The U.S. Pivot to Nowhere

by Patrick Truffer. He graduated from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich with a Bachelor of Arts in Public Affairs and completes a Master of Arts program in International Relations at the Freie Universität Berlin.

In an address to the Australian parliament in November 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that, with the “Pivot to East Asia“, the importance of the Southeast Asian region would receive more attention. This was interpreted as a shift in military focus from a peaceful, consolidated Europe to an emerging Asia increasingly under China’s influence.

Now, five years later, as Obama nears the end of his term, has this strategic realignment been a success? During this period, was there actually a shift in military focus from Europe to the Asian region? What consequences has this had on the power politics in the region? Could the United States do a better job of keeping China under check and help resolve regional conflicts?

US President Barack Obama addresses the Australian Parliament Parliament House in Canberra on November 17, 2011. President Obama is in Australia to mark the 60th anniversary of their security alliance and to bolster Washington's presence in the strategically important region (Photo: Rick Rycroft / AFP).

US President Barack Obama addresses the Australian Parliament Parliament House in Canberra on November 17, 2011. President Obama is in Australia to mark the 60th anniversary of their security alliance and to bolster Washington’s presence in the strategically important region (Photo: Rick Rycroft / AFP).

Even when U.S. President Barack Obama announced the “Pivot to East Asia” with a bang in November 2011 in Canberra, the American commitment in Asia was not new: The United States had long been both an Atlantic and Pacific nation. The U.S. had been intensifying its military and diplomatic engagement in the Asian region since 2004, under then-President George W. Bush. Corresponding developments in military technology could ensure the long-term supremacy of the United States in the Asian region even with China’s increasing military competitiveness. The Pentagon, for example, had noticed that China’s development and acquisition of precision weapons had made U.S. aircraft carriers increasingly more vulnerable (Nina Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia“, International Security 40, No. 4, 10.05.2016, p. 53f).

Additionally, the means of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S.Navy were augmented in Guam, Hawaii and Alaska as well as a loose network of partner states in the region established in the long-term. Improving diplomatic relations with China became a stated goal. Since Russia was no longer considered a military threat, there were plans from the beginning to shift military expenditures from Europe to Asia. However, to avoid upsetting its European partners or provoking China, the Bush administration has never shouted it from the rooftops (Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot”).

PLA "sinks" US carrier in DF-21D missile test in Gobi.

PLA “sinks” US carrier in DF-21D missile test in Gobi (see here).

With the bold announcement of the “Pivot to East Asia”, Obama did no service at all regarding the relations to the European partners or to China, and already 2012, the term “pivot” was replaced by “rebalance” (Lanxin Xiang, “China and the ‘Pivot’” Survival 54, No. 5, October 2012, p. 113).

The Obama administration further reinforced the military and diplomatic measures already initiated by the Bush administration. Also, the expansion of the network of partner states was intensified with the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a comprehensive free trade agreement signed in February 2016 by 12 states. If ratified, it could take effect in about two years’ time. With the enforcement of international law the U.S. will ensure long-term economic and maritime freedom in the Asian region.

With the “Pivot to East Asia”, Obama primarily wanted to seize the opportunity to boost the U.S. economy in the long term and create jobs, but other factors have also played an important role (Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century“, Foreign Policy, 11.10.2011). As far as Obama was concerned, U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan was coming to an end after ten years in Afghanistan and seven years of a highly unpopular war in Iraq. He insisted that the responsibility for these two nations’ security would be transferred back to the respective national armed forces as soon as possible. Military resources would now be freed up and could be allocated elsewhere. At the same time, as part of overall budget cuts, Obama sought a significant reduction in the defence spending which had reached a record $750 billion in 2010 (Diem Nguyen Salmon, “A Proposal for the FY 2016 Defense Budget“, The Heritage Foundation, 30.01.2015). Meanwhile, in the lead-up to the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, U.S. criticism of its European NATO partners had become increasingly spiteful as the latter had repeatedly slashed their military spending in the aftermath of the 2007 global economic crisis, making the US even more responsible for the bulk of NATO’s budget. Even before Obama’s speech in Canberra, it was obvious that Europe, which had remained relatively economically prosperous, secure, and politically stable despite the global economic crisis, was not willing to assume responsibility for its strategic environment. For instance, in June 2011, U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates was highly critical that the European states involved in the international military intervention in Libya had already exhausted their entire inventory of bombs in just eleven weeks. The entire mission would have been doomed, Gates argued, if the U.S. had not provided support to its European partners (Thom Shanker, “Defense Secretary Warns NATO of ‘Dim’ Future“, The New York Times, 10.06.2011).

troop_deploymentThe European partners were listening carefully, when Obama reassured the audience in Canberra that the reductions in the U.S. defence budget would not be at the expense of the Asian region and that U.S. military presence and missions in the Asian region would be the top American priority over the next decade. What this specifically meant for Europe would become apparent in 2012 when the V Corps was disbanded and two Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) with more than 10,000 U.S. troops were withdrawn from Europe. Today, there are only some 65,000 U.S. soldiers on European territory. But the cutbacks are continuing as the Pentagon plans to close fifteen of its 34 remaining bases in Europe over the long term (Andrew Feickert, “Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress“, Congressional Research Service, 28.02.2014).

Finally, it was the Russian annexation of Crimea in spring 2014 and the subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine that eventually applied the brakes to the withdrawal of the U.S. presence from Europe. In its immediate aftermath, Obama announced his $1 billion “European Reassurance Initiative” in 2015 which would increase the number of U.S. troops in Eastern Europe with the rotation of an ABCT. This initiative received another $789 million in funding for 2016 and will enjoy an expanded budget of $3.4 billion in 2017. Almost 2/3 of this budget flows into the maintenance and expansion of equipment being held on the ready (tanks, artillery, ammunition, etc.) in Western Europe. This is apparently meant to be a long-term commitment of the U.S. in Europe. Despite the efforts to cut costs, a strategic realignment in Europe is therefore only taking place on a limited basis.

Under Obama, the economic and military measures regarding the Asian region are evident. The network of partner states has especially been strengthened. At the same time, the deployment of troops respectively their very specific reduction aimed not only to expand military cooperation with the U.S., but also to build partnerships between Asian countries. For example, troops have been reduced in South Korea and Japan to motivate these countries to play a more active role — certain parallels to European NATO member states are evident. Currently, initial results are being seen in Japan, where the new “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” were signed in 2015. In addition to the deployment of an X-band radar at Shariki in 2006, another such radar was stationed in Kyogamisaki in 2014. In the case of South Korea, the measures so far have shown to be less successful.

An aerial view from above U.S. Naval Base Guam (NBG) shows Apra Harbor with several navy vessels in port. As many as 22 total ships at one given time, marking the largest in-port presence at NBG in 30 years. The new ships in port, mostly destroyers from Destroyer Squadron-15 based out of Japan and three destroyers and a destroyer command ship from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, will participate in Multi-Sail 2016, a five-day at-sea bilateral exercise off the Guam’s coast before returning back into Apra Harbor for liberty in Guam (Photo: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Deven Ellis).

An aerial view from above U.S. Naval Base Guam (NBG) shows Apra Harbor with several navy vessels in port. As many as 22 total ships at one given time, marking the largest in-port presence at NBG in 30 years. The new ships in port, mostly destroyers from Destroyer Squadron 15 based out of Japan and three destroyers and a destroyer command ship from the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, will participate in “Multi-Sail 2016”, a five-day at-sea bilateral exercise off the Guam’s coast before returning back into Apra Harbor for liberty in Guam (Photo: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Deven Ellis).

The military base in Guam has been further expanded. Since 2014, a fourth nuclear-powered attack submarine is based in Guam and the nuclear-powered strategic submarines U.S.S Ohio and U.S.S Michigan are often in Guam. In 2020, the III Marine Expeditionary Force will also be stationed permanently in Guam (Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot”, p. 68). In June 2012, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue, that, by 2020, 60% of the U.S. Navy fleet would be stationed in the Pacific region, i.e. at least six aircraft carriers would be assigned to the Pacific at any time.

In order to expand military training with its Pacific partner countries, a Marine air-ground task force has been stationed in Australia starting in 2012 and up to four new littoral combat ships have been sent to Singapore. After the Vietnam War, the U.S. armed forces had reduced their numbers in Asia from around 451,000 to an average of 69,000 between 2002 and 2014. This number has since climbed up to 77,000 troops in 2015 (Tim Kane, “The Decline of American Engagement: Patterns in US Troop Deployments“, Economics Working Paper, Hoover Institution, 11.01.2016, p. 5). Nevertheless, despite Obama’s assertions to the contrary, the cost-cutting has not abated in the Asian region. For example, the number of ships and aircraft required for a military operation remains inadequate and will remain so for budgetary reasons until after 2020 (Dakota L. Wood, 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength, The Heritage Foundation, 2016, 86).

From China’s perspective, these measures are being interpreted as an aggressive strategy with the aim of curbing China’s legitimate claim to regional power. China especially takes a negative view of the TPP, since they were not included in it. It also does not help that the U.S. itself does not recognize this as a containment strategy (Xiang, “China and the ‘pivot'”). China’s response to what it sees as strategic challenges in its neighbourhood is both internal (military armament) and external (forging alliances). Although Chinese defence has remained about 2% of its GDP since the early 1990s, the economic growth of the country has meant much larger budgets for its military, growing from $43.23 billion in 2000 to $214.5 billion in 2015 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database“, 2015). This is hardly surprising and confirms the American assessment of the emergence of an increasingly competitive China.


However, the United States has underestimated the possibility of an external balance in power. The last few years have shown that China’s power can not been constrained and that its international influence is increasing. This includes, for instance, the initiative to build a “modern Silk Road” as announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 which would expand China’s foreign trade infrastructure and secure its gateway to Africa and Europe. China’s future military ambitions could also be fulfilled, for example with its plans to build a logistical support point for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in Djibouti. The justification for the construction of this base is PLAN’s involvement in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. China also participated in a UN peacekeeping mission for the first time in 2013 (in Mali). Today China is involved in 10 UN peacekeeping missions with around 2,500 soldiers, the largest contingent being just over 1,000 soldiers in South Sudan, where China is also pursuing its economic interests in protecting oil production. In the Central Asian region and also internationally, China has found a partner with which it has much common and with which it shares some geopolitical and international interests: Russia. Already, both major powers are increasingly influential in Central Asia due to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot”, p. 85).

The territorial conflict in the South China Sea is another example that shows how China is no longer cowering in fear before U.S. displays of power and is consistently asserting its interests against Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, and the Philippines, all countries with a positive relationship with the U.S. and all signatories of the TPP. This has resulted in active U.S. involvement in this conflict with so-called “Freedom of Navigation” operations where U.S. warships demonstratively sail through international waters territory claimed by China, and U.S. reconnaissance aircraft fly over disputed islands (Joseph Bosco, “After the South China Sea Ruling, Time for More FONOPs“, The Diplomat, 29.07.2016).

Satellite images show where local officials say China is building its first overseas military outpost and a commercial port in Djibouti. Left: November 23, 2015 / Right: August 07, 2016

After the Philippines lodged a complaint in the Permanent Court of Arbitation (PCA) against China’s claims to the Spratly Islands in 2013, China began to fortify the reefs, adding land mass, and building up infrastructure for military use. If China continues to significantly expand its military presence in the Spratly Islands, the likelihood of a potentially unintentional armed incident with the United States would increase. A military escalation in the tensions between the U.S. and China would be ruinous not only for both countries, but for the entire Asian region and the world, according to a study by the Rand Corporation. On 12 July 2016, the PCA ruled in favour of the Philippines, deciding that China does not have exclusive rights over the South China Sea. China has made it known that it does not accept the court’s jurisdiction on the matter and has called the whole process a charade fabricated by the U.S. (Jane Perlez, “Tribunal Rejects Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea“, The New York Times, 12.07.2016).

Neither the Philippines nor the United States can enforce the decision of the PCA against the will of China and the “Freedom of Navigation” operations are not impressing anyone, least of all the U.S. partner states. The weakness of this network has been reflected in the change of government in the Philippines, an important U.S. partner. The president elected in June 2016, Rodrigo Duterte, wants stronger relations with China and is distancing himself from the U.S.-friendly path of his predecessor. Since taking office, he has vehemently pursued drug dealers and addicts, which has resulted in the arrest of 18,000 drug addicts and a dramatic increase of fatalities during police operations. The U.S. criticism of the situation and the accusations of human rights violations have estranged Duterte from Obama. In late September, Duterte announced that the Philippines would be ceasing its maritime cooperation with the United States. In early October he even threatened to expel the U.S. Troops in the Philippines (Kevin Lui, “Philippines: Duterte Threatens to End Defense Pact with U.S.“, Time, 03.10.2016). Other U.S. partners in the region, for instance Vietnam, are also only partially reliable (Simon Tisdall, “Obama’s failed ‘Asian pivot’ leaves China ascendant“, The Guardian, 25.09.2016). This is the result of the Obama administration’s failure to achieve any progress with major regional conflicts such as the South China Sea or the nuclear threat from North Korea. In the light of an increasingly militarily and economically growing China, some countries in the region seem to have resigned themselves to having to deal with China in the long term.

Construction on Johnson South Reef. In regard to the territorial conflict in the South China Sea, there was a bloody skirmish between China and Vietnam about that reef in 1988 during which 64 Vietnamese sailors were being killed. Left: January 2014 / Right February 2016.

Construction on Johnson South Reef. In regard to the territorial conflict in the South China Sea, there was a bloody skirmish between China and Vietnam about that reef in 1988 during which 64 Vietnamese sailors were being killed. Left: January 2014 / Right February 2016.

The U.S. has always been an Atlantic and Pacific nation. Already President George W. Bush intensified its military and diplomatic engagement in the Asian region, but he never shouted it from the rooftops. President Obama has pushed these efforts further, but the “Pivot to East Asia” announced in November 2011 in Canberra has actually been a disservice to these efforts. The European NATO member states, which had already been heavily criticized for their reductions in their military spending, feared a substantial shift of U.S. forces from Europe to the Asian region, as signalled by the withdrawal of two ABCT. The fact that this reduction in troops was due more to cuts in U.S. defence spending than to a strategic realignment has largely been ignored. Since the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine, the European region has once again become a point of interest for the U.S., as indicated by the European Reassurance Initiative, which will be substantially expanded next year. Although budget cuts will continue to be noticeable with the closure and concentration of bases, the “Pivot to East Asia” itdelf is only having a limited effect on the U.S. position in Europe.

Unlike Europe, the number of troops in the Asian region has increased by almost 10%, and the military base in Guam has especially expanded with more military equipment being moved to the region. But here too the spending cuts by the U.S. Armed Forces are noticeable. The military equipment and the number of vessels and aircraft necessary for a military operation remain inadequate. With military cooperation, military training and joint exercises, the U.S. is trying to establish a network of partner countries in the region. The mid-term success seems rather ambivalent. Depending on domestic and regional political interests, certain states seem ready to change sides or align with both sides at a whim. Additionally, the TPP, which was intended to forge economic ties among the partner states, has yet to be ratified. Faced with the unrestrained economic and military growth of China and the U.S. impotence in resolving regional conflicts, some countries will have to accept China’s long-term role as the dominant regional power.

Despite the “Pivot to East Asia”, it is obvious that China will not kowtow to the U.S. On the contrary, the Obama administration’s efforts have led to a hardening of attitudes, because the entire strategy appears to China as an aggressive attempt to restrict its power. Courting potential partners in the region and creating the framework for the TPP while leaving China out has come to be seen by the Chinese negatively. There is therefore no rational reason for China to renounce its claim to power in the region, which is obvious from its point of view, as can clearly be seen in the territorial conflict in the South China Sea. On the contrary, China has steadily expanded its international activities since 2008, with its commitment to Africa, the fight against piracy, the construction of the “modern Silk Road”, global investment, participation in UN peacekeeping missions, and plans to establish a navy logistics base in Djibouti. Perhaps the U.S. would be better advised to accept the power demands of China and embrace a more diplomatically-constructive approach. A military conflict between both great powers, whether intentional or not, would be disastrous for both countries, the Asian region and the world. Moreover, a lasting serious conflict of interest with the U.S. and the similarities between China and Russia could lead to the two becoming companions in fate, which would cause further headaches in Washington.

Despite his bold announcement, Obama’s strategic reorientation has not managed to bring China under control or make any progress in important regional conflicts. At the moment, the measures taken by Obama are much more a “pivot to nowhere”.

More information

Duterte journeyed to Beijing this week to announce his “separation from the United States” in military and economic terms. “America has lost,” Duterte said. He claimed that a new alliance of the Philippines, China, and Russia would emerge — “there are three of us against the world.” His trade secretary said the Philippines and China were inking $13 billion in trade deals; that’s a pretty hefty signing bonus for switching sides. Duterte said he will soon end military cooperation with the United States, despite the opposition of his armed forces. […] If the Philippines becomes a Chinese satrapy, by contrast, Washington will find itself hard-pressed to hold the “first island chain” in the Western Pacific that encompasses “the Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Philippine archipelago.” Defending that line of island barriers has been a linchpin of U.S. strategy since the Cold War. It now could be undone because of the whims of one unhinged leader. — Max Boot, “Duterte’s Flip-Flop Into Bed With China Is a Disaster for the United States“, Foreign Policy, 20.10.2016.

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The U.S. must stop the Taliban’s Rise

by Austin Michael Bodetti. He is a student in the Gabelli Presidential Scholars Program at Boston College. He focuses on the relationship between Islam and conflict in Syria and Sudan.

Preparations for the liberation of Mosul: A convoy of Iraqi security forces advances on the outskirts of Mosul (Photo: Ako Rasheed / Reuters).

Preparations for the liberation of Mosul: A convoy of Iraqi security forces advances on the outskirts of Mosul (Photo: Ako Rasheed / Reuters).

The U.S.-led intervention against the Islamic State (IS) has made obvious progress in the last year and a half. Criticized in late 2014 and early 2015 for failing to stop the militants’ advances, the Arab–Western coalition first started reversing these gains after the Siege of Kobanî in January, 2015. This February, the Iraqi Security Forces freed Ramadi, the only Iraqi city that IS had captured since U.S. warplanes started bombing it. Three months later, Syrian soldiers with Russian air support expelled the militants from Palmyra, the Roman-influenced city that IS had conquered a year earlier, to much fanfare. From Fallujah in Iraq to Manbij in Syria, the terrorist organization is on the retreat, and news media has been dutiful in reporting the achievements.

The disaster in Afghanistan, for which the U.S. government bears much of the responsibility, has received far less attention. Last year, the Taliban seized Kunduz, a northern provincial capital far from traditional militant strongholds. The country’s ill-equipped soldiers required U.S. air and fire support — in addition to the participation of U.S. special operations forces — to recapture the city. Journalists focused on the accidental bombing of the MSF-hospital during the lengthy firefight instead of the startling facts on the ground: the Taliban, once on the run from Western soldiers in the Afghan countryside, now had the firepower, manpower, and willpower to seize the country’s fifth-largest city. Since then, the Taliban has managed to besiege Kunduz again in addition to making further inroads into Helmand, Afghanistan’s largest province and the centerpiece of its illegal drug trade.

The U.S. have failed Afghanistan on the level of peacekeeping and public opinion. Though the country hosts 9,800 U.S. soldiers, more than Iraq’s 5,000 and much more than Syria’s several hundred, the U.S. government has failed to commit itself to peace or victory in Afghanistan, giving the Afghans enough air and fire support to maintain tenuous control of urban areas but too little to hold and secure the countryside around cities such as Kunduz and provinces such as Helmand, where the Taliban has blocked the northern highway and mined the eastern one. The insurgents have even severed supply chains between the capital and the rest of the country.


The number of airstrikes conducted by the U.S. Air Force in Afghanistan this year until the end of August, 813, pales in comparison to the 19,623 of U.S. bombings aiding anti-ISIS campaigns in Iraq and Syria. Afghan officers in Helmand and elsewhere have begged the Americans to launch more airstrikes as the Taliban constricts their country’s cities. Whereas the Pentagon has injected hundreds of millions of dollars into strengthening Arab and Kurdish militias and security forces in the Middle East to support its efforts there, U.S.-led projects such as the Afghan Local Police have been a disaster, in part contributing to Kunduz’s initial fall. According to the U.S. government’s own sources, the Afghan National Army replaced a third of its recruits in 2015, meaning that the security forces founded by the Americans still have little loyalty to what should be long-term U.S. goals, such as defeating the Taliban.

The Americans have sent mixed signals on the subject of peace talks, perhaps the best hope of stopping an insurgency that has survived over a decade of Western airpower and firepower. On the one hand, the White House has encouraged the Taliban to join peace talks and engaged the insurgents before, negotiating the release of Bowe Bergdahl in 2014. On the other, the White House killed the Taliban’s controversial leader this May, citing his opposition to peace talks. The irony of this confusing strategy came full circle when the Taliban’s new leader, more conservative than his machiavellian but pragmatic predecessor, voiced renewed opposition to peace talks. Given that the Taliban has cooperated with Iran and Russia, which itself occupied Afghanistan in the 1980s, it would follow that the U.S. should be able to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table, yet they have failed.

(Situation in April 2016)

(Situation in April 2016)

The Taliban controls a fifth of Afghan territory and influences half of it, giving the insurgents little reason to negotiate or retreat. Afghanistan now resembles Iraq in 2014: Militants are using a Western withdrawal to besiege or seize cities while the U.S. government and public express reluctance to intervene in a country where they have spent billions of dollars and thousands of lives. This attitude, however understandable, led to the power vacuum that empowered IS. A similar blitzkrieg by the Taliban, which hosted al-Qaeda during the planning of 9/11 and still maintains an alliance with it, presents a threat equal to (if not greater than) IS. The Taliban has fought U.S. soldiers for fifteen years without facing IS’s near extinction of the late 2000s, rendering it a more patient, resilient foe.

If the U.S. government wants to prevent an Afghan sequel to the IS surge in Iraq, it must invest military and political resources in Afghanistan now, when adequate intervention can preserve the Afghan state and protect its national security. The Taliban will only concede or negotiate if the U.S. government gives it a reason to fear defeat. Till then, the insurgents will edge closer to victory.

Posted in Afghanistan, Austin Michael Bodetti, English, International, Iraq | Tagged , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The benefits and risks for Russia of having a permanent naval base on Syria’s Mediterranean coast

Amid deteriorating relations between the US and Russia over the Syria crisis officials in Moscow are voicing that country’s intention to establish a permanent naval base on Syria’s Mediterranean coastline. Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov told the Federation Council on October 10 that Moscow “will have a permanent naval base at Tartus“.

Igor Morozov, a member of the Federation Council, followed up this announcement by declaring, “[b]y doing this Russia is not only increasing its military potential in Syria but in the entire Middle East and in the Mediterranean region as a whole.”

Despite other claims, Russia didn’t expand their naval facility in Tartus, yet. It is expected that the Russian aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov will anchor off Syria's coast at the end of October / beginning of November and will stay there until January 2017.

Despite other claims, Russia didn’t expand their naval facility in Tartus, yet. It is expected that the Russian aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov will anchor off Syria’s coast at the end of October / beginning of November and will stay there until January 2017.

Since Soviet days the Kremlin has had a warm water port in Tartus, but it was never more than a naval depot. Russia has reportedly begun dredging the sea around the port to enable it to host its larger warships. If Russia does this then Tartus would constitute its most strategically important foreign military asset. The big ships of the Russian navy could stay for months on end not far from the British RAF station in Akrotiri, Cyprus and Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, which is a major NATO base.

Russia’s state-run press could hardly contain gloating about the strategic significance such a facility would provide Moscow. Sputnik News published an article outlining what it considers the “five reasons why Russia needs a military base in Syrian Tartus“.

“If our new combat surface ships and submarines outfitted with Kalibr cruise missiles are based in Tartus, this will allow Moscow to keep the situation in the Middle East and Mediterranean under control,” Igor Korotchenko, the editor of the National Defense magazine, told Sputnik.

Russia has been making moves in this direction since early in its Syrian intervention. A foretaste of this came in late November 2015, following Turkey’s shoot-down of a Russian bomber over its border with Syria, when Moscow deployed long-range S-400 missiles to its Hmeymim airbase in Latakia and dispatched its large Moskva cruiser, outfitted with S-300F missiles, off Syria’s coast. These advanced weapons would have enabled Moscow to shoot down any Turkish jet fighter which violated Syrian airspace.

In October and November 2015, Gepard class frigates and Buyan class corvettes, part of the Caspian Flotilla totally launched 44 Kalibr-NK system cruise missiles 3M-14T from the Caspian Sea at targets in Syria. The missiles traveled 1,500 km through Iranian and Iraqi airspace and struck targets in Al-Raqqah (then controlled by the Islamic State) and Aleppo Governorate, but primarily in Idlib Governorate (then controlled by the Jaish al-Fatah and its ally al-Nusra Front

The only major thing to change since that time is the striking fact that Russia and Turkey are making great headway in restoring relations since they began their rapprochement over the summer. Meanwhile, Washington’s accidental bombing and killing of at least sixty-two Syrian soldiers in Deir Ezzor last month along with Moscow’s full backing of, and support to, the Syrian regimes ferocious bombardment of Aleppo, has seen relations deteriorate to dangerous Cold War lows.

Russia has just added advanced S-300VM missiles to its arsenal in Syria amid the fallout with Washington, a clear message to Washington that Moscow could readily make all of Syria’s airspace a no-fly zone if the US tries to interfere with the present campaign it is waging, alongside the Syrian regime, in Aleppo.

Also, data accumulated by Reuters show that Russia’s “Syrian Express”, hence the international shipping route from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean Sea, is more busy than ever. “Some of the ships that have been sent to Syria were so heavily laden the load line was barely visible above the water”, Reuters observed.

With such a logistical route stretching directly from the Russian mainland to a large permanent Syrian naval base, Russia could maintain a very formidable force in that wider region in the foreseeable future. Having warships, as Korotchenko describes, with lethal weaponry permanently based in the Mediterranean Sea (rather than further north in the Black Sea) would seriously alter the balance of power there.


For the meantime Syria remains a largely unstable country. Granted, while Russia does have a largely stable foothold in the Latakia province – which it helped secure through its initial intervention, when the Syrian regime was largely on the defensive – the future of Syria remains in the balance. Russia counts on having a weak regime, that it will have to continuously shore up, as its host in a country which has been completely wrecked from war.

However, even under the two Assad’s relations with Moscow, while mostly cordial, have had their ups and downs over the decades. One notably tense, but largely forgotten, incident occurred back in 1989 in Tartus. The scholar David W. Lesch, author of a political history of the presidency of Bashar al-Assad, recalls that incident well since he was present as a graduate student at the time. It saw two Syrian helicopter gunships attack one of the Russian cruisers docked at that port, killing two Soviet sailors. Not knowing why on earth Damascus did such a thing to their superpower ally Lesch wagered a guess that the incident was “a not-so-subtle message from [then Syrian President] Hafez al-Assad to [General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Mikhail Gorbhachev that Damascus did not like the direction of Syrian-Soviet relations at the time.”

That incident aptly demonstrates that the relationship between the major Russian power and the Syrian regime was not always built on solid foundations and is susceptible to sudden ruptures. Something the Kremlin should bear in mind before it commits to devoting the large amount of capital and resources such an undertaking will inevitably require.

Posted in English, International, Russia, Sea Powers, Security Policy, Syria | Tagged , , , , , | 1 Comment

Turkish UAV Bayraktar TB2 Flying from Batman

Imagery acquired during October 2015 shows the Bayraktar TB2 parked at Batman. (DigitalGlobe).

Imagery acquired during October 2015 shows the Bayraktar TB2 parked at Batman. (DigitalGlobe).

As Turkey pushes toward becoming a major player in the UAV industry, seeing more of their drones on satellite imagery beyond test airfields should come as no surprise. DigitalGlobe space snapshots from October 2015 captured one of the country’s latest drones, the Bayraktar TB2, complete with its ground control station, parked in front of an aircraft shelter at Batman air force base.

The TB2, a medium altitude drone developed by the Kale-Baykar group, is a twin-boom, push-propeller UAV which first took to the skies back in 2009. According to the manufacturer, the platform has a length of 6.5m, wing span of 12m – both confirmed on imagery – and a maximum take-off weight of 630kg. The unmanned aircraft can fly up to 22,500 feet (6,800km), loiter for more than 24 hours on station at a range of 150km from the ground station. It’s equipped with electro-optical and infrared sensors, a laser designator and laser range finder.

Highly capable, Ankara has plans to make it one of the country’s front line UAVs. Domestic press reports say that the platform will conduct orbits along the Iraqi border. Batman, located less than 60 and 90 miles from the Syrian and Iraqi borders, respectively, also hosts the IAI-built Heron. Turkey acquired two Heron systems in 2010 after significant delay integrating Turkish components. Up to four of the Israeli-built platform have been observed at the airbase in previous imagery.

Like the UAE, Turkey turned to the domestic private sector to develop its own platform of surveillance and strike drones after Washington turned down requests to buy armed Predators and Reapers. So far, the country’s done pretty well advancing the tech. In December 2015, Turkey conducted its first armed UAV test flight using locally developed smart micro munitions (SMM) fitted to the TB2. Targets were struck with pinpoint accuracy, according to Turkish press reporting. The initial drop test utilized a variant of the air launched anti-tank missile, the UMTAS (or Mizrak), which is infrared seeker and laser seeker capable.

The UMTAS is made by the Turkish armor and missile manufacturer Roketsan and was designed for Turkey’s homegrown T-129 ATAK combat helicopters, a locally produced version of the Agusta A129 Mangusta. A second test in May 2016 (see video above) saw a live warhead fitted with the SSM completing the trials. Notably, handhelds showed the drone armed with the unpowered variant at two hardpoints underneath the wings, a similar carriage configuration to the U.S. Predator.

However, unlike their U.S. counterparts, each Bayraktar TB2 system is comprised of six aerial vehicles while U.S. systems typically have four drones. Additional equipment for the Turkish platform includes two ground control stations, three ground data terminals, two remote video terminals and other support equipment.

As of 2016, press reporting suggests that two systems are operational with the land forces where they’ve already been used in operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) since 2014. Rumors even suggest that the platform may have made a foreign appearance recently during Turkey’s Jarabulus operation. Outside of the military, other operators include Turkey’s Police who received at least two systems this year.

Batman air force base, the location the drone was observed, is the HQ of the 14th Unmanned Aircraft System Command.

See also
Turkey’s growing domestic arms industry“,, 21.05.2016.

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Afghanistan: challenging aid neutrality in war-torn Helmand

by Laura Cesaretti. Laura is Freelance Reporter in Middle East and South Asia, currently based in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Kharim Ahmad, 22, suffered shrapnel wounds on his face and the loss of a leg from fighting in Sangin. He was being treated at the Emergency hospital in Lashkargah on March 25, 2016 (Photo: Paula Bronstein for the Pulitzer Center).

Kharim Ahmad, 22, suffered shrapnel wounds on his face and the loss of a leg from fighting in Sangin. He was being treated at the Emergency hospital in Lashkargah on March 25, 2016 (Photo: Paula Bronstein for the Pulitzer Center).

There is a reason why you can find a cold Guinness in the unstable and alcohol-free Afghan capital Kabul: Globalization. For many, it is a refreshing relief from their daily struggles, which help them to cope with a life full of renunciation. Normally, those people are the humanitarian workers, who have moved to Afghanistan in the name of highest values, career building, or more cynically, the opportunity to have a generous wallet in their pocket. For others, globalization is the process whereby their own culture is weakened and questioned by an unknown outside agenda. “I have a message to send to the world. Please, stop this fight against Afghanistan. We are simple and poor people, the only thing we got is our homes”, says Mahmud.

Mahmud is one of the thousands victims of the fight between the post-2001 governmental forces and the Taliban in Helmand, a troubled province in southern Afghanistan. His brother was killed in a crossfire inside the war-torn district of Marjiah. The wife is still suffering from the many injuries caused by the bullets that crossed her body. But she doesn’t even think about crying. Although she lost a husband and her elder child, she is patiently breastfeeding her younger baby, wrapped in badages in a hospital bed in Lashkargah, the provincial capital.

Emergency NGO Medical Coordinator Luca Radaelli, center, listens in as doctors and nurses make their morning rounds at the Emergency Hospital in Lashkargah, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, Wednesday, August 21, 2013.

Emergency NGO Medical Coordinator Luca Radaelli, center, listens in as doctors and nurses make their morning rounds at the Emergency Hospital in Lashkargah, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, Wednesday, August 21, 2013.

Afghans, especially children, are used to never cry or complain. Many believe this is due to their pride and strong body shape. Most probably it is because mourning is a luxury that they still cannot afford. For decades, international NGOs have been filling this country with aid supplies, humanitarian services, and generous donations. However, the rapid proliferation of these NGOs has also been accompanied by the understanding that their activities on the ground would have been far from neutral. Allegedly international organizations, including non-governmental ones, were accused of aiming to change the behaviour of an entire population. In exchange, they would have provided security and economic development.

Something happened though. An unprecedented number of attacks on NGOs, humanitarian workers, and even international institutions, such as the United Nation, have shown the world that humanitarian inviolability was not to last in Afghanistan. With the rational incontestability of the NGOs purpose challenged, the “machine of aid” was sucked into the sadistic network of war itself. In a conflict where the line between civilians, fighters, criminals and politicians is blurred, they have became simply another actor, struggling between its good and bad side justified by the violence of the environment.

The dramatic use of private securities companies that accompany the humanitarian works in the provinces and the capital is one of the most outstanding evidence of that. Many organizations have also forced their international staff to leave the country, managing the local projects from Europe or other more safe locations. Others have focused their activities in the few districts where security could still be guaranteed. Where welcomed, it was mainly due to the opportunity of high salaries and local economic growth, creating a sickening dependency and the enrichment of certain tribes at the expense of others.

In the name of neutrality: No armed guards, no security cameras and no barbed wire — this is the „Emergency Surgical Center for Civilian War Victims“ in Lashkargah.

In the name of neutrality: No armed guards, no security cameras and no barbed wire — this is the „Emergency Surgical Center for Civilian War Victims“ in Lashkargah.

Emergency, an international medical charity founded in Italy, has helped heal war victims in Afghanistan since 1999, is one of the few, who have followed an opposite trend. As a policy, they refuse to have armed guards, security cameras or barbed wire that covers their medical and accommodation buildings. In the unstable southern province of Helmand, where Mahmud lives, they have located 10 internationals among doctors, nurses and logicians. In their guest house, based in the provincial capital of Lashkargah, even local kids can jump, out of curiosity, over the small walls that surround the building.

It took the organization 17 years, and an abundance of common sense, to gain this trust. When Gino Strada, renowned war surgeon and founder of the NGO, opened the hospital in Panjshir province in 1999, none would have bet that he would manage to run also a hospital in Kabul, the Taliban capital of the, at the time, Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Panjshir at that time was the home of the Northern Alliance, the Afghan armed opposition that rejected violently the Taliban’s fundamentalist ruling. Yet, according to Strada, even Ahmad Shah Massoud, head of the movement and famous “Lion of Panjshir”, left his inseparable AK-47 outside the doors of the Emergency hospital.

It was in the name of neutrality, not security, that then, as now, Emergency has banned everyone from bringing arms inside their structures. It is also the same reason why the international staff are forbidden from going to areas in Kabul, where the night-life appeals to expats: “We cannot afford that our role could be questioned by the behaviour of a single individual”, explains Luca Radaelli, the country program coordinator.

In Afghanistan, as in other zone of crisis, the idea of purely neutral humanitarian relief has always been difficult to apply, especially when the services were closely associated with cultural and social questions. The realm of “do not harm” policy, to whom all NGOs are inspired to abide by, has been easy contradicted by the social intercourse of foreign entities with the natural development of extremely fragile societies. If this truth concerns certainly any non-governmental nation building effort, it doesn’t spare the basic humanitarian actions, such as medical aid.

The international staff of Emergency based in Lashkargah, Helmand.

The international staff of Emergency based in Lashkargah, Helmand.

Emergency, who have provided medical assistance to over 4 million people, knew that operating under the name of neutrality could cause mistrust, especially when it meant working on both sides of a war. After decades of conflicts, any violated society would have learnt that even good intentions have their price, and will become distrustful toward those, who claim the contrary. There were times when rumours spread regarding Emergency’s activities and the amputations they were carried in their operation rooms. Some believed that this kind of surgical removal aimed to weaken one of the opposite side of the conflict. Others found Emergency’s policy to cure everyone disturbing. Clearly, they were also saving the life of an enemy, allowing him to go in shape in order to kill again.

This and other more difficult events have repeatedly put the organization under severe scrutiny. In 2010, three Italian and six Afghan employees were accused of “terrorism and assassination“, although then released without charges. In 2007, due to their role as facilitator in the release of Daniele Matrogiacomo, an Italian journalist kidnapped with his Afghan colleague Ajmal Naqshbandi (tragically killed then by the kidnappers), their role was extensively investigated by the Afghan authority.

In our work, we keep asking ourselves: will you let your mother be operated here? — Luca Radaelli, Emergency NGO Medical Coordinator, Afghanistan.

Nowadays, however, Emergency is unquestionably the first hospital, where all victims of war are taken in Afghanistan. This is in spite of the availability of other public medical structures, often stationed nearest the location of an attack. In a civilian struggle, where brothers kill each other on the frontlines, their works proved that it is possible to help civilians, government soldiers and Taliban fighters, keeping all of them in nearby beds under the only principle of human care. In a society, which cannot provide adequate formative courses in many of the most basic fields, they found a way to transform almost illiterates into one of the most professional and respected team of health workers in the country.

Emergency has 46 first aid posts (FAPs), all run by a local team and available in the most remote and profoundly unstable areas of the country. “We go only where we are welcome”, explains Luca. In practice, it means never forcing the opening of a clinic according to a top-down organization assessment, but always replying to a demand made by the local communities itself. It is by following this simple rule that they reached otherwise inaccessible districts such as Sangin and Marjiah in Helmand. Those, as other places where their clinics are located, are normally the frontlines of the struggle between government and insurgency forces, inhabited by thousands of victims with war-related injuries.

The staff of the FAPs has to pass through different checkpoints with the risk to be unexpectedly caught in the crossfire with its ambulances, which bring patients to the three main Emergency hospitals, located in the Panjishir valley, Kabul and Lashkargah on a daily basis. In order to guarantee the right hygiene and professional quality standards, actual surgeries and intensive health assistance are provided just inside those structures: “In our work, we keep asking ourselves: will you let your mother be operated here?”, explains Luca. If the answer is yes, it is only thanks to this strict operative model, which takes little inspiration from the new humanitarianism theories, but instead has been developed along years of considerations, humility, and willingness of exposure.

No exceptions!

No exceptions!

Always behaving as a guest, Emergency have received the greatest feeling of openness by the Afghan community. Nevertheless, they never took a step back, when it was time to prove that there were no “weapons” hidden behind the people’s smiles. Even in the conservative Islamic Helmand, the local male staff do not show embarrassment in shaking the hands of their international female colleagues. An important effort, aimed simply to communicate appreciation and respect, not adaptation to others strangers beliefs. Indeed, for the humanitarian realm, this can be translated as a sign of the sacred obligation of hospitality — as a common worldwide certainty embraced by the old Greek western inspired civilization, as well as the historical eastern Afghan society, regardless the doubts that inevitably tie any relationship between host and guest.

In these constant daily actions, Emergency and the Afghan population are proving that something like “universal rights” exists. However these basic rights can only be identified, if a common ground of mutual respect between a foreign NGO and the local community can be found. In that sense, humanitarian assistance implemented in the name of liberal values without the regard for local social inclusion and coherence can no longer be considered as neutral. The balance between “harm and benefit” depends on this effort and on commonly defined ethical rules, rather than high budgets. It might require a deep articulate reform of the international humanitarian aims, but results prove that it is worthwhile.

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Iran’s Simorgh Test Site Identified

Iranian coverage of the Simorgh & Saegheh UAVs in October 2016.

IHS Jane’s identified the test site of one of Iran’s latest UAVs, the Simorgh, through open source geolocation analysis.

Video released by several of Iran’s domestic broadcasters was used to determine that Kashan Airport is the location of the country’s Simorgh testing activities. The surrounding buildings, situated to the West of the runway and viewed from the landing gear, were a primary indicator confirming the site.

The video, showing the aircraft taking off and landing at the airport, is the latest sign that Iran has successfully reverse engineered elements of the captured RQ-170 Sentinel reconnaissance UAV. The advanced U.S. drone reportedly crashed in Iran in December 2011, while conducting surveillance on Iranian targets presumably connected to the country’s secretive nuclear program.

The Kashan airport, otherwise known as the Nasr airbase subordinate to the IRGC, is familiar to imagery watchers as a location already supporting Iran’s unmanned aircraft. Historical imagery available in Google Earth has shown equipment associated with Iran’s drones deployed at the site since at least 2010, if not earlier.

DigitalGlobe imagery of Kashan airport from April 2014.

DigitalGlobe imagery of Kashan airport from April 2014.

Specifically, the country’s rail launched UAVs have been observed operating from the airport. Imagery from April 2014 shows a probable Ababil-2 in flight along with the platform’s rail launcher and support equipment parked near the runway. More recently however, we’ve observed ground control stations similar to the later variants of the rail-launched or landing gear-equipped Mohajer series. It’s possible these ground stations may also work with Iran’s Simorgh and related variants.

Video also released by the regime showed handhelds of one identified Simorgh variant, the Saegheh (or Thunderbolt). The drone was displayed on a stand and armed with four missiles. Unfortunately, there was no video evidence showing the drone in operation. However, we did notice a new bermed munitions storage area added to the site since 2014, which could suggest Iran is experimenting with the armed variant at the airfield. We look to future imagery to provide more insight.

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Construction at Brazil’s Nuclear Sub Shipyard Slows

Imagery from June 2016 shows Brazil's Itagui shipyard and naval base under construction. (DigitalGlobe)

Imagery from June 2016 shows Brazil’s Itaguaí shipyard and naval base under construction. (DigitalGlobe)

Construction activity at Brazil’s Itaguaí nuclear submarine shipyard continues to show signs of slowing, a review of recent satellite imagery suggests. Initially, Brazil was to have its naval shipyard and co-located submarine base ready to start initial vessel construction by 2016. As we moved along the project timeline, the country’s economic troubles and scandals made that less of a possibility. Space snapshots show that very little activity has occurred over the last several months. The installation of the syncrolift (or ship elevator), a notable milestone, did however proceed in Q2 2016. Imagery shows the Norwegian acquired winches and ship platform modules were in place by the end of May. Beyond the syncrolift, other structures appear incomplete, land reclamation activity has not progressed and building material storage shows little change.

In February, Bloomberg reported that Brazil had cut funding for its nuclear submarine project by 50 percent. With Brazil’s shrinking economy — six consecutive declines — high inflation, and higher borrowing costs, not to mention the Zika virus epidemic, things look dim for the project. Without any direct maritime threats, modernizing the country’s naval arm, especially with further undersea platforms, has become less of a priority.

See also

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Zambia’s Perfect Storm

by Paul Pryce. With degrees in political science from both sides of the pond, Paul Pryce has previously worked as Senior Research Fellow for the Atlantic Council of Canada’s Canadian Armed Forces program, as a Research Fellow for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and as an Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. He has also served as an infantryman in the Canadian Forces.

Zambian President Edgar Chagwa Lungu addressing UN General Assembly, September 20, 2016.

Zambian President Edgar Chagwa Lungu addressing UN General Assembly, September 20, 2016.

Since gaining independence from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland – and by extension the British Empire – in 1964, Zambia has been a relatively peaceful oasis in southern Africa. The sole exception to this came in July 1990, when Zambian troops responded violently to protests for the ouster of then President Kenneth Kuanda and the establishment of multiparty democracy. However, tensions have begun to simmer, drawing concern from such international actors as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – a multilateral body comprised of Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

There are three main factors contributing toward Zambia’s slide into instability. The most immediate cause of dissent is the general election held on August 11, 2016. According to the official results of the vote, President Edgar Lungu was re-elected with 50.3% of the vote, defeating challenger Hakainde Hichilema, who received 47.6% of ballots cast. Hichilema disputes the official results and has accused the governing Patriotic Front of rigging the vote, though his appeals have been rejected by the High Court of Lusaka. For its part, a Carter Center election observer mission led by Sylvie Kinigi, the former Prime Minister of Burundi, assessed the vote as “satisfactory” but raised concerns about the safety of journalists while a SADC mission to observe the vote also reported the election was peaceful, free, and fair.

Presidential election results map. Blue denotes constituencies won by Lungu, and Red denotes those won by Hichilema. With a such distribution, tensions are almost inevitable.

Presidential election results map. Blue denotes constituencies won by Lungu, and Red denotes those won by Hichilema. With a such distribution, tensions are almost inevitable.

The dispute over the election results reflects the intense polarization of Zambian politics. In the east of Zambia, support among the Bemba, Nyanja, and Tumbuka speaking communities is squarely behind President Lungu and the centre-left Patriotic Front. Meanwhile, in the western regions of the country, support among the Tonga, Lozi, and Lunda speaking communities is almost uniformly behind Hichilema’s centre-right United Party for National Development (UPND). That the ideological differences between the UPND also touches on tribal and linguistic divisions gives these new tensions in Zambia some lasting power, especially as the opposition seems unwilling to abide by court rulings on the validity of the election results.

A second and equally important factor is a drought that has persisted in Zambia and elsewhere in southern Africa since 2013. The severe lack of rainfall has left water levels at the Kariba Dam, one of the world’s largest hydropower stations, at the minimum operating level. As such, rather than exporting part of the 6,400 gigawatt-hours (GWh) produced annually by the facility, Zambian communities suffer intermittent blackouts, especially in the summer months. Agricultural production, an important contributor to Zambia’s economic growth has also suffered to such an extent that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to grow only 3.6% in 2016 and 4.9% in 2017, compared to average annual growth rates of 6.7% in the years preceding the drought. The persistent drought could also potentially impact Zambia’s balance of trade, returning the country to the status of a net food importer rather than a net exporter and worsening the employment prospects for a significant number of Zambians.

Finally, the fall in copper prices globally has crippled the rural economy, particularly in the western regions of Zambia that have so strongly thrown their support behind Hichilema and the UPND. Copper is valued at approximately $2.07 US per pound as of this writing, whereas it was valued at roughly $4.50 US per pound in 2011. Producing more than 710,000 metric tons of the mineral each year, Zambia is among the world’s largest sources of copper and, on the African continent, is second only to the Democratic Republic of Congo for its scale of copper production. Despite the negative trend in copper prices, Zambia is doubling down on its production of the mineral and the government expects Zambian copper production to exceed 1 million metric tons in 2017. This will only serve to further depress prices for copper and is not likely to correct Zambia’s current economic trajectory, which entails rising unemployment and diminishing returns for those entrepreneurs who hopped to form part of Africa’s emerging middle-class.

Pherry Mwiinga, a hydrologist, looks out over the Zambezi River in Zambia, where water levels are at record lows (Photo: Joao Silva/The New York Times).

Pherry Mwiinga, a hydrologist, looks out over the Zambezi River in Zambia, where water levels are at record lows (Photo: Joao Silva/The New York Times).

Unless the re-elected Patriotic Front can find some means of correcting Zambia’s economic course or reach a power-sharing agreement with the UPND, the civil strife will only continue to worsen. Fortunately, the Zambian Defence Force (ZDF) is not likely to become a factor in determining where political power is vested in the near future. As Zambia does not exercise conscription, the ZDF lacks the mass infantry necessary to seize power and control the country as part of some military junta. However, on the other hand, the relatively small size and poor equipment of the ZDF also means that the formation of paramilitary groups by either or both of the main political parties could have severe consequences for the maintenance of law and order in the country. A diplomatic effort by the SADC or the African Union is necessary to avoid such an eventuality.

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Russia’s SU-27 Probably Departed Belarus

DigitalGlobe imagery from June 2016 shows the departure of Russia's SU-27SM at Baranovichi. Three overhauled Belarusian MIG-29 fighters were parked on the apron at the time of capture.

DigitalGlobe imagery from June 2016 shows the departure of Russia’s SU-27SM at Baranovichi. Three overhauled Belarusian MIG-29 fighters were parked on the apron at the time of capture.

The Russian Air Force appears to have recalled their Su-27SM from Belarus, a review of satellite imagery of the 61st Fighter Airbase in Baranovichi suggests.

Russia had 4 Su-27SM Flanker parked in revetments on the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) apron since December 2013. The multi-role fighters originally deployed as part of an advanced element that would eventually form a full forward deployed squadron.

Space snapshots acquired between May and September have not shown the return of the aircraft to the apron. A review of other active and reserve airfields also indicate they were not redeployed within the country.

Although no official reporting has mentioned the relocation, their absence may be a further sign that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko managed to quell Russian plans for an airbase on the territory.

Further yet, Belarus may have even found a way to get new equipment to support the declining air defence arm. Earlier in February, the country signed a deal with Irkut to procure new Su-30SM fighters, despite lacking funds for the purchase. Details regarding their potential sale were not made public.

The SU-30SM are expected to replace Belarus’ ageing MIG-29 of which 10 were recently refurbished by the 558th Aircraft Repair Plant. Five of the aircraft were recently pulling QRA duty with the Russian fighters. Kazakhstan also took delivery of four SU-30SM fighters from Russia last year.

Looking Ahead
Expectations going forward remain murky. Russia’s move to support separatists in Ukraine has created additional unease in Minsk. As a result, Lukashenko’s loyalty doesn’t appear to be what it once was. A battered economy highly exposed to Russian sanctions has pushed Eastern Europe’s last strongman to consider further Western style reforms.

Between 19 September – 01 October, Belarus is hosting another IMF mission in the attempts to secure a $3 billion loan. The Washington-based organization is hoping to push for greater structural changes which, inter alia, include increasing the role of private companies and reducing that of state owned enterprises.

Nevertheless, we can’t count Russia out just yet. Despite a growing divide, Moscow’s ability to help re-arm the Belarusian military through either hefty subsidies or donated materials remains an important bargaining chip to bring the country back into the fold. In addition to the SU-30SM, the country recently took delivery of former VKO-operated S-300. Imagery already shows the units actively deployed to Belarusian border regions.

But it’s not just the carrot to watch for. Russia also has other levers to influence Belarus’ decisions and further promote its own interests. The supply and subsidy of Russian oil and gas, for example, is a tried and true measure that highly affects Belarus’ GDP growth. Q4 oil supplies from Russia were recently announced which put overall oil deliveries to the country at 18 million tons, down from the scheduled 24 million. This year oil cuts alone have accounted for a Belarusian GDP reduction of .03 per cent, according to the Belarusian Prime Minister.

Bottom Line
Russia’s neighbor is economically vulnerable. With Belarus decommissioning a sizable part of its air force — its entire fleet of Su-24s and Su-27s — developments with Russia, air defense and otherwise, remain important to watch.

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Turkey’s eternal search for an adequate air defense system

A picture shows two Russian S-400 Triumf missile systems at the Russian Hmeymim military base in Latakia province, in the northwest of Syria, on December 16, 2015 (Photo: Paul Gypteau/AFP/Getty Images).

A picture shows two Russian S-400 Triumf missile systems at the Russian Hmeymim military base in Latakia province, in the northwest of Syria, on December 16, 2015 (Photo: Paul Gypteau/AFP/Getty Images).

Following Turkey’s controversial downing of a Russian bomber over its border with Syria last November Russia deployed advanced S-400 air defense missile systems to its main airbase in Syria’s coastal Latakia province. Turkey had reason to fear this deployment, variants of these missiles can take down airborne targets from over 200 miles (approximately 322 km) away.

Relations between Ankara and Moscow have thawed since that tense time, despite this the missiles remain in place in Syria. Turkey’s neighbour Iran is scheduled to receive four S-300PMU-2 Favourite systems – the S-400’s older brother – by the end of the year (according to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database). All the while Turkey remains with a very basic air defense system and no long-range surface-to-air missiles. Instead the country remains reliant on anti-aircraft guns like the M42A1 Duster (262 units according to the Military Balance 2016), Oerlikon 20 mm (439 units), Oerlikon GDF-001/-002/-003 35 mm (120 units) and Bofors 40 mm (L/60 and L/70; 843 units). With the exception of MANPAD’s the closest thing Turkey has to a formidable missile defense system are its medium-range American-made MIM-23 Hawks, short-ranged British-made Rapiers and other quite aged systems.

While these weapons are certainly better than nothing Turkey is heavily reliant on its air force to combat aerial threats. It has recognized this fact and tried to compensate for it, with no tangible success to date. Even though it has come a long way in the last 25 years, the Turkish military remains an blend of new and old. Its air force is relatively formidable, consisting of about 240 General Dynamic F-16 Fighting Falcons backed up by 108 modified and upgraded F-4 Phantom II and Northrop F-5A/B Freedom Fighters.

On the ground the make-up of Turkey’s armored forces is very informative, even though Ankara possesses over 700 Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 main battle tanks, the backbone of its armored forces remain older M48 and M60 Patton tanks, of which it has almost 2,000.

These forces are considerably competent, however Turkey doubtlessly wants to acquire or develop a substantial long range air defense capability. When spillover from the Syrian conflict began affecting Turkey’s frontier provinces (mortars and rockets, some stray some intentionally aimed at it, landed in Turkish territory) NATO-deployed Patriot missile systems to its southeast to reassure Ankara.

An HQ-9 portable launcher during China's 60th anniversary parade in 2009.

An HQ-9 portable launcher during China’s 60th anniversary parade in 2009.

However Ankara’s inability to deploy such weapons itself doubtlessly irks it. Back in 2013 it entered talks with the China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) to purchase four FD-2000 (HongQi 9 or HQ-9) long range air defense batteries, each consisting of missiles, launchers, radars, sensors, vehicles, and support systems. It is basically a clone of the S-300. This resulted in the US warning Turkey that it would withhold any funds it had in protest of this deal (the same firm had done business with Iran, Syria and North Korea, three countries the US has long leveled arms embargoes against) and American and European defense firms also warning it that cooperation could be jeopardized “in certain fields” if Turkey continued those negotiations and purchased that equipment. NATO also argued that the air defense system couldn’t be integrated into NATO’s joint systems and was therefore, at a $4 billion price tag, a gigantic waste of money. The Turkish military thought about acquiring the system despite this fact. (See also Ethan Meick, “China’s Potential Air Defense System Sale to Turkey and Implications for the United States“, China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 18.12.2013).

Our plan is to completely eliminate external dependency on Defense equipment supply with ongoing plans and investments until 2023. — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the International Defence Industry Fair in Istanbul in May 05, 2015, cited in Alexander Murinson, “T-LORAMIDS decision points to Turkey’s strengthening bonds within NATO“, 15.02.2016.

It wasn’t clear how far Turkey would go with these talks, but those strong worded warnings were telling, and were likely noted in Ankara, which remains without the capability to independently deploy such weapons in defense of its airspace.

As Turkey’s patience with the US and Europe seems closer to its limit after the failed coup attempt it might not only seek to further diversify its military (clear steps are already being taken in this direction), but also to actively distance itself from the western powers and the NATO alliance by becoming a more independent and self-reliance power with less constraints and obligations free to pursue whatever policy it believes serves its political, security and strategic interests.

More information
Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu, chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations and director of the Center for International Security Studies and Strategic Research at MEF University in Istanbul stated that Ankara had neither the intention nor the capacity for a dramatic departure from NATO’s defense infrastructure. All along, Turkish officials had planned to leverage its purchasing power to gain the know-how to develop its own long-range missile system and to expand the indigenous capabilities. According to him, Turkey had been forthright about these intentions. It repeatedly pointed that the Chinese were offering a lower price, favorable technology transfer conditions, and early delivery on the first batch of batteries. (Mustafa Kibaroglu and Selim C. Sazak, “Why Turkey Chose, and Then Rejected, a Chinese Air-Defense Missile“, Defense One, 03.02.2016).

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