slow and low altitude platform and comes with easy to master controls, real-time video downlink and simple navigation systems. Furthermore its ability to hover over a target offers relatively good accuracy. For aerial attack, quadcopters are often used with small ABIEDs. The most frequently ones have been made of 30 mm or 40 mm grenade launcher ammunition with an improvised tail-fin assembly (Nick Waters, “Death From Above: The Drone Bombs of the Caliphate“, Bellingcat, 10.02.2017). ISIS is also known to have designed and manufactured in numbers, several types of ABIEDs, projectile bombs and related fuses in Syria (“Islamic State’s Multi-Role IEDs: Projected Grenades Used as Air-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (ABIEDs)“, Conflict Armament Research, April 2017).
However, according to military analyst Nick Waters, the ABIEDs recovered after the Khmeimim attack may be specifically built for a drone-borne attack (see his Tweet below). The downed drones displayed by the Russian Ministry of Defence indicate that they were purpose built. Designed in a conventional aircraft (fixed–wing) configuration and powered by a small diesel engine, it is clear that these drones were designed to have greater range and higher payload capacity. These facts indicate that the Khmeimim Air Force Base attack was a progression in the tactics of drone-borne ABIED-use by a non-state actor. Further, the use of commonly available “off the shelf” components make it difficult to track its origins and builders, adding a layer of deniability to the drone user.
More pictures released by the Russian MoD of the mysterious Khmeimim drones.
Note the construction of the bomblet too. These were custom made for drones, rather than modifying an existing munition. https://t.co/4sMfYTbRrc
There have been reports of drones and ABIEDs being used in the ongoing civil wars in Yemen and Libya. In December 2017, the US have used a recovered drone amongst other exhibits as evidence for alleged Iranian state sponsoring of Yemeni rebel and terrorist groups. Laura Seal, a US Defence Department Spokesperson, referred to the Qasef-1, an ABIED “kamikaze-style” drone, which had been recovered from Houthi groups by the Saudi Forces. Seal claimed that “[o]nly Iran makes the Qasef-1. It is a member of the Ababil UAV family, designed and produced by the Iranian government.” Due to such claims, it is prudent to expect that more sophisticated UAS technology and more advanced types of drones may be fielded by non–state actors in the future. Drones such as the Qasef-1, give non-state actors a degree of stand-off range precision strike capabilities which were previously only available to government forces.
Captured Qasef-1 Kamikaze style drone, on exhibit by the US Department of Defense.
Off the battlefield, drone-borne threats to critical infrastructure, aviation and soft targets are a significant security concern, too (Asiri Fernando, “Unlawful Use of Civilian Drones in Sri Lanka: A Security Concern?“, Institute of National Security Studies of Sri Lanka, 29.07.2017). Between early October and late November 2014, drones breaching the restricted airspace over 13 of France’s 19 nuclear power plants caused the French authorities to introduce several measures to counter illegal drone intrusions over critical infrastructure and defence related sites. In 2015, a drone carrying radioactive sand landed on the Japanese Prime Minister’s residence. Police later arrested a man who had intended to protest against Japan’s Nuclear energy policies with the drone landing (“Japan Radioactive Drone: Tokyo Police Arrest Man“, BBC News, 25.04.2015). Such acts demonstrate that Drones or UASs can be used to deliver small chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear payloads.
In February 2017, the US Department of Homeland Securityreleased a document on critical infrastructure security where it notes that drones can be a significant threat to national security and that the potential for drone use in an attack is on the rise. Utility services networks such as the national power grid, water distribution systems and filtration plants, telecommunication networks, ports and oil refineries are key to maintain the economy running smoothly and are vulnerable on drone attacks. Therefore, it is important that security policymakers pay attention to the evolving threat landscape, especially in relation to critical infrastructure protection.
Die Anstrengungen, welche das langfristige Schicksal des Iraks beeinflussen werden, beginnen erst jetzt. Der IS forderte unter der irakischen Bevölkerung seit 2014 mehr als 68’000 Todesopfer und das fehlende Vertrauen unter den einzelnen Bevölkerungsgruppen ist noch lange nicht wieder hergestellt. Zusätzlich zu den Flüchtlingen aus Syrien hatte der Irak bis zum Ende der erfolgreichen Bekämpfung des IS über 5 Millionen Binnenflüchtlinge, wovon schätzungsweise die Hälfte wieder in ihre Häuser zurückkehren konnten. Der Wiederaufbau wird nach irakischen Schätzungen mehr als 88 Milliarden U.S.-Dollar kosten und noch mehrere Jahre andauern. Al-Abadi unterstrich deshalb auch, dass der Irak nun weitreichende politische Reformen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung erzielen müsse, welche allen ethnischen Gruppierungen zugute kommen müssten.
Das Problem des richtigen Sprachgebrauchs
Nicht nur das Beispiel Iraks zeigt auf, dass mit dem militärischen Erfolg gegen den IS dessen Form des Dschihadismus noch lange nicht besiegt ist. Es geht vielmehr um einen vielfältigen und komplexen Kampf der Ideologien. Das beginnt bereits beim richtigen Sprachgebrauch und bei der Deutung der Begriffe. So erklärte der nationale Sicherheitsberater des nigerianischen Präsidenten, General Babagana Monguno, dass für die überwiegende Mehrheit der Muslime die Begriffe “Dschihad” und “Kalifat” nichts mit Terrorismus, Extremismus und Zerstörung gemeinsam hätten. Vielmehr würden es Konzepte darstellen, die nicht gegen andere Staaten und Kulturen, sondern gegen die Tyrannei gerichtet seien. Deshalb sei darauf zu achten, dass diese Begriffe nicht mit einer negativen Konnotation versehen würden.
Auch der Stabschef der pakistanischen Streitkräfte, General Qamar Javed Bajwa vertrat diese Meinung in einer einführenden Ansprache an der MSC 2018. Ein bewaffneter Dschihad sei eigentlich ausschliesslich einer Staatsmacht vorbehalten. Dieser Grundsatz sei jedoch beim Kampf gegen den sowjetischen Einmarsch in Afghanistan 1979 aufgeweicht worden. Auf der Seite der westlichen Staaten unterstützte damals Pakistan die Mudschahedin. In Schulen wurden mit gewaltverherrlichenden Lehrbüchern und aus dem Zusammenhang gerissenen Koranversen Kinder radikalisiert. Die USA unterstützten diese Indoktrinierung in Afghanistan mit mehreren Millionen U.S.-Dollar. Dadurch wurde auch die Meinung verbreitet, dass der bewaffnete Dschihad zu Verteidigungszwecken auch für nichtstaatliche Akteure legitim sei. Später diente diese Indoktrinierung den terroristischen Gruppierungen als Basis zur weiteren missbräuchlichen Instrumentalisierung des Konzepts des Dschihads. Bis heute versuchen auf dieser Basis terroristische Gruppierungen in Pakistan die Bevölkerung zu radikalisieren — zum Teil mit Erfolg, denn gemäss Bajwa fühlten sich viele Muslime verletzt oder missverstanden.
Pakistan habe seine Lektion schmerzlich lernen müssen — man ernte nun, was vor 40 Jahren gesäht wurde. Um den Extremismus in Pakistan zu bekämpfen, sei es deshalb wichtig, die Dinge korrekt beim Namen zu nennen: Beim gewalttätigen Extremismus handle es sich nicht um Dschihadismus, sondern um blanken Terrorismus. Informationskampagnen an Schulen mit dem Ziel falsche Interpretationen des Korans zu korrigieren, würden für Pakistan seit letztem Jahr eine wichtige Massnahme im Kampf gegen den Extremismus darstellen. Eine im letzten Jahr ausgesprochene Fatwa untersage beispielsweise Selbstmordanschläge und gesetzliche Regelungen würden jegliche Form von Extremismus unter Strafe stellen.
Der Verbleib der IS-Kämpfer
Die Frage nach dem Verbleib der IS-Kämpfer nach dem Fall ihres Kalifats ist von höchster Bedeutung. Gemäss einer Studie des Soufan Center vom letzten Oktober sind etwas mehr als ein Achtel bzw. 5’600 der ursprünglich mehr als 40’000 ausländischen IS-Kämpfern in ihre Ursprungsländer zurückgekehrt (siehe Graphik oben). Gemäss einem Bericht des von der EU finanzierten Radicalisation Awareness Networks sollen bis im Juli 2017 von den rund 5’000 europäischen Dschihad-Reisenden rund 30% wieder in ihre Ursprungsländer zurückgekehrt sein. Die danach zunehmend erfolgreiche Bekämpfung des IS führte jedoch gemäss dem bis im März 2018 noch amtierende deutsche Innenminister Thomas de Maizière zu keiner signifikanten Rückreisewelle von ehemaligen IS-Kämpfer bzw. zu deren geografische Verlagerung in andere Konfliktgebiete. Der britische EU-Kommissar für die Sicherheitsunion, Sir Julian King erklärte, dass die Rückreisewelle der europäischen IS-Kämpfer bereits zu einem Zeitpunkt erfolgte, als der IS zunehmend Gebietsverluste einstecken musste. Es handelte sich dabei primär um desillusionierte bzw. wenig motivierte Kämpfer. Die bis zum kompletten Zusammenbruch des IS in der Region Verbliebenen, würden vermutlich zu den motivierteren Kämpfern gehören, welche entweder getötet wurden, oder sich auch jetzt noch in der Region aufhalten bzw. sich in andere Konfliktgebiete verlagern würden.
Mit der erfolgreichen Bekämpfung ist die Attraktivität des IS für potentielle Kämpfer aus westlichen Staaten spürbar gefallen. Doch am Nahen Osten benachbarte Konfliktgebiete und Staaten mit Ablegern des IS oder der Al-Qaida werden zukünftig mit sich verschiebenden motivierten ehemaligen IS-Kämpfern konfrontiert sein. General Qamar Javed Bajwa sagte beispielsweise, dass mehrere Nachrichtendienste bestätigt hätten, dass der erfolgreiche Kampf gegen den IS im Nahen Osten zu einer Verschiebung der IS-Kämpfer nach Afghanistan bewirkt hätte. Dies werde natürlich auch die Sicherheitslage in Pakistan beeinflussen, denn der grenzüberschreitende Terrorismus aus Afghanistan stelle für Pakistan nach wie vor ein grosses Problem dar. Zwar hätten die pakistanischen Streitkräfte Fortschritte im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus erzielt, und es gäbe keine terroristischen Camps auf pakistanischem Territorium, doch die 2,7 Millionen afghanischen Flüchtlinge in Pakistan würden insbesondere vom Haqqani-Netzwerk zur Anwerbung neuer Kämpfer missbraucht. Deshalb habe die pakistanische Regierung ein Interesse daran, mittel- bis langfristig diese Flüchtlinge wieder nach Afghanistan zurückzuführen. Gleichzeitig würden Schritte unternommen, um die afghanisch-pakistanische Grenze besser zu sichern, darunter auch die Befestigung eines 2’300 km langen Grenzabschnittes. Zwar konnte sich der IS bis jetzt nicht in Pakistan etablieren, doch für Afghanistan bleibe diese Gefahr bestehen. Um dies zu verhindern sei zukünftig eine noch stärkere internationale Zusammenarbeit wichtig. Die Befriedung Afghanistans sei entscheidend im Kampf gegen den grenzüberschreitenden Terrorismus. Deshalb unterstütze Pakistan den U.S.-amerikanischen Ansatz in der Region voll und ganz. Man dürfe sich jedoch keine Illusionen machen, der Kampf gegen den Extremismus werde noch lange andauern. Für den Erfolg sei ein ideologisches Gegenkonzept notwendig — in diesem Bereich sei noch Aufholbedarf. Darüberhinaus versuche Pakistan die verschiedenen Konfliktparteien zusammenzubringen und so eine Aussöhnung zu erreichen.
Eine falsche Ideologies muss bekämpft…
Der Direktor der nationalen Nachrichtendienste in den USA, Dan Coats erinnerte an die Erfahrungen bei der Bekämpfung des IS in den südlichen Philippinen. Hier habe die Vernichtung des IS-Rumpfes dazu geführt, dass Teile davon sich wie Fangarme weiter verbreitet, und sich in anderen Gebieten festgesetzt hätten. Diese Beobachtungen wurden auch in Indonesien, Malaysia und in anderen ostasiatischen Staaten gemacht. Al-Qaida, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab und andere lokale terroristische Gruppierungen würden die Niederlage des IS nicht primär als Schlag gegen ihre eigenen Organisationen auffassen, sondern als Chance eine tragende Rolle spielen zu können. Die Herausforderung bestehe also nicht nur darin den IS militärisch zu vernichten, sondern der Ideologie dahinter erfolgreich zu begegnen. Der IS sei auch eine pervertierte theologische Interpretation des Korans. Es sei deshalb notwendig, dass die muslimische Gemeinschaft von sich aus klar auf diese falsche Interpretation hinweise. Wegen der fehlenden Reputation könne diese Aufgabe nicht von anderen Religionsgemeinschaften übernommen werden. Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus gleiche stark dem ideologischen Kampf gegen den Kommunismus in den 1980er-Jahren: Auch hier habe schliesslich die Bevölkerung in den betroffenen Staaten den Ausschlag gegeben — sie hätten von der kommunistischen Ideologie genug gehabt, und sich schliesslich dagegen gewehrt. Die Einschätzung der U.S.-Nachrichtendienste sei deshalb, dass der IS eine langfristige weltweite Bedrohung bleiben werde.
Der ägyptische Aussenminister Sameh Hassan Shoukry teilte die Ansicht von Coats, dass primär die muslimische Gemeinschaft auf die Pervertierung des Korans durch extremistische Ideologien hinweisen müsste, und dass dies nicht anderen religiösen Gemeinschaften überlassen werden könne. So wie die terroristischen Gruppierungen die sozialen Medien für die Verbreitung falscher Ideologien benutzen würden, müssten diese Kanäle noch stärker im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus genutzt werden, um die richtigen Botschaften bei den Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen zu platzieren. Shoukry erinnerte jedoch auch daran, dass es beim Kampf gegen den Terrorismus nicht nur um den IS gehen würde, sondern dass eine Vielzahl von verschiedenen Gruppierungen auf einer gleichen oder sehr ähnlichen ideologischen Welle mitreiten würden. Der IS sei dahingehend etwas Besonderes, weil er als Einziger die Ausrufung und die Etablierung eines Kalifats zum Ziel hatte. Auch wenn das bei den anderen terroristischen Gruppierungen nicht oder noch nicht der Fall sei, so gehe es ihnen primär ebenfalls um die Erreichung politischer Ziele. Dies sei womöglich auch der Grund, weshalb gewisse dieser Gruppierungen von einigen Staaten finanziert würden. Bezüglich Ägypten sei der Kampf gegen den Extremismus noch lange nicht vorbei, im Gegenteil seien einige ägyptische Bürger seit 2011 von Terroristen eingelullt und zu kriminellen Aktivitäten verführt worden. Doch mit der folgenschwersten Attacke islamistischer Terroristen in Ägypten im letzten November auf eine Mosche im Sinai, was zu über 300 Todesopfer führte, sei dem ägyptischen Volk schmerzvoll aufgezeigt worden, dass eine solche fehlgeleitete Ideologie nicht hinnehmbar sei. Momentan würden die ägyptischen Streitkräfte eine grossangelegte, langfristige Kampagne durchführen, um den Terrorismus im Sinai zu einem Ende zu bringen. Allein anfangs Februar seien mehr als 50 Waffenverstecke ausgehoben worden, an zwei Orten seien total 1’500 kg C4-Sprengstoff, eine hohe zusätzliche Menge TNT, 56 Zünder und 13 Schaltkreise zur Herstellung von IEDs sichergestellt worden (siehe auch “Statement No. 7 of the General Command of the Armed Forces on the Comprehensive Operation ‘Sinai 2018’“, Ministry of Defense – Egyptian Armed Forces, 14.02.2018).
Soldaten der ägyptischen Streitkräfte während einer Operation gegen Terroristen auf der Sinai-Halbinsel Mitte Februar 2018.
…und die wirtschaftlichen sowie sozialen Bedingungen der Bevölkerung verbessert werden!
Der tunesisch Aussenminister Khémaies Jhinaoui ist überzeugt, dass die IS-Kämpfer aus dem Nahen Osten früher oder später unter einer neuen Adresse — beispielsweise in Libyen oder in der sub-Sahara — wieder auftauchen würden. Um langfristig den Krieg gegen den Terrorismus zu gewinnen, müssten drei Punkte angegangen werden: Die falsche Ideologie muss bekämpft, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und die internationale Kooperation gefördert werden. Für Tunesien hiese dies beispielsweise, dass der Bildungssektor reformiert und gestärkt, sowie die Toleranz gefördert werden müssten. Der Wohlstand müsse nicht nur lokal, sondern global erhöht werden, denn wo es grosse Wohlstandsgefälle gäbe, da entstehe auch Terrorismus (siehe auch “The future of rising aspirations“, offiziere.ch, 15.04.2018). Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus sei im Interesse aller Staaten; deshalb würde sich Tunesien eine noch intensivere Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Staaten wünschen. Tunesien stelle eine junge, laizistische Demokratie dar, was den islamistischen Terroristen ein Dorn im Auge sei. Leider zeige sich, dass Tunesien über Jahre hinweg viel zu wenig in seine Streitkräfte investiert hätte, um Bedrohungen aus der eigenen Bevölkerung anzugehen. Hier seien Korrekturen vorgenommen worden, doch dazu benötige Tunesien die Unterstützung anderer Staaten. Sollte das tunesische Modell erfolgreich sein, dann wäre dies schliesslich zum Vorteil für die ganze Region.
Nicht nur Ägypten und Tunesien müssen sich der Herausforderung des grenzüberschreitenden Terrorismus stellen — das Problem betrifft insbesondere die Sahel-Region. Gemäss Jim Yong Kim, dem Präsidenten der Weltbank, gäbe es weltweit keine zweite Region, wo die Weltbank mit so hohen Herausforderungen im Kampf gegen die Armut konfrontiert sei. Die Hälfte der 150 Millionen Einwohner würden in extremer Armut leben und die Klimaerwärmung erhöhe bereits heute die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Dürre und Überflutungen. In der südlichen Sahel-Region seien mehr als 30 Millionen Menschen der Gewalt der Boko Haram ausgesetzt. Im letzten Dezember seien 5,3 Millionen Menschen auf der Flucht gewesen, inklusive 1 Million Flüchtlinge von anderen Regionen, die nach Europa gelangen wollten, jedoch das Mittelmeer nicht überwinden konnten. Seit der französischen Intervention in Mali seien mehr als 11’000 UN-Soldaten in der Region im Einsatz gewesen, wovon 150 getötet wurden. Die Sahel-Region sei ein Beispiel dafür, dass für einen langfristigen Erfolg im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus Sicherheit und Entwicklung Hand in Hand gehen müssten — leider würden bis dato effektive Konzepte dafür fehlen.
Die Bevölkerung als Alliierte der staatlichen Sicherheitskräfte gewinnen
Die Sahel-Region sei seit gut hundert Jahren noch nie stabil gewesen, bemerkte der malischen Aussenministers Tiéman Coulibaly. Durch ein Bildungssystem, das nie wirklich funktioniert habe, und einer nur schwer zu überwindenden Armut sei die Bevölkerung in der Sahel-Region sehr anfällig für extreme Ideologien. Die Vorgänge in Libyen, Syrien und im Irak bzw. im Nahen Osten im Allgemeinen hätten einen direkten Einfluss auf die Sicherheit und Stabilität in dieser Region. Sicherheit und Stabilität könne nur mit der Bevölkerung als Alliierte der staatlichen Sicherheitskräfte erreicht werden. Dies sei jedoch nur dann möglich, wenn die Erwartungen der Bevölkerung an die staatlichen Institutionen und Sicherheitskräfte erfüllt würden. Diese Erwartungen seien jedoch nicht nur sicherheitstechnischer Natur, sondern würden beispielsweise auch die Versorgung mit Wasser, Güter usw. umfassen. Militärische, ökonomische und soziale Massnahmen müssten dementsprechend Hand in Hand gehen. Dabei müsse es auch Raum für lokal geplante, entwickelte und umgesetzte Lösungen geben. In Mali hätte die Regierung leider die Erfahrung machen müssen, dass mögliche lokale Ansätze zur Konfliktlösung und Entwicklung von NGOs blockiert wurden, weil eine Vielzahl von externen NGOs in Mali Interessen verfolgen würden, welche sich nicht mit den Interessen des Staates decken würden.
Auch General Babagana Monguno unterstrich die Wichtigkeit der Entwicklung als Grundlage für Sicherheit und Stabilität. Nigeria sei bis 2001 nicht mit Terrorismus konfrontiert gewesen. Strukturelle Faktoren und Korruption hätten jedoch einen negativen Einfluss auf die Regierungsführung gehabt und zusammen mit Armut und Hoffnungslosigkeit einen Nährboden für terroristische Gruppierungen, insbesondere für Boko Haram geschaffen. Damit stelle Boko Haram ein selbstgemachtes Problem mit einer Rekrutierungsbasis im Nord-Osten des Landes dar. Boko Haram kämpfe gegen die gesellschaftlichen Normen in Nigeria und mittlerweile auch in anderen Staaten um den Tschadsee. Mit der erfolgreichen Bekämpfung des IS im Nahen Osten bestehe die Gefahr, dass ein Teil der Kämpfer in die Konfliktzzonen in der sub-Sahara abwandern könnten, und dass dabei Nigeria nur schon wegen der Bevölkerungszahl und der Volkswirtschaft ein lohnenswertes Rückzugsgebiet darstellen könnte. Die Regierung von Präsident Muhammadu Buhari habe deshalb eine nationale anti-Terrorismus-Strategie mit verschiedenen Unterprogrammen entwickelt. Diese umfassen beispielsweise die Verhinderung von Extremismus, die Verbesserung der Grenzsicherung, die Verstärkung der regionalen und internationalen Kooperation usw. In der Region des Tschadsees bekämpfe eine Task-Force aktiv den Terrorismus mit militärischen Mitteln, gleichzeitig würden aber auch die Fähigkeiten und die Effizienz der Streitkräfte im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus verbessert. Nigeria müsse sich jedoch zunehmend auch mit den Themen Cyber-Sicherheit und Terrorismus-Finanzierung befassen, um die Dominanz in diesen Bereichen nicht den Terroristen zu überlassen. Im Rahmen des Kampfes gegen den Terrorismus müsse jedoch auch die Regierungsführung verbessert und die Armut bekämpft werden (siehe auch Peter Dörrie, “Nigerias Terrorismusproblem ist größer als Boko Haram“, offiziere.ch, 16.11.2015).
by Captain Stefan Bühler, graduate engineer (University of Applied Sciences), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer at the NBC-KAMIR Competence Center for the Swiss Armed Forces and Commander of Tank Squadron 12/1. This article was originally published on the OG Panzer blog site – my gratitude to the author for allowing its republication on offiziere.ch. For a German version of the article see here.
Twice, offiziere.ch has taken a critical look at the new Russian combat tank, the T-14 Armata. In the first critique in the summer of 2015, Joseph Trevithick came to the conclusion that the basic design of the T-14 was rather antiquated, based on the limited public resources available at the time. He was not alone in this opinion at the time: Dave Majumdar, for example, noted in an article in National Interest that the Leopard 2 could successfully engage the T-14 if the right ammunition was used. With the publication of additional technical details, Sébastien Roblin critically analyzed the T-14 once again and came to a mixed conclusion. However, some findings were based on incomplete data resources – to this day, not all the technical details have been published. For this reason, and the fact that both authors are not engineers, we take into serious consideration the criticism offered to us that the reports on the T-14 on offiziere.ch may be politically biased and may no longer be based on fully accurate facts. We are, therefore, extremely grateful to Captain Stefan Bühler for making his article available to us for a second publication, and for giving us a somewhat different perspective.
Since the first public display of the T-14 Armata at the Victory Parade in May 2015, the vehicle and its capabilities have been hotly debated in the western military press. Many of the articles published were extremely critical; this was, in part, due to the authors’ lack of technical expertise but, in most cases, quite obviously for political reasons. Every breakdown and alleged defect in the system, no matter how small, were used to criticize the technical concept as a whole. The following article aims to evaluate the T-14 from a technical point of view, based on the published data and pictures as well as the author’s personal impressions, and without political bias, if possible.
The T-14 has the same power output as the Leopard 2 or the M1 Abrams, however, with a combat weight of 48 tons, it is 20% lighter, resulting in a specific output of 31.3 hp/T (22.9 kW/T). In comparison its western counterparts with 24 hp/T (17.6 kW/T), this new vehicle is extremely agile. Its maximum range should be around 500 km (310 miles) with a comparable consumption and an estimated fuel tank size of 1,000 liters (265 gallons), similar to the western models.
In contrast to previous models T-64/T-72/T-80/T-90, the T-14 chassis consists of seven pairs of track rollers, whereof the two front rollers and the rear suspension can be actively controlled hydraulically (hydropneumatic chassis). This allows for manual or automatic adjustment of the chassis to the terrain, and thus enables significantly higher speeds on medium-heavy terrain compared to a chassis with conventional torsion bar suspension. However, experience shows that chassis with hydropneumatic suspension systems are much more technically demanding and less reliable than torsion bar suspension systems, which is why technical difficulties are still to be expected in this area. Notwithstanding, the T-14 prototype vehicles are already equipped with such a chassis (the author can be certain of this based on observations of the 2016 Victory Parade in Moscow), and it can be assumed that the Russian engineers have already gained some experience with this technology in the past three years.
The T-14’s tracks are narrower in the current version compared to the Leopard 2 or the M1 Abrams, however, due to the significantly lower combat weight, wide tracks are also not absolutely necessary: the specific ground pressure will be about the same compared to the western counterparts.
For understandable reasons, the Russians did not give exact values related to vehicle protection. However, a few estimates can be made on the basis of weight and geometry.
The following components contribute to the protection of the crew and the main groups of the T-14:
welded basic structure of armor steel;
local reinforcement of the basic structure with composite armoring;
For mechanical reasons, the basic structure should have a thickness of at least 25 mm of armored steel with a hardness of 400 to 500 Brinell. Thus, the basic structure of the vehicle consists of a continuous minimum protection against armor piercing with 12.7 x 99 mm caliber ammunition (.50 Browning heavy machine gun), in some areas – depending on geometric arrangement – the basic structure is also expected to resist fire from the 14.5 x 114 mm API (Russian heavy machine gun) and older 20 mm caliber weapon systems.
For operational reasons, it is not be possible under normal circumstances for lighter vehicles such as infantry fighting vehicles to neutralize a main battle tank from the front (±60°). Most western infantry fighting vehicles have 30 x 173 mm machine guns as their main armament and shoot armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabots (APFSDS-T) with a maximum penetration capacity of 120 mm steel armor equivalents. A few exceptions, such as the Dutch CV9035 and the Swedish CV9040 respectively, have larger 35 or 40 mm caliber machine guns but the maximum penetration capacity of this ammunition should not exceed 160 mm of armored steel. The crew and ammunition compartments on the T-14 are likely to be protected frontally and laterally with a suitable dimension of composite armor.
For weight reasons, it can be assumed that the basic structure in the engine compartment has not been reinforced. However, the T-14 prototypes have a so-called cage armor around the engine compartment – this shuts off the electric ignition circuit on some antitank munitions, such as the widely used PG-7, upon impact, thus preventing them from being triggered. Since this type of protection system has no performance-reducing effect on most western anti-tank munitions (e.g. Panzerfaust or M72 LAW) – apart from the increased explosive distance – it can be assumed that the production version does not use the cage armor or that it will only be used adaptively in certain countries of operation.
In urban terrain, light anti-tank weapons (e.g. PG-7, Panzerfaust, M72 LAW), which are fired at short range at the side of the vehicle, are a major problem for a battle tank. By attaching reactive protection elements in the appropriate dimensions, the effect of shaped charges can be reduced by more than 80%. The Malachit reactive protection elements used in the T-14 are a logical further development of the previous Kontakt-5 and Relikt models, and should be correspondingly powerful. Like the Kontakt-5 technology, Malachit will also be able to significantly reduce the penetration rate of projectiles.
In terms of penetration performance, the biggest threats to a battle tank are the large-caliber projectiles from other battle tanks and modern anti-tank guided weapons.
Even with highly-developed passive and reactive protection technologies, this threat can be countered only to a limited extent – especially not with the estimated 48 ton combat weight of the T-14. Accordingly, the Afganit active protection system must be designed in such a way that – in combination with other technologies – it offers effective protection against both artillery projectiles and powerful antitank guided weapons (with tandem shaped charges).
The Afganit active protection system (Hard Kill).
It is currently very difficult to make a reliable statement about the performance of Afganit due to the scarce amount of data available. It is assumed that it contains both a hard-kill and a soft-kill system. This seems plausible, especially since the Russians have the appropriate operational experience in both areas with the Arena system (hard-kill) and the Shtora-1 system (soft-kill).
The Afganit system is comprised of the following components:
ten forward facing launchers arranged on the turret (hard-kill system);
two swiveling launchers, each with 12 tubes on the left and right in the front area of the turret (soft-kill system);
two fixed, upturned launchers with 12 tubes each in the rear area of the turret (soft-kill system);
two laser warning modules on the left and right side of the turret’s front;
two radar panels on the left and right side of the turret.
Threats are detected by laser warning modules (laser distance measurement or laser target illumination by the enemy) or by a radar with electronic beam deflection (measurement of the trajectory of incoming projectiles). According to various sources, the radar is based on the AESA radar technology of the new Suchoi T-50 fighter – this would make sense inasmuch as the unit price reduced by the larger procurement volume would ultimately benefit both projects.
In the area of soft-kill system performance, it must be assumed – also against the background of the Russian capabilities in electronic warfare that have been greatly expanded over the past ten years – that Afganit is significantly more powerful than the Shtora-1 developed in the 1980’s: a possible disturbance or deception of modern guided-weapon sensors by corresponding electro-optical or magnetic effectors is quite realistic from a technical point of view.
Furthermore, the four small launchers (two swiveling, two fixed, upturned) probably serve as smokescreens with multi-spectral smoke. Should this be the case, modern third or fourth generation anti-tank guided weapons with top-attack capability (including the FGM-148 Javelin) and sensor function of artillery (SMArt, BLU-108) could also be defended against, in contrast to Shtora-1.
Components of the Afganit active protection system.
The ten launchers on the turret are definitely part of the hard-kill system and, like their predecessors Drozd and Arena, are likely to fire a type of explosive and/or fragmentation grenade that damages or destroys explosive and shaped charge projectiles or anti-tank missiles and guided weapons before they hit the main armor. Due to the geometric arrangement of the launchers, a coverage of ±60° in the front area can be assumed.
Although it is technically unlikely that these countermeasures will damage or destroy a projectile made of tungsten carbide or depleted uranium. However, if the grenade is fired at the level of the control unit, this would lead to a pendulum of the penetrator and thus to a considerable reduction in power (30 – 50%). The necessary ignition of the grenade requires a data link between the fire control computer of the active protection system and the grenade itself. The fact that this is basically possible has already been proven in Western research projects.
However, all these protection systems – apart from the further developed technology – are not really new. What actually makes the T-14 unique from a technical point of view is the unmanned turret. This offers two distinctive advantages over a manned turret:
The crew compartment volume – and thus the volume requiring a high level of protection – is reduced by approximately 60%, which in turn leads to corresponding weight savings with the same level of protection for the crew.
The turret volume is also reduced: the turret surface is about 35% smaller, the front surface is about 15% smaller than the Leopard 2A6 or M1A2 Abrams. The first shot probability (without taking aiming errors into account) with the Leopard 2A6 and the most advance projectile DM63 available on the turret of a T-14 (partially covered position) at a distance of 3,000 m (9,842 feet) is approximately 25%. Or in other words, statistically speaking, four shots would be needed to land a hit.
Based on all these considerations, it must be assumed that the T-14 Armata offers the crew a higher overall level of protection than its western counterparts, despite its significantly lower combat weight.
The T-14 Armata turret (clearly visible are the launcher tubes on the turret, the two swiveling launcher units on the top of the turret, as well as the radar panels and laser warning modules on the front and side of the turret).
The current T-14 prototypes are all equipped with a new 125 mm (2A82) smoothbore gun. It can be assumed that this new version has undergone an increase in performance compared to the 2A46M-2 of the T-90. Since Russian designers, like their western counterparts, are also bound to the laws of physics, the expected penetration performance can be predicted quite accurately: at an operating distance of 3,000 m (9,842 ft), it should be in the range of 800 mm armored steel and thus about 10% above the values of the 120 mm RH L55 of the Leopard 2A6 with the DM53/63 projectile. In the case of shaped charge projectiles, the penetration rate increases practically in proportion to the caliber, which is why the penetration values here are probably only about 5% higher compared to the 120 mm caliber shaped charge projectiles. The maximum operating distance for the projectiles should be around 5,000 m (16,404 ft), with an effective operating distance around 3,000 m (9,842 ft).
The new weapon will probably be able to fire all 125 mm projectiles already introduced and, like its predecessors, will have a guided missile complex which allows the firing of anti-tank guided weapons with operating distances of more than 5,000 m.
Since the first presentation of the T-14, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the vehicle could also later be equipped with a 152 mm smoothbore gun. From a technical point of view this should be feasible, but the problem is different: a 152 mm projectile requires approximately 50% more space than a 125 mm projectile, which would reduce the ammunition capacity from 45 rounds (125 mm) to approximately 30 rounds (152 mm), which in turn has a negative effect on the autonomy of the system.
For secondary armament, the Russian designers have initially held to the proven system of a 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine gun and a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun. The announced optional 30 mm coaxial machine gun would probably be technically feasible without any problems, especially since the Russian tank builders already have decades of experience in this field (the BMP-3 introduced in 1987 also has a 30 mm coaxial machine gun in addition to the 100 mm main weapon).
The automatic loader should also pose no technical problems – Russian designers can look back on 50 years of development and application experience in this field (the first automatic loader EZ-10 was introduced in 1967 with the T-64A). The discussion in the West about the advantages and disadvantages of automatic loaders and three or four crew members is probably less technical than emotional: with the introduction of the T-64, the Russians have opted for this solution and have consequently adapted their training and deployment procedures accordingly, which is why a comparison with western main battle tanks (apart from the French AMX-56 Leclerc) makes only limited sense from the author’s point of view.
The crew are placed side by side in the front and are comprised of the driver (left), the gunner (middle), and the commander (right). A bulkhead separates the crew compartment from the weapons and ammunition compartment, another bulkhead separates the weapons and ammunition compartment from the engine compartment. The control of the weapon system and propulsion is exclusively electronic, so that the vehicle can be controlled remotely without any problems, even without a crew.
In cross section: in front, the strong armor; the compartment for the commander, the gunner, and the tank driver; the unmanned turret; the fuel tank; propulsion; and at the rear of the turret, additional space for ammunition and tools.
Driver, gunner, and commander each have two LCD monitors, which serve as an interface with the vehicle computer or fire control computer. The T-14 Armata fire control system consists of the following components:
electro-optical rifle scope with infrared camera and laser range finder;
electro-optical commander periscope with infrared camera and laser range finder;
stand-alone weapon station (12.7 mm) with infrared camera and laser range finder;
autonomous analogue TV rifle scope (emergency shooting);
six TV cameras on the turret for 360-degree observation;
millimeter wave radar (Afganit active protection system);
various sensors (e.g. wind, temperature, tilt);
fire control computer;
LCD monitors for the crew;
control panels and control handles for the crew.
Driver and commander each have three additional periscopes, while the gunner has only one periscope. The commander’s periscopes are most likely equipped with tip-visor buttons, which were introduced with the T-90MS and serve to swing the turret in the direction corresponding to the tip-visor button pressed.
The information and management system consists of a satellite navigation system (GLONASS) and a tactical command system. The interface with the fire control system via the vehicle computer essentially makes it possible to determine the coordinates of a spotted target and make them visible in real time to all vehicles and command posts integrated in the control system.
The discussion among experts now revolves mainly around the question of whether the commander lacks the necessary overview when sitting in the tank or whether TV cameras and electro-optical aiming devices can actually provide the same information as the optical aiming devices and observation equipment on the current generation of battle tanks. A look into the sky provides the (technical) answer: the pilot of an F-35 can look through the aircraft with his head-up display – a computer generates a virtual 3D world from the video signals from the cameras mounted all around, which is then faded into his optics depending on the pilot’s direction of vision. With such technology, as offered by the Israeli company ELBIT Systems under the name “Iron Vision” for use on armored vehicles, the commander of a T-14 could see even more than the commander of a battle tank with a manned turret. A completely different question in this case is the price: a pilot’s helmet for the F-35 costs about $400,000; there is no reliable information about the price of “Iron Vision” yet.
Finally, the question of vulnerability remains: compared to older optical systems, video cameras and electro-optical scopes are neither more nor less vulnerable to enemy fire or splintering. Optics are, and will remain, the Achilles’ heel of a battle tank, including the T-14.
Certainly, all data released by the Russians on the new tank must be critically examined. Notwithstanding: Russian engineers, with the appropriate political support from the Kremlin, have consistently implemented the concept of the unmanned turret battle tank; while in the West, desperate attempts were made to extend the life of battle tanks whose development dates back to the 1970’s with limited system upgrades.
The current version of the T-14 may still have a number of constructive deficits and teething problems, but one thing is certain: when the West presents the first prototype of a new generation of battle tanks in three to five years (a highly optimistic estimate), the Russians will already have several years of practical experience in this area – a backlog that cannot be compensated for so quickly even with the alleged technological superiority of Western industry. A look at the history of tank development shows that the Russians revolutionized tank construction several times – not because they were the first to have the idea, but because they were the first to have the courage to take a step forward.
• • •
Info-Box: Russian milestones in tank development
Although developed in the USA as early as the beginning of the 1920’s, and after the Americans showed no particular interest in it, the Soviet designers built and improved the Christie drive under licence and, from 1931, installed it as standard equipment in BT-series light tanks. The BT tanks were the fastest tanks at that time and the Christie drive was later successfully used for the T-34.
The T-34 is considered by many tank experts to be the most successful tank design of all times. The almost perfect balance of firepower, protection, and mobility made it technically superior to German tanks at the beginning of the war. The T-34 was also the first mass-produced tank with a diesel engine.
The T-55 was the first battle tank to be equipped with NBC protection.
The T-62 was the first battle tank with a smoothbore gun capable of firing penetrator projectiles.
The T-64 was the first battle tank with an automatic loader. With the T-64A version, a fire suppression system was installed for the first time in a battle tank, and the T-64B was equipped with the first composite armor (Combination K).
The T-72 is the most produced battle tank in the world. It was also the focus of western criticism, in particular because of the poor performance of the Iraqi T-72 against the American M1 Abrams in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Although the different versions of the T-72 were used in numerous wars and conflicts, the Soviet vehicle versions never clashed with Western tank models – always the weaker export versions were involved in the fighting.
The Kontakt-5 reactive armor, which first appeared in 1985 on the T-80U, was able to reduce the penetration rate of projectiles by more than 30% compared to its predecessors. Western engineers were able to analyze the technique after the fall of the Berlin Wall and came to the conclusion that no western battle tank from that time would have been able to penetrate a Kontakt-5 reinforced armor with the first hit.
The T-90 was the first battle tank to be equipped with a soft-kill active protection system (Shtora-1) as standard.
The T-14 will probably be the first battle tank to be built with an unmanned turret as standard.